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1.1 INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS ON THE CHILD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The particular vulnerability of children and their need for specific protection has 
been translated in legal protection under international law. The main source of legal 
protection of the child is provided under human rights law.
1
 Independent of the 
situational background, numerous human rights documents address children’s need 
for protection and their particular vulnerability in substantive terms. Children are 
provided with rights that are intended to protect the material needs of the child, such 
as nutrition, shelter, education and health care. The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) provides for the most child specific protection in substantive terms.
2
 In 
addition to the general protection guaranteed to the child under human rights law, 
specific protection is also provided to children during armed conflict and large scale 
violence. In this regard, human rights law also includes the specific call to protect 
children from being recruited as child soldiers.
3
 The Optional Protocol to the CRC 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict focuses in particular on this 
aspect.
4
 International human rights law and international humanitarian law also 




International criminal law incorporates child specific protection under distinct crime 
headings. The Statutes of the different international criminal courts and tribunals 
vary in this regard. The Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals are the most limited. They 
                                                 
1
  UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children 
and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. A/F95/219 2010, para. 3. Flinterman 2006, 303-313; Ayissi 2002, 5-
16; Hamilton & El-Haj 1997, 1-46; Dixit 2001, at 12-35; Heintze 1995, at 200. 
2
  See, e.g., arts. 9, 22, 24, 27-29 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3. For 
further child specific protection under Human Rights Law, see, e.g., art. 3 of the 2000 Convention 
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labor (ILO Convention no. 182), 2133 UNTS 161; art. 22 of the 1990 African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
3
  See in this regard, art. 38 CRC. 
4
  See, e.g., arts. 1-6 of the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 2173 UNTS 222. 
5
  See, e.g., arts. 14, 17, 23-27, 49-51, 68, 81-82, 85, 89, 94 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War, 75 UNTS 287; arts. 70, 74-75, 76-78 of 
the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3; arts. 4-6 of the 1977 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 








only contain one crime, which explicitly include the victimisation of children as an 
element of crime. This is the crime of transferring children from one group to the 
other as an act of genocide which was copied literally from Article III of the 
Genocide Convention.
6
 A more explicit mention of children as victims of 
international crimes can be found in the Statute of the SCSL. For the first time in 
the history of international criminal law, the Statute of the SCSL criminalises the 
use of child soldiers as a war crime.
7
 Another step further in terms of child 
protection has been achieved with the coming into force of the Rome Statute. The 
Statute enshrines child specific crimes within the elements of the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.
8
 The child specific crimes as actus reus of 
genocide and crimes against humanity do not specify age limits nor do they provide 
other indicia that may concretise the concept of childhood. In contrast, the war 
crime of recruitment does specify age limits. This crime protects children below the 
age of fifteen years.9 
 The forcible transfer of children when constituting an element of the crime of 
genocide (Article 6(e) Rome Statute) and the enslavement of children as a crime 
against humanity (Article 7(2)(c) Rome Statute) do not have child specific age 
limitations. Given the express age limit for recruitment as a war crime, it may be 
inferred that for these crimes, the age limit is the generally accepted age of eighteen 
years of age. This conclusion is in line with the Elements of Crimes (EoC). As 
regards child victims of the forcible transfer as an element of the crime of genocide 
the EoC define that, 
 




In addition to these child specific crimes, there are other international crimes to 
which children often fall victims. Sexual violence and trafficking as crimes against 
humanity constitute two such additional crimes.
11
 Amongst civilians who became 
victims of sexual violence during armed conflict, children, in particular, girls, are 
specifically targeted by perpetrators.
12
 This can to some extent be explained by the 
                                                 
6
  Art. 4(2)(e) ICTY Statute, art. 2(2)(e) ICTR Statute. See for more, Schabas 2000, at 281. 
7
  Art. 4 SCSL Statute states that ‘[c]conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years 
into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities’ is a serious violation 
of international humanitarian law. Justice Robertson was not convinced that this crime was 
considered a crime under customary international law when allegedly committed by Sam Hinga 
Norman, dissenting opinion Justice Geoffrey Robertson, SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), paras. 3-5. 
8
  Arts. 6(e), 7(2)(c), 8)2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii) Rome Statute. 
9
  Arts. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and (e)(vii) Rome Statute. For further information, see, Cottier & Zimmermann 
2008, at 470-475, 496-497. 
10
  Art. 6(e)(5) EoC. 
11
  Ibid., paras. 45-46, 91. See, for instance, arts. 7(1)(g), 7(2)(c), 8(2)(b)(xxii), and 8(2)(e)(vi) Rome 
Statute; art. 2(g) of the Statute of the SCSL. 
12
  The documentation of young boys being the victim of sexual violence is poorly documented, which 
does not alter the fact that young boys become victims of sexual violence. See, e.g., UN General 













Next to the legal protection of the child under international law, the United Nations 
Security Council permanently monitors the situation of children during armed 
conflict. The Council has adopted resolutions and it has taken note of reports 
provided for by the Special-Representative of the Secretary General on Children 
and Armed Conflict.
14
 These resolutions and reports examine the risks and threats 
children face during conflict situations and call in particular for state action.
15
 On a 
regular basis, a specifically established working group of the Security Council for 
children and armed conflict monitors and reports on the recruitment of child 
soldiers.
16
 International attempts on various levels to prevent that children are 
victimised also underline that children are seen as special not only given their 




Considering that international law and state practice mirrors the recognition of 
children’s particular need for protection during peacetime but also in situations in 
which international crimes are being committed, the prosecution of international 
crimes committed against children before international courts and tribunals is well 
embedded. While international prosecutions are thus in line with the overall 
development of protecting children from the consequences of armed conflict and 
large scale violence, the involvement of the child in international criminal 
proceedings also gives rise to new questions which relate to the procedural 
                                                                                                                       
General Assembly resolution 48/157, UN Doc. A/51/306 (1996), para. 93. Honwana 2006, at 58-63; 
Wessels 2006, at 94-101.  
13
  UNICEF, UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 2005, Childhood under Threat, 
www.unicef.org/sowc05/english/sowc05_chapters.pdf, at 45. UN General Assembly, Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. 
A/65/219 (2010), paras. 19-20. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children 
and Armed Conflict underlined in her 2010 report that, ‘[s]exual violence against children, 
particularly in the context of armed conflict, continues to be of utmost concern. Such violations are 
exacerbated in conflict situations by the general security vacuum and the lack of administrative, law 
enforcement and judicial infrastructures, among other factors. Sexual violence is often used to 
achieve military, political and social objectives through, for instance, the targeting of specific 
ethnicities or terrorizing populations for force displacement. Data indicate that children are 
particularly vulnerable to sexual violence in and around refugee and internally displaced population 
settings, and when they are directly associated with armed forces and groups. Child survivors of 
sexual violence suffer both physical and psychological consequences, which are often debilitating. 
This is particularly true for girls who have been raped or forced to “marry” combatants, as well as 
for their children born of rape.’ 
14
  See, e.g., UN Doc. A/68/267 (2013); UN Doc. A/65/256 (2012); UN Doc. A/65/219 (2010); UN 
Doc. S/RES/1882 (2009); UN Doc. S/RES/1612 (2005) ; UN Doc. A/60/335 (2005); UN Doc. 
A/55/163-S/2000/712 (2000); UN Doc. S/1999/957 (1999). 
15
  Ibid.. 
16
  See for instance, UN Doc. A/65/256 (2012), S/2011/793 (2011), UN Doc. A/65/219 (2010), UN 
Doc. A/60/335 (2005). For more specific information, see www.un.org/sc/committees/WGCAAC/. 
17








involvement of the child. Questions which relate to the child sensitivity of ICC 
proceedings constitute the central subject of this research. 
 
1.2 THE CHILD AND THE ICC 
 
Among the international criminal courts and tribunals, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are the first courts which 
specifically focus on crimes committed against children. The SCSL included, 
amongst other charges, the charge of the recruitment of child soldiers in all cases.
18
 
The first case before the ICC, the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
solely charged the war crime of child recruitment.
19
 Trial Chamber I (whose 
decision was upheld by the Appeals Chamber on 1 December 2014) convicted 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for having recruited child soldiers in the conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
20
 Other cases before the ICC have also included 
the war crime of child soldiering in their indictments.
21
 As a consequence of this 
charging policy, children have been involved in the proceedings before the SCSL 
and the ICC in different capacities.
22
 In addition to their involvement as witnesses 
in the proceedings, children can participate as victims of international crimes in the 
criminal and reparation proceedings before the International Criminal Court. 
 
The International Criminal Court is the first permanent international criminal court. 
Prior to the establishment of the ICC, the ad hoc tribunals in the 1990s and hybrid 
courts, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone, played a major role in the 
renaissance of international criminal law.
23
 The primary objective of these 
institutions is of a punitive nature.
24
 Through the prosecution of international crimes, 
the courts and tribunals aim in particular to avoid impunity of such crimes.
25
 This 
purpose is also restated in the Preamble of the Rome Statute of the ICC.
26
 In 
addition to the punitive objective of the earlier criminal courts and tribunals, the 
ICC and international criminal law more generally also serve other purposes, such 
                                                 
18
  See, for instance, SCSL-03-01-T, SCSL-04-15-A; SCSL-04-16-A; SCSL-01-14-A. 
19
  ICC-01/04-01/06-2. 
20
  ICC-01/04-01/06-2842; ICC-01/04-01/06-3121. 
21
  ICC-01/04-01/07-717; ICC-01/04-02/06-2. 
22
  Prior to the establishment of the ICC, children also participated in truth and reconciliation 
proceedings in , for instance, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are 
established on a temporal basis in order to establish a historical record of human rights violations 
and to examine the roots of the conflicts and the consequences of such violations. In order to 
establish the truth, such commissions organise public and closed hearing sessions in which 
statements are taken from all parties involved: victims, witnesses and perpetrators. Individual 
criminal responsibility is thus not an objective of such commissions. See, for example, Hayner 
1994, 597-655; Chapman & Ball 2001, 1-43; Evenson 2004, 730-767; UNICEF 2010a, ix-x. 
23
  Cryer, Friman & Robinson 2010, at 122; Triffterer 2008, at 16-21. Sloane 2007, at 39, Fletcher& 
Ohlin 2005, at 540, Robinson 2003, at 482. 
24
  Sloane 2007, at 39, Fletcher & Ohlin 2005, at 540, Robinson 2003, at 482. 
25
  Van den Wyngaert 2011, 495. 
26








as deterrence, prevention, education and acknowledgement.
27
 These remedial goals, 
and in particular the purpose of acknowledgement introduced a greater role for 
victims before the ICC.  
 As this greater role for victims in the course of the proceedings also entails the 
potential of greater child involvement in ICC proceedings, it is necessary to briefly 
address the underlying debate of victim participation in ICC proceedings in order to 
situate child victim participation within the broader context and debate. 
 
The procedural status of victims of international crimes was limited before the 
earlier institutions. Victims were only involved as witnesses who gave testimony 
during examination and cross-examination.
28
 The Rome Statute provides for 
additional procedural capacities. It enables victims, including children, for instance, 
to become procedural participants pursuing their own interest.
29
 Victim 
participation is not limited to the criminal proceedings. Victims may also participate 
in reparation proceedings which are to be held when alleged perpetrators have been 
found individually responsible before the commission of international crimes.
30
 
Remedial goals and a particular focus on reconstruction of post-conflict societies 
have in this way entered the court room of international criminal proceedings.
31
 
These other purposes and expectations of international criminal justice have put the 
punitive nature of international criminal law and the ICC under pressure. In contrast 
to this strict criminal law approach which is, for instance, also argued in favour for 
by ICC Judge van den Wijngaert, another ICC judge, Judge Odio-Benito upheld a 
victims-orientated approach.
32
 In her separate and dissenting opinion to Trial 
Chamber I’s judgment in the Lubanga case, the judge argued that, 
 
‘that the Majority of the Chamber addresses only one purpose of the ICC trial 
proceedings: to decide on the guilt or innocence of an accused person. However, ICC 
trial proceedings should also attend to the harm suffered by the victims as a result of 
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. It becomes irrelevant, therefore, if the 
prosecution submitted the charges as separate crimes or rightfully including them as 
embedded in the crimes of which Mr. Lubanga is accused. The harm suffered by 
victims is not only reserved for reparations proceedings, but should be a fundamental 




                                                 
27
  Gradoni et al. 2013, at 55-67; Drumbl 2012, 162; Akhavan 2001, at 8; Meron 1994, at 78; 
Bassiouni 1983, at 30. 
28
  Olasolo 2009, at 513-514; Sloane 2007, at 48. 
29
  Art. 68(3) Rome Statute. Donat-Cattin 2008, at 1288; Jorda & Hemptinne 2002; Bitti & Friman 
2001, at 459. 
30
  Art. 75(3) Rome Statute in conjunction with Rules 86, 89 and 90 RPE and Regulation 86 of the 
Regulations of the Court. Henzelin, Heiskanen & Mettraux 2006, at 321-327. 
31
  Keller 2007, at 189-190; also see Fletcher & Ohlin 2005 criticising this development, at 552. 
32
  Van den Wijngaert 2012. 
33








The human rights approach is of the view that the involvement and participatory 
status of victims is as important as the criminal prosecution of alleged perpetrators 
in the course of ICC proceedings.
34
 In contrast to the human rights perspective, 
scholars have argued that international criminal proceedings are not the right forum 
for victims to elaborate on their experiences. It has been suggested that truth 
commissions constitute a better forum for victims’ views. Robinson provides a 
critical analysis of a victim-focused approach in international criminal proceedings. 
This scholar addresses in particular the potential negative implications for the 
accused when a victim-focused approach determines the course of the criminal 
proceedings.
35
 Worth mentioning in this regard is the dissenting opinion of ICC 
Judge Van den Wyngaert in the proceedings against Germain Katanga.
36
 The judge, 
by vehemently disagreeing with the majority decision, upheld that a fair trial for the 
accused constitutes the core objective of ICC proceedings.
37
 This ongoing debate 
has repercussions for the interpretation of the substantive and particularly 
procedural rules of the ICC. It is within this dialectic that the current thesis looks at 
the position of the child in ICC proceedings.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM, STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
 
We can thus witness a growing attention for the child as a victim of international 
crimes. Whereas the child hardly featured in the crimes catalogue of the ad hoc 
tribunals, the SCSL and the ICC Statutes contain more specific child crimes and at 
both courts the prosecutors made use of these provisions. In line with this, and 
possibly as a result of the silence of the law, the ad hoc tribunals did not have a 
child focus in their charging policies. The indictments did not include any child 
specific crimes. A similar increase in attention can be discerned at the procedural 
level. 
 The procedural rules of the ad hoc tribunals hardly refer to the child. Neither 
were children extensively involved in their practice as witness or otherwise. The 
practice changed with the establishment of the SCSL. As the Sierra Leonean 
conflict is known for the wide recruitment of child soldiers and given the inclusion 
of this crime in the Statute, the indictments charged, amongst others, crimes 
committed against children.
38
 Consequently, children also participated quite 
considerably in the procedures of the SCSL as witness. The increased focus on and 
participation of the child at the SCSL may thus well be explained by the character 
of the conflict and by the type of crimes committed. 
 
                                                 
34
  Ibid., paras. 22-35. 
35
  Robinson 2008, at 938, 961.  
36
  ICC-01/04-01/07-3388-Anx. 
37
  Robinson 2003, at 484. ICC-01-04-01/07-3319, paras. 25-36. See also, Wyngaert 2011, at 488; 
Vasiliev 2015. 
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As indicated, the ICC continued this focus on the child in terms of substantive law 
and charging policy. In fact, the charges in the very first case, the case against 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, are limited to the charge of child soldiering. While all 
indictments before the SCSL included the recruitment crime in addition to other 
crimes, the first case before the ICC is unique. The prosecutorial decision to focus 
on the recruitment crime gives room for greater involvement of children in the 
procedure compared to cases in which other crimes have also been charged.
39
 Both 
the SCSL and ICC procedural framework do not include express bars or limitations 
to involve children in the procedures. 
 
The above anticipates, that in addition to children’s role as beneficiaries of 
substantive protection under international law, their status seemed to have gained 
another component: the child as procedural player. Whether the child is also in need 
of particular procedural protection as a result of being a child, has not been 
comprehensively addressed under international law and is therefore the subject of 
this research. The Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and 
Armed Conflict underlined in the 2010 report to the United Nations General 
Assembly the imperative of child participation in transitional justice and in 
particular that  
 
‘procedures to protect the rights of children involved in transitional justice processes 
should include a specific focus on adolescents and should be constituent with the evolving 
capacities of the child.’40  
 
Providing for child participation which is constituent with the evolving capacities of 
the child presupposes in the context of this research that the child is able to increase 




In contrast, under domestic law, the special status of children in both practical and 
legal terms has been translated into special child-sensitive procedures. This is 
particularly the case because children are often not accepted in legal systems as 
subjects with full legal capacity and competence to act.
42
 These procedures 
recognise the inherent difficulties for children to have access to justice and their 
need for particular protection when involved as a procedural actor. Children who 
participate in ICC proceedings may equally be confronted with specific childhood 
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related procedural particularities. These may arise at various stages in the 
proceedings before the ICC. 
 
In light of the aforementioned, the research aim of this is twofold: Firstly, it 
analyses whether and to what extent the proceedings are child-sensitive. Secondly, a 
lack of child-sensitivity might lead to child participation which cannot be 
considered to be in the best interests of the child, meaning in particular that the 
legal or factual consequences of child participation threaten the well-being of the 
child. Consequently, where necessary, this research aims to establish whether 
additional child-specific regulation and awareness is necessary in order to 
accommodate the particular needs of the child.
43
 It thereby also aims to establish 
whether it is at all possible that ICC proceedings are sufficiently child-sensitive. If 
not, it might be necessary to reconsider the possibility that children participate. 
Summarising the foregoing, the concrete objective of this research reads as follows: 
 
The research aims to provide informed insights into whether and to what extent 
participation in ICC proceedings is in the best interests of the child. 
 
When addressing these aims, it is to be kept in mind that, even if victims, including 
children, may participate in the proceedings before the Court and claim reparations, 
the author agrees with the perspective that the ICC has as its primary objective to 
ensure a fair trial for alleged perpetrators. Accordingly, the punitive nature is of 
foremost importance when balancing the best interests of the child to participate 
against the core objective of international criminal justice. One may therefore as 
such still question the principal relevance of child participation in ICC proceedings. 
 In light of this research aim and considering the fact that child development is 
not a static process, the problem statement reads as follows: 
 
To what extent is the ICC procedural framework child-sensitive taking account of the 
evolving capacities of the child? 
 
With a view to shedding light on this problem statement, some concrete research 
questions have been formulated that guide the evaluation in respect of the different 
capacities in which children participate. As child participation in the proceedings 
before the ICC constitutes a matter of fact, one may raise the question whether such 
participation is a welcome development. Is it in the best interests of the individual 
child? Should it be appraised positively if viewed from broader angles such as the 
role of children in processes of post-conflict reconstruction? These questions are not 
purely legal in nature. Instead, they are part of a broader debate that cannot be 
limited to a legal analysis but is also involving other fields such as psychology and 
sociology. With this caveat in mind, the current research intends to contribute to the 
debate by offering legal views and perspectives. It is therefore not aimed at 
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providing final and conclusive answers to these questions but wishes to contribute 
to the debate on whether child participation in different procedural capacities is in 
the best interest of the child. 
 A detailed analysis of other aspects, such as the psycho-social constitution of the 
child during and after armed conflict and how cultural and geographical 
circumstances of a particular case at issue influence the child’s capacity to recover, 
is not the focus of this research. Instead, this research departs from the factual 
observation that children currently participate in judicial proceedings before 
international criminal courts and tribunals. 
 
1.4 TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS 
 
1.4.1 The child in ICC proceedings 
 
Children can participate in the following five procedural capacities in international 
criminal and reparation proceedings at the ICC: 
 
In criminal proceedings: 
 
o child witness  
o child victim 
o child perpetrator 
o child of an (alleged) perpetrator 
 
In reparation proceedings: 
 




Children frequently become witnesses of international crimes during conflict 
situations.
44
 Seeing acts of torture, killing, shelling and shooting constitute typical 
experiences of children who find themselves in situations of armed conflict.
45
 
Witnessing international crimes occurs in three constellations: children are either 
eyewitnesses, become victims themselves or witness because they commit crimes 
themselves.
46
 Children might thus be called into the witness stand in order to give 
testimony on international crimes.
47
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Armed conflicts and situations of large-scale violence lead to numerous child 
victims of international crimes. Children might therefore have an interest to be 
involved in the course of international criminal proceedings. As has been indicated, 
certain international crimes are specifically child-oriented and other crimes, such as 
sexual violence, tend to victimise children in particular. With the establishment of 
the ICC, victims may indeed participate in international criminal proceedings. 
When victims convince the Court that they have suffered harm as a result of a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, they might present their views and concerns 
during the course of the criminal proceedings.
48
 The Rome Statute does not exclude 




Children may also be perpetrators of international crimes.
49
 In particular, children 
are identified as perpetrators of international crimes if they have been recruited as 
child soldiers.
50
 The theoretical international criminal prosecution of child 
perpetrators has been introduced through the establishment of the SCSL. Minors 
that have committed crimes at the age of 15-18 could have been confronted with 
international criminal proceedings
51
 The Prosecutor of the SCSL, however, never 
charged children.
52
 This prosecutorial decision does not alter the fact that the 
question of prosecuting children at international level raises may nevertheless be 
raised. If not before the ICC as a result of Article 26 of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
which excludes persons under 18 from the jurisdiction of the Court, a specifically 
established international criminal court for child perpetrators could constitute a 
form for the prosecution of minors. For this research, this procedural capacity is 
thus not as such relevant. It may, however, have to be taken into account when child 
victims claim reparations while having themselves committed international crimes 
as former child soldiers. 
 
Child of an (alleged) perpetrator 
 
The final capacity in the course of international criminal proceedings relates to the 
child of an (alleged) perpetrator. Children, whose parents are prosecuted before the 
ICC might be confronted with numerous consequences of their parents’ 
involvement. While this procedural capacity is of an indirect nature as it is the result 
of their parents’ (alleged) perpetration of international crimes, decisions taken in the 
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course of the proceedings against their parent might bear consequences for the child 




In addition to the possibility of child participation in the course of the criminal 
proceedings before the ICC, children may also participate in reparation proceedings. 
Prior to the establishment of the ICC, international claims for breaches of 
international humanitarian law could not be brought by victims before an 
adequately mandated international court or tribunal. Human rights bodies have been 
found to be less equipped to adjudicate these claims.
53
 As a result, victims of 
international crimes were for a long time not able to claim reparations for their 
suffering before an international judicial body.
54
 The first conviction before the ICC, 
the conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, paves the way for reparation proceedings. 
As with regard to child participation in the criminal proceedings, the Rome Statute 




Why are child participants to be distinguished from adult participants? The central 
concept of this thesis is the concept of childhood. The definition of this concept is 
under discussion.
55
 The factor age, start of a working life or the completion of 
educational training have been referred to as criteria which determine the end of 
childhood. 
56
 While the end of this period of life and the entrance into adulthood 
might vary, depending on socio-economic aspects, such as living in a developed or 
underdeveloped country it is agreed upon that childhood refers to a particular time 
in life which should provide sufficient room for play, school and a safe and caring 
environment.
57
 Article 1 of the CRC is helpful in defining the benchmark of this 
concept as it provides for an upper age limit. It states that ‘every human being 
below the age of eighteen years’ is considered to be a child.
58
 Accordingly, 
irrespective of the factors of a rather substantive nature, the age of a young human 
being can be considered as a criterion which can be referred to in order to 
distinguish children from adults. 
 
The clear cut definition of article 1 of the CRC seems to be attractive at first sight 
and useful to be transposed to the ICC framework when distinguishing between 
child and adult participation in the proceedings. The Rome Statute and the Rules of 
                                                 
53
  Krieger 2006. 
54
  Zegveld 2003. 
55
  See, for a general discussion, Prucnal 2012, at 70-72; Mousavi, Rastegari, & Nordin 2012. 
56
  Boyden & Levison 2000. 
57
  Brocklehurst 2006, at 8. 
58









Procedure and Evidence refer to the child in various provisions.
59
 However, explicit 
reference to a particular age can only be found twice in the Rome Statute. Firstly, 
Article 26 of the Rome Statute refers to children below the age of eighteen years. 
This provision determines that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over persons 
younger than eighteen years of age. Secondly, the war crime of child recruitment 
criminalises the recruitment of children below the age of fifteen years. The 
remaining provisions refer to the child without further age specification. The 
exclusion of the Court’s jurisdiction from persons below the age of eighteen years 
might reflect an understanding of childhood as being terminated when the age of 
eighteen years is reached. Alternatively, the absence of general criteria that apply to 
the concept of childhood across all provisions also offers leeway to take a more 
encompassing approach, and to differentiate between different stages of childhood, 
such as early, middle childhood and adolescence.
60
 
 Bearing in mind the aforementioned different stages of childhood and 
considering the major focus of international criminal proceedings on the war crime 
of child soldiering, one may argue that children are particularly involved in the 
proceedings during a particular stage of childhood, namely their teenage years or 
young adulthood. Very young children, at least in these cases, are not likely to 
participate as the recruitment of babies or toddlers simply seems to lack any 
purpose as they cannot be expected to be capable of being used for the spectrum of 
tasks child soldiers perform.  
 Yet, in light of the potential of youth and next generations in processes of post-
conflict reconstruction and the explicit limitation of the Court’s jurisdiction to 
persons above the age of eighteen years (Article 26 Rome Statute), child 
participants within the ambit of this research are understood to be those persons 
who have been below the age of eighteen years when the triggering moment of, for 
instance, witnessing international crimes or victimisation, took place. This leads to 
the logical consequence that their procedural status of being a child participant does 
not differ despite the fact of having reached majority before the commencement or 
during the course of the proceedings. It should therefore be mentioned in this regard 
that keeping the term child participant instead of adolescent participant does not 
mean to imply that the current research is limited to minors.
61
 Instead, having 
reached majority while still being involved in ICC proceedings does not alter the 
legal status of being a child participant within the ambit of this research. 
 Thus it is possible, that despite having reached majority, young persons may still 
come into consideration for child specific procedural treatment because they were a 
child at the triggering moment. It is therefore to be examined whether not only 
those who are during the proceedings minors are in need of child-sensitive 
procedural treatment but also whether those who have reached majority are still in 
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need of a child-sensitive approach when the triggering moment took place during 
childhood. 
 
1.4.3 The particular vulnerability of the child 
 
Children are particularly vulnerable human beings. The Preamble of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child points out that,  
 
‘the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards 




According to the Convention, the need for special protection is, vested in two 
childhood-related characteristics, namely children’s physical and mental immaturity. 
These are two child specific features which exist irrespective of the situational 
background of the child. 
 The determination of the degree of the child’s vulnerability is based on various 
factors. The capacity of the child to express and communicate, the dependence on 
adults, reading skills, but also the educational levels of parents are decisive in this 
regard.63 At the same time, not all children are equally vulnerable and children 
cannot always be considered as being the most vulnerable.
64
 It is generally accepted 
that being vulnerable means, that a person is not able to protect him/herself. 
However, this does not imply that vulnerability should be understood as a static 
concept.
 65
 Even if children are understood to be particularly vulnerable as a 
consequence of their physical and mental immaturity, there are children who are 
capable of protecting themselves.66 The varying degrees of child vulnerability do 
not diminish the overall need to distinguish children and adolescents from adults as 
potentially more vulnerable and in need of special procedural protection. The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child held in this regard that children should not be 
seen as mini adults.67  
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1.4.4 The best interests of the child and child-sensitive procedures 
 
The main objective of this research is to examine whether the law and practice of 
the ICC is child-sensitive. But what does child sensitivity mean in relation to ICC 
proceedings? Guidance on what is to be understood under child-sensitivity can be 
found in the principle of the best interests of the child. This principle has been 
codified in article 3 of the CRC. Article 3 CRC provides that, 
 
‘[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’ (emphasis added). 
 
The call that in all actions concerning children the best interests of the child shall be 
a primary consideration presupposes that the actors involved, such as judges, 
prosecutors, defence lawyers and legal representatives, are aware of what is to be 
considered in the child’s best interests, i.e. that the proceedings are child-sensitive. 
 Various aspects are acknowledged as being important when measuring the best 
interests of the child.
68
 The values of societies, for instance, play a decisive role in 
the determination of the best interests.
69
 The culture and religion in a concrete 
situation are also of particular relevance, which may lead to different applications of 
the principle depending on the particular context of a case.
70
 It should also be 
remembered that the assessment of the best interests of the child may be difficult to 
determine when examining today’s and tomorrow’s best interests. The child-
specific difficulty relates to the fact that what today might be considered to be in the 
best interests of the child, may not be considered to be so in the future.
71
 
Furthermore, other issues might override the best interests of the child in the 
decision-making process as the best interests are only a primary consideration.
72
 
 The Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-
friendly justice provide the, to date, most explicit yardstick for assessing the best 
interests of the child. The Guidelines suggest that the assessment should include the 
following elements: 
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‘all other rights of the child, such as the right to dignity, liberty and equal treatment 
shall be respected at all times; a comprehensive approach shall be adopted by all 
relevant authorities so as to take due account of all interests at stake, including 





The Committee on the Rights of the Child recently published a General Comment 
on the interpretation of this principle.
74
 The Committee held that, 
 
‘[t]he concept of the child's best interests is complex and its content must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. It is through the interpretation and 
implementation of article 3, paragraph 1, in line with the other provisions of the 
Convention, that the legislator, judge, administrative, social or educational authority 
will be able to clarify the concept and make concrete use thereof. Accordingly, the 
concept of the child’s best interests is flexible and adaptable. It should be adjusted 
and defined on an individual basis, according to the specific situation of the child or 
children concerned, taking into consideration their personal context, situation and 
needs. For individual decisions, the child's best interests must be assessed and 




The Committee continued stating that, 
 
‘[t]he full application of the concept of the child's best interests requires the 
development of a rights-based approach, engaging all actors, to secure the holistic 





The Committee also stated that, 
 
‘[w]henever a decision is to be made that will affect a specific child, an identified 
group of children or children in general, the decision-making process must include an 
evaluation of the possible impact (positive or negative) of the decision on the child or 
children concerned. Assessing and determining the best interests of the child require 
procedural guarantees. Furthermore, the justification of a decision must show that the 




Bearing the above in mind, child-sensitivity in light of the research aim is in 
particular understood to refer to the degree of the Court’s awareness in law and in 
practice of the procedural particularities of child participants. In order to ensure that, 
if desirable and possible at all, child participation can be considered to be in the best 
interests of the child, a child-sensitive approach is indispensable. This implies that 
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the potential implications of child participation for the individual child but also for 
the proceedings as such are to be taken into account. Child-specific regulation and 
procedural treatment might constitute a tool to determine whether child 
participation is in the best interests. The preceding elaboration of the CRC 
Committee also points out, that the awareness of the child-specific particularities 
should not be limited to the organs of the ICC. Instead, the Court, but equally 
parties and participants should adopt a child-sensitive approach when engaging with 
children in the course of the proceedings. 
 
The research therefore aims to examine in particular, whether the actors involved 
adopt a case-by-case approach when children are involved in ICC proceedings. 
Again, this research is in need of a yardstick to evaluate international practice. 
Bearing in mind that the principle of the best interests could constitute such a 
yardstick, the suggested assessment of the CRC Committee is helpful to be referred 
to. The Committee suggested in particular to assess the best interests as follows: 
 
‘Assessing the child’s best interests is a unique activity that should be undertaken in 
each individual case, in the light of the specific circumstances of each child or group 
of children or children in general. These circumstances relate to the individual 
characteristics of the child or children concerned, such as, inter alia, age, sex, level of 
maturity, experience, belonging to a minority group, having a physical, sensory or 
intellectual disability, as well as the social and cultural context in which the child or 
children find themselves, such as the presence or absence of parents, whether the 
child lives with them, quality of the relationships between the child and his or her 
family or caregivers, the environment in relation to safety, the existence of quality 




The above alludes that the assessment of the best interests is not limited to a legal 
assessment and should generally be made on a case-by-case basis. However, this 
research is premised on the idea that the proceedings can also be tested against this 
yardstick in a more generic and abstract manner. The best interests are thereby to be 
assessed in light of the other rights of the child. An interdisciplinary examination 
scrutinises the non-legal fields of interests, such as the psycho-social constitution of 
the individual child. This assessment, in particular the non-legal aspects, clarifies 
why this research does not aim to provide a definite answer to the overreaching 
question whether child participation in the proceedings is in the best interests of the 
child. It is limited to providing an assessment as far as the legal aspects are 
concerned for all actors involved, in particular judges, when deciding on whether 
and how children should participate. The limitation to an examination of the child-
sensitivity from a legal perspective also explains why this research does not try to 
give a final and definite conclusion on whether child participation should generally 
be encouraged or not. 
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 In sum, child-sensitivity is intended to entail that all actors involved in ICC 
proceedings approach child participants on a case-by-case basis and are aware of 
the special needs of children. In light of the foregoing it is necessary to bear in mind 
that participation in the best interests of the child can only be at stake, if desirable at 
all, when the multiple facets that are inherent to being a child are taken into account.  
 
1.4.5 The evolving capacities of the child 
 
Closely related to the question whether ICC proceedings are to be considered in the 
best interests of the child, is the principle of the evolving capacities of the child.79 It 
has been explained before that childhood is not a static concept. Instead, depending 
on the individual capability and circumstances of the child, the capacities of the 
child might vary. As a matter of fact, a child-sensitive approach generally needs to 
take into account that the capacities of the child are evolving. It is therefore 
necessary to determine the factual capacity of the child at the time of the procedural 
involvement. The principle of the evolving capacities is, again, a principle which 
can be found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 5 CRC states that, 
 
‘States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where 
applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by 
local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to 
provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate 
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the 




The concept of evolving capacities aims to ensure that the limited autonomy of the 
child is gradually to be increased to full autonomy, and thereby enables the child to 
increase his or her own participation in the decision-making process. It ensures in 
this manner the progression of the child from a legal subject, which possesses a 
limited autonomy to a subject whose autonomy is unlimited.
81
 Such an approach 
implies that childhood is seen as a dynamic process of human development.
82
 The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child held in this regard, that  
 





The assessment of the best interests of the child in the light of the evolving 
capacities concept guarantees that the best interests are determined in relation to the 
individual capacity or developmental stadium of the child at the time of decision-
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 Having said this, an increasing capability of the child lessens his or her 
need to be supervised or guided by others.
85
 As a result of the developmental 
progression of the child, the respective actors involved should provide the child 
gradually with greater responsibilities for decisions that affect him or her.
86
 
 Factors that have an impact on the capacity of the child are, for instance, the 
gender of the child, the financial situation, the ethnical or cultural background, the 
geographic position of the child and also socio-political factors, such as living in 
times of armed conflict or large scale violence.
87
 It needs to be noted that the age of 
the child, again, is excluded from these factors.
88
 The underlying reason for 
excluding the age as a relevant factor is reflected in the words of van Bueren, who 
stated that 
 




Bearing the research aim in mind, the assessment of the law and practice of the ICC 
is therefore also made in light of the question whether the actors involved take, as 





1.5.1 Sources and approach 
 
Legal research is usually conducted through an analysis of the lex lata with 
reference to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which lists 
the sources of international law.
90
 This thesis focusses on procedure. This focus on 
procedure has direct ramifications for the approach and identification of relevant 
sources. Given that procedure is jurisdiction-specific, customary international law is 
generally not the most suitable source.
91
 Hence, the analysis in this research will 
mostly rely upon and be informed by treaty law, whereby the ICC legal framework 
obviously functions as the most immediate point of departure. 
 
The primary source for this research is therefore the ICC legal framework. Firstly, 
the Rome Statute is examined. As supplementary source, the Elements of Crimes 
(EoC) and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) are analysed and used in this 
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regard as interpretative guidance for the Rome Statute.
92
 Following the same 
methodology, the Statutes and procedural regulations of the ad hoc tribunals and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone are scrutinised in order to clarify to whether and to 
what extend child participation has been explicitly addressed in the procedural 
regulation. 
 
An additional primary source of this research is human rights law. The relevant 
human rights conventions are scrutinised in light of the question whether these 
documents can provide guidance for child participation in ICC proceedings.
93
 
Important to note is that this source is not understood to be directly applicable but 
may constitutes a primary source which could be referred to as yardstick for child 
participation in ICC proceedings. 
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most relevant human rights 
treaty. Concepts from this Convention are used as a source of inspiration and in 
particular as a yardstick for the determination of the procedural status of the child 
participant in ICC proceedings. Bearing the aim of this research in mind, it refers in 
particular to two core principles of the CRC: the principles of the best interests 
(Article 3) and the evolving capacities of the child (Article 5). As a matter of fact 
these principles are used for guidance in a different judicial and situational setting. 
Firstly, as regards the judicial setting it is held that while the proceedings before the 
ICC are determined by international criminal law, the CRC principles, as set out in 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child mainly address a domestic setting, in 
particular proceedings, such as cases being based on domestic family or adoption 
law. As a result of the different judicial settings, also the legal questions addressed 
differ. In contrast to the proceedings before the ICC, which cover questions relating 
to situations of gross human rights violations, mass victimisation and individual 
criminal responsibility, domestic proceedings with a CRC-component involve 
individual cases brought, for instance, in relation to family law issues. 
 Secondly, the transposition of the two core principles of the CRC can also not be 
considered to be a direct application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as 
the situational background is of major difference. The CRC relates to the largest 
extent to peacetime situations in which children might find themselves. ICC 
proceedings, however, are per definition held in light of a (sometimes even still 
ongoing) armed conflict or situation of large scale violence.  
 Bearing thus the different judicial and situational setting in mind, seeking 
guidance in the CRC core principles of the best interests and evolving capacities of 
the child may not necessarily lead to the same implications for the child participant 
in the course of ICC proceedings. 
 While the Convention itself does not extensively refer to the child as a 
procedural actor, the General Comments of the CRC Committee elaborate upon 
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procedural aspects and implications of child participation in judicial proceedings. 
These comments are therefore looked at in order to determine whether guidance for 
child participation in ICC proceedings can be found despite their non-binding force. 
The almost universal acceptance of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
stands for a broad recognition of the rights of the child as entailed by the 
Convention.
94
 It is recognised though that principles and concepts being introduced 
by the CRC may not always be directly applicable since they are tailored to be used 
in the domestic setting. There may thus be a need to transpose the concepts and 
adjust them to the specific features of an international setting.
95
 
 The fact that these documents, including the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, are mainly drafted for individual cases in a domestic and in particular 
peacetime context does not necessarily constitute a problem or constraint. 
Procedural particularities of the child participant might, after all, mainly exist as 
they might be inherent to being a child – a developmental status which is 
distinguished from adulthood. The elaboration on the concept of childhood also 
stipulates in this regard, that children are to be distinguished from adults. This 
distinction has not been found to exist as a result of a particular situational setting, 
such as a peacetime environment or a domestic setting. It is recognised that children 
might be considered to be in need of particular protection because of factors which 
are inherent to being a child, regardless of whether they participate in domestic or 
international proceedings. 
 
Next to the legal and other authoritative documents referred to, the case law of the 
International Criminal Court constitutes the second source of this research. While 
Article 38(1)(d) classifies judicial decisions as a subsidiary source, it is, due to the 
major silence of the relevant treaty law, of particular importance for this research. 
The case analysis is thereby not limited to the decisions of the ICC, but 
encompasses as a supplementary or comparative guiding source, the case law of the 
other international criminal courts and tribunals. Equally, questions which arose in 
domestic proceedings in relation to the child participant in criminal and reparation 
proceedings are examined if relevant and useful. For the same purpose, the case law 
of human rights courts is referred to as yardstick and inspiration for a comparative 
analysis of the procedural particularities of the child participant.  
 
As a third and also supplementary source for this research, scholarly writing is 
examined. A constraint with regard to this source is reflected in the limited 
availability of scholarly writing on child participation in international criminal and 
reparation proceedings. Scholarly writing in related fields of research is therefore 
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used for a comparison. Academic literature on the procedural status of the 
individual under international law, in particular on victim participation in ICC 
proceedings is available. Similar problems which have generally occurred in 
relation to victim participation, for instance, might bear particular consequences for 
the child participant and are therefore interesting to be used for a comparison and 
further inspiration.  
 
1.5.2 Relevance of human rights law in ICC proceedings 
 
The relevance of human rights law in ICC proceedings finds its justification in the 
interrelationship between human rights law and international criminal law. While 
human rights law primarily aims to protect the rights of individual human beings 
against states, international criminal law first and foremost intends to prevent 
impunity of individual perpetrators for violations of such rights in situations of 
gross human rights violations and mass victimisation.
 96
 This means in concreto that 
violations which constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide fall 
within the ambit of international criminal law.
97
 Safferling states in this regard that: 
 
‘[h]uman rights are thus protected through criminal prosecution. […] Yet the concept 




In relation to ICC proceedings, the choice to be inspired by human rights and in 
particular children’s rights and to use concepts developed in this area of law as a 
yardstick is informed and endorsed by Article 21 of the Rome Statute. Article 
21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute provides that the Court shall apply international 
treaties. Paragraph 3 calls upon the Court to ensure that,  
 
‘the application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with internationally recognized human rights.’ 
 
The exact implications of this provision have been discussed extensively in 
scholarly writing. It has been argued, that Article 21 of the Rome Statute is not to 
be understood to imply that the ICC is bound to apply those treaties as such.
99
 
Instead, it is suggested that reference to international treaties by the ICC is a 
possibility for the Court to be assisted by such treaties when formulating a 
decision.
100
 It has been pointed out in this regard that,  
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‘[w]hile the distinction between interpretation and application is not always easy to 
make, it is clear that the Court is duty bound (‘must’) to interpret the Statute 




Accordingly, based upon Article 21(1)(b) and (3) of the Rome Statute, the ICC is 
invited to interpret the Rome Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence in 
light of other international treaties. The Court may therefore rule upon child 
participation in light of the internationally recognised interpretation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Using for this research the core principles of 
the CRC as a yardstick for child participation in ICC proceedings does not therefore 
constitute an approach which is either farfetched or in conflict with the sources the 
Court may rely upon when formulating a decision. 
 The possibility that Article 21(3) invites the use of human rights as a yardstick 
for an assessment of ICC law and practice has also been addressed by Arsanjani. 
She pointed out that, 
 
‘[w]hile the original intention behind this paragraph may have been to limit the 
court’s powers in the application and interpretation of the relevant law, it could have 
the opposite effect and broaden the competence of the court on these matters. It 
provides a standard against which all the law applied by the court should be tested. 
This is sweeping language, which, as drafted, could apply to all three categories in 
Article 21. For instance, if the court decides that certain provisions of the Elements 
of Crimes or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are not compatible with the 




Sluiter also seems to prefer such approach, as he stated that Article 21(3) of the 
Rome Statute, 
 





Fletcher and Ohlin argued in relation to Article 21(3) that, 
 
‘[t]hough this phrase obviously refers to the rights of the accused, it can also be read 





A more modest and criminal law approach has been suggested by Grover. She 
pointed out by reference to the drafting history that this provision was primarily 
drafted with the intention of ensuring the principle of legality and the fairness of the 
                                                 
101
  Vagias 2011, at 83. 
102
  Arsanjani 1999, at 29. 
103
  Sluiter 2009, at 466. 
104








proceedings for the alleged perpetrator. Broadening the protection of others, such as 
victims, has, according to the author, not been the intention of the drafters.
105
 
 Delmas-Marty, by contrast, suggested that reference and inspiration from human 
rights law is not limited to the principle of legality and fair trial for the accused. She 
held that, 
 
‘[t]his provision adds interactions between international criminal law and 
international human rights law […] and grants official status to cross-references 
between these bodies of law. But it may also introduce a hierarchy in favour of 
human rights, while international judges have until how rejected any such hierarchy. 
[…] The mechanism of Article 21(3) […] could encourage them to give greater 




As the yardstick of human rights law in this research is predominantly suggested for 
an interpretation of the procedural provisions concerning child participation in ICC 
proceedings and not for an interpretation of the substantive provisions that aim to 
protect victims, including children, from international crimes, one may assume that 
fair trial concerns are not as likely as regards the interpretation of the substantive 
law. This assumption, however, cannot be relied upon without further research as 
one can imagine that also a victim-oriented interpretation of the procedural 
provisions might indeed give rise to fair trial concerns. While this question is not 
part of the current research due to its general nature, it is a question to be kept in 
mind within the overall discussion of victim participation in ICC proceedings. 
 
The case law of the International Criminal Court has also addressed the possibility 
to use human rights law as yardstick – be it without explicitly distinguishing 
between the substantive and procedural provisions under the ICC system. Direct 
reference to human rights law has indeed also been made with regard to victims. In 
the decision of 18 January 2008, Trial Chamber I ruled that, 
 
‘[i]n light of Article 21(3) of the [Rome] Statute, and taking into consideration the 
decision of the Appeals Chamber that it “makes the interpretation as well as the 
application of the law applicable under the Statute subject to internationally 
recognised human rights”, the Trial Chamber has considered the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations 
of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 




The Chamber explicitly referred to Articles 3 and 12 of the CRC as relevant 
provisions which need to be considered for victims’ participation.
108
 The reference 
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of the Court itself to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and related human 
rights documents indicates that, where necessary, the Court does refer to human 
rights law in relation to others than the accused.
109
 In this tenor, Schabas pointed 
out that, 
 
‘[h]uman rights sources have proven to be particularly useful in developing issues 
relating to victim participation and protection. In this context, reference has been 
made to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as to so-called soft law 
instruments such as the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power and the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 




Accordingly, the Rome Statute, ICC practice and scholarly writing permit the 
approach chosen in this research, namely to use the CRC and related documents as 
a yardstick for an evaluation of ICC practice in relation to the child participant. 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
This book is divided into three parts. Pursuant to the primary aim of this research 
(the examination of the child-sensitivity of the ICC procedure), Part I (criminal 
proceedings) and Part II (reparation proceedings) address the procedural 
particularities of the child participant. Both parts focus on the question whether and 
to what extent ICC proceedings are child-sensitive. The analysis of the law and 
practice focusses in particular on the question to what extent procedural 
insensitivities exist when children access and are involved in ICC proceedings. 
Pursuant to the second research aim (to determine whether there is a need for child-
specific regulation), the examination of the procedural status of the child within 
each capacity seeks to provide not only an overview of the procedural rights and 
protection of the child, but also to scrutinise those fields in which additional 
procedural regulation, child-focused awareness and practice is needed. 
 As the procedural particularities might vary depending on the specific 
procedural capacity in which children are involved, each capacity is addressed in a 
separate chapter. Chapter Two analyses the procedural capacity of the child witness. 
Questions relating to the legal status and credibility of the child witness are 
addressed. Chapter Three focuses on the child as participating victim. It examines 
child-specific procedural particularities which are in particular the result of the 
child’s limited legal capacity. Questions relating to the application criteria and the 
procedure as regards the ability to file an application on his/her own behalf or the 
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possibility to be represented by a legal representative in the course of the 
proceedings are also addressed. Chapter Four looks at the possibility of the 
procedural capacity of the child perpetrator and the derived procedural capacity of 
the child of a(n) (alleged) perpetrator. Subsequently, Chapter Five scrutinises the 
child in international reparatory justice mechanisms. Particular attention is paid to 
the law and practice of the International Criminal Court in relation to child 
claimants. Finally, Part III provides a concluding and comparative evaluation of the 
procedural capacities of the child in the proceedings before the ICC. It connects and 
evaluates the core conclusions reached within each chapter and offers some 
overreaching reflections on the position of the child as procedural actor in 
international criminal law (Chapter Six). As a final point, the research concludes 
with a view to the future and in particular calls for further research and procedural 





























Witness testimony in international criminal proceedings is a crucial but not 
unproblematic means by which evidence is provided. While the criminal 
prosecutions before the Nuremberg Tribunal largely relied on documentary 
evidence, a shift to using eye-witness testimony occurred before the later 




Child witness testimony can be expected in international criminal proceedings when 
children are the direct victims of the crimes that are prosecuted. A child may also be 
able to provide insider information on other alleged crimes as a result of his or her 
specific and unique knowledge. It will be analysed in this chapter whether child 
witness testimony might encounter additional procedural difficulties compared to 
adult testimony which might deem it necessary that child-sensitive procedural 
treatment is provided for. This chapter presupposes that adult testimony prevails in 
proceedings which do not entail indictments of child focused crimes or in 
proceedings where crimes have been charged about which children cannot provide 
insider information. This means that child witness testimony is expected especially 
in cases in which, for instance, the recruitment of child soldiers below the age of 
fifteen years is charged. And indeed, as it will be seen, children, more specifically 
(alleged) former child soldiers have testified at the different international courts and 
tribunals.  
 
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is known for the tremendous 
numbers of child soldiers.
112
 The first case before the ICC is unique as the ICC 
Prosecutor chose to charge Thomas Lubanga Dyilo solely with the crime of 
recruitment. This prosecutorial decision underlines that the Prosecutor deemed it 
necessary to focus on crimes committed towards children in armed conflict. Calling 
children to the witness stand in such cases seems to be considered a conditio sine 
qua non and inherent to a prosecutorial strategy in order to prove the charged crime. 
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Such practice alludes that first-hand evidence from former child soldiers is likely to 
constitute one of the most direct methods of proof. 
 
A child who has witnessed atrocities may thus be able to provide information which 
parties or participants in international criminal proceedings wish to introduce as 
evidence into the court record.
113
 Bearing this in mind and since there is no bar to 
child testimony in the Rome Statute or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
children may be called to testify. Age is not referred to as a potentially excluding 
factor for testimony. Rule 65 RPE only states in this regard that ‘[a] witness who 
appears before the Court is compellable by the Court to provide testimony […].’ 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the relevant provisions and practice governing 
witness testimony in ICC proceedings. Two research questions guide this chapter. 
Firstly, do child-specific provisions exist or should they be developed? Secondly, 
are child-sensitive interpretations given or needed to apply the general rules to child 
witnesses? 
 
The chapter commences with an overview of the international practice followed by 
an analysis of the general and child-specific rules governing witness testimony. As 
the most extensive practice of calling children into the witness stand occurred 
during the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, this case is of particular 
relevance for the legal analysis in the current chapter. In this regard, questions 
relating to the capability of the child to provide informed consent, a potential need 
for child-specific protective measures and the danger of self-incrimination are 
addressed. Specific attention is paid to the risk of self-incrimination when children 
testify as the exclusion of the prosecution of minors under the Rome Statute does 
not prevent domestic criminal proceedings against alleged minor perpetrators. After 
this examination, the research assesses the trustworthiness of children and the 
impact of conflict situations as two potential factors which might influence the 
credibility of the child witness. It investigates in particular whether the ICC, the 
Court which is focussed upon in this research, refers to these two factors as grounds 
for the unreliability of child witness testimony. The chapter continues with an 
overview of those measures which could enhance the credibility of child witness 
testimony, in particular witness familiarisation and age determination. This analysis 
thereby pursues to provide insights to the underlying question whether the rules 
should be applied differently compared to adults when the child witness testifies. 
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2.2 CHILD WITNESSES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
Until the first indictments before the ICC, child witnesses were either not at all or to 
a very limited extent called to testify in international criminal proceedings. In 
addition to the practice of international criminal courts, child witnesses testified 




 Publicly available information on the overall numbers of child witnesses is not 
easy to access. On the one hand, exact numbers are difficult to track as a result of 
protective measures applied in the course of the proceedings.
115
 On the other hand, 
the respective Registries did not publish statistics on child witnesses. Neither were 
they willing to share this information upon request. An estimation of the number 
can, nevertheless, be traced from decisions taken within the course of the 
proceedings and also judgments. 
 
Before the ICTY, only two young witnesses gave testimony while in total more 
than 6,000 witnesses testified.
116
 In the Galić case, for instance, a witness gave 
testimony on how she was injured by a bullet.
117
 Children were not called to the 
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witness stand before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
118
 The limited 
amount of practice indicates that child witness testimony was not a widespread 
practice before the ad hoc tribunals. 
 
A larger, though still limited and, compared to the overall number of witnesses, 
rather small number of child witnesses gave testimony before the SCSL. Until June 
2009, among the more than 500 hundred witnesses, twenty former child soldiers 
had given testimony.
119
 Accordingly, child testimony before the SCSL was limited 
to the direct victims of international crimes. 
 
Different conclusions can be drawn from the pending cases before the ICC – in 
particular from the practice of the competent Chambers and the Office of the 
Prosecutor in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and the combined cases 
against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. In these cases the 




The first case before the ICC, the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, is of 
particular importance in this context. In this case, children were the direct victims of 
the single crime charged, the recruitment of child soldiers. In order to achieve a 
conviction for the recruitment of children below the age of fifteen, an essential part 
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of the prosecutorial strategy was to call victim witnesses who could testify on their 
personal experiences as former child soldiers.
121
 Consequently, a high number of 
child witnesses gave in-court testimony.
122
  
 The importance of the statements of child witnesses in ICC proceedings is also 
reflected in the decisions confirming the charges: Pre-Trial Chamber I in the 
Lubanga case, for instance, repeatedly referred to statements provided by former 
child soldiers.
 123
 At the trial stage of the same case, one third (9 out of 28) of the 
Prosecution witnesses were young former child soldiers.
124
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 The practice of the SCSL and the ICC establishes that, thus far, children gave 
testimony in cases against alleged perpetrators who were responsible for the war 
crime of recruiting child soldiers. Furthermore, all institutions have in common that 





Currently, it is too early to draw definite conclusions as regards the percentage of 
child witness testimony compared to adult testimony. Tendencies are visible. 
International practice alludes that the prosecution teams tend to call witnesses other 
than children for crimes that do not particularly address child victims. The overview 
of the international practice also shows that the overall number of child witnesses 
called in international proceedings is increasing while not constituting a majority 
compared to other witness testimony. 
 
2.3 RULES GOVERNING WITNESS TESTIMONY DURING TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
Rules governing witness testimony during trial proceedings serve as the point of 
departure for an analysis of the legal status of the child witness. In turn, both, the 
general rules applying to witness testimony and the few regulations which are child-
specific are for this reason briefly described.  
 
Under the Rome Statute, the Prosecution may call witnesses.
126
 Equally, one of the 
core rights of the accused is the right to call for the presence and examination of 
witnesses.
127
 Article 64(6)(b) of the Rome Statute empowers the Court to call 
witnesses. The provision states that the Trial Chamber may, 
 
 ‘[r]equire the attendance and testimony of witnesses […]. 
 
It is debated whether this provision, in conjunction with the earlier mentioned Rule 
65 RPE can be understood to compel witnesses to provide testimony.
128
 In contrast 
to the silence of the Rome Statute and the Respective Rules in this regard, the Rules 
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The first practice of the ICC mirrors that witnesses, other than the suspect or the 
accused, have not been compelled to provide testimony.
130
 It thus seems that the 
Court follows the principle of the voluntary appearance of witnesses in its 
practice.
131
 In this regard, Schabas also underlined that children, like any other 
witnesses, have to appear on a voluntary basis before the Court and cannot be 




Prior to their testimony, witnesses have to make the solemn undertaking that they 
will speak the truth.
133
 Paragraph 2 of Rule 66 RPE provides an exception for child 
witness testimony. It states that, 
 
‘A person under the age of 18 or a person whose judgment has been impaired and 
who, in the opinion of the Chamber, does not understand the nature of a solemn 
undertaking may be allowed to testify without this solemn undertaking if the 
Chamber considers that the person is able to describe matters of which he or she 
has knowledge and that the person understands the meaning of the duty to speak 
the truth.’ 
 
A particular situation exits when victims are called to give testimony. As a result of 
the novelty of victim participation in the criminal proceedings before the ICC which 
is addressed later (Chapter Three), a selected number of witnesses may, as 




 The ICC recognised that some witnesses may hold a so-called dual status – 
individuals who qualify as victims within the meaning of Rule 85 RPE and who are 
at the same time called as witnesses are classified as victim-witness.
135
 The 
participation of victims, including children, enjoying a dual status gives rise to 
procedural issues which are particularly related to their protection and 
communication between the parties, participants and organs of the Court. Since this 
particular aspect of dual status witnesses is of a more general nature and therefore 
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2.4 ABILITY TO PROVIDE INFORMED CONSENT AND THE PROTECTION OF 
THE CHILD WITNESS 
 
The practice of international criminal courts and tribunals established that children 
participate in the capacity of child witnesses. It will be established in turn that the 
ability to provide informed consent and the protection of the child constitute the two 
pillars of their participation. The questions addressed in relation to the ability to 
provide informed consent of the child are formulated as follows: what are the rules 
on consent to testify and consent to disclose medical records? How are these rules 
interpreted by the Court, and do we need new rules or a more child-sensitive 
interpretation? As regards the protection of the child witness, it is examined what 
protective measures exist to protect the child against re-traumatisation, the accused 
and self-incrimination. How are these rules interpreted and applied in practice, and 
do we need a more child-sensitive approach? 
 
2.4.1 Informed consent of the child witness 
 
The ability of the child witness to give consent is governed if not even limited by a 
number of legal matters. Firstly, testifying in ICC proceedings presupposes that the 
child witness is able to provide informed consent to testify. Secondly, as child 
testimony thus far only occurred in relation to children as direct victims of the 
crime of recruitment, the determination of the child’s age calls for particular 
attention in relation to the child’s consent to disclose medical records. Consent to 
disclose medical records is important as the crime definition of the recruitment 
crime requests that it is proven that the victim has been below the age of fifteen 
years at the moment of victimisation. Without the disclosure of age determination 
results it might be impossible to prove beyond reasonable doubt that this particular 
element of crime is fulfilled. 
 
The need to obtain an informed decision has only occasionally been explicitly 
addressed in the procedural rules of the International Criminal Court. Remarkably, 
not the child’s but the parent’s or legal guardian’s consent is referred to. In order to 
question children, the Prosecution is explicitly obliged to obtain the consent of the 
caretaker of the child. 137  Regulation 38 of the Regulations of the office of the 
Prosecutor states that, 
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‘[w]hen a person is under the age of eighteen, the Office shall obtain consent [to 
testify] from his or her parents, guardians or other relevant adult before questioning. 
In considering whether to question such a person, the Office shall take into account 




The legal incompetence of children to give an informed decision with regard to 
their participation as child witnesses is also reflected in the Regulations of the 
Registry. The admission of child witnesses into the Court’s protection programme, 
for instance, which is decided upon by the Registrar, requests the prior consent of 
the representative of the child. Regulation 96(5) of the Regulations of the Registry 
states that, 
 
‘[b]efore being included in the protection programme, the person or – where the 
person is under the age of eighteen or otherwise lacks the legal capacity to do so – 
his or her representative, shall sign an agreement with the Registry.’ 
 
The wording does not clarify whether the representative of the child is solely 
understood to be the next of kin or legal guardian of the child or whether the legal 
representative is also recognised as being competent to provide such consent. 
Unquestioned seems to be that children themselves are not legally competent in this 
regard. As a result, the procedural regulations under the Rome Statute require that 
either the parent, the legal guardian or other relevant adult provides informed 
consent to the child’s testimony. A need to gain the informed consent of the child 
concerned is not mentioned in the respective regulations. 
 
The requirement to obtain prior consent from a parent or legal guardian as 
established in Regulation 38 has not always been recognised to be indispensable by 
the Prosecution. Prior to the entry into force of the Regulations of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, it has been argued by the Office in the Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui case that, 
 
‘there was no legal requirement in the Court’s judicial framework requiring the 
consent of a parent or guardian prior to interviewing a witness under eighteen years 
of age. The Prosecution further explained that despite the absence of such 





The Defence counsel, on the other side, challenged in the same case that, 
 
‘the statements of witnesses who were minors on the ground that the interviews of 
these witnesses were conducted without certain procedural safeguards in place. In 
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particular, the Defence for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui argues that: (i) Witness 28, who 
is a minor, was interviewed without the prior consent of a guardian; (ii) as to 
Witness 157, it is unclear if the person who consented to the witness’s interview had 
the authority to give his consent; (iii) although Witness 279’s statement indicated 
that it was taken after consent had been given, no information was provided as to the 
capacity of that person to give his consent. The Defence […] asserted that because 
minors are especially vulnerable, the consent and presence of a legal guardian is a 




In contrast to the later adopted procedural rules and practice, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
concluded that, 
 
‘no statutory provision makes the prior consent of a parent or a guardian a condition 
for a child’s testimony. In addition, in regions which have been or are being ravaged 
by conflict, parental consent can often be unavailable due to, inter alia, the 
disappearance of the child’s parents, the separation of the child from his parents in 
the course of the conflict and/or the death of the child’s parents. In the present case, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Prosecution had no legal obligation under the 
Statute or the Rules to do so, it took additional measures to secure the consent of a 




Does the above allude that neither the consent of the child witness nor the consent 
of the caretaker is necessary to be obtained when children are involved in ICC 
proceedings? Furthermore, can the child’s or caretaker’s consent never be 
considered to be sufficient in individual cases? 
 
Extensive legal research addresses the elements of informed consent. Difficulties in 
defining this doctrine nevertheless remain.
 142
 The Nuremberg Code of 1947, as the 
first internationally recognised document, codifies this doctrine as one of its 
principles.
143
 The Code underlines that,  
 
‘[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that 
the person involved should have the legal capacity to give consent; should be so 
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of 
any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching or other ulterior form of 
constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of 
the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an 
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The elements of this definition are addressed in more detail by Meisel and Roth, 
who argue that the doctrine of informed consent is comprised of five components, 




As regards the first component it is required that children, in order to formulate a 
decision based on informed consent, be provided with the information needed to 
understand the implications of their decision.  
 Closely related to the above are the second and third component: the child’s 
competency to provide informed consent and its capacity to understand the 
implications of this act. 
 With regard to the competency of the child, it is noted that an increasing 
capability of the child calls for more child involvement and lessens his or her need 
to be supervised or guided by others and thereby not being involved in the decision-
making process.
146
 As a result of the developmental progression, the child should 
gradually be provided with greater responsibilities for decisions that affect him or 
her.
147
 One should recall in this regard that the analysis of the evolving capacities of 
the child (Chapter One) underlines that a general presumption of children being 
able to understand the given information is difficult to make – an assumption which, 
by contrast, is usually made with regard to adults. Factors that have an impact on 
the capacity of the child to comprehend the implications of providing consent are, 
for instance, the gender of the child, the financial situation, the ethnical or cultural 
background, the geographic position of the child and also socio-political factors.
148
 
The age of the child is not among these factors.
149
 Closely related to the individual 
capability of the child is his or her ability to foresee the consequences of the 
decision (in particular in relation to potential self-incrimination, section 2.4.4). The 
remaining two components request that the decision to provide informed consent is 
not only taken, but is taken voluntarily.  
 Under numerous national jurisdictions, children, particularly those who are very 
young, such as babies and toddlers, are frequently seen as not being legally 
competent to provide an informed consent. Instead, the consent is to be obtained 
from parents or legal guardians.  
 The circumstances of the proceedings before the ICC, such as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, lead to situations in which these care takers may not be at 
the disposal of the child. Difficulty contacting these caretakers could give rise to 
procedural difficulties when a party intends to call a child witness. Indeed, it may 
not be possible at all for a legal representative, the Prosecution or Defence counsel 
to approach the parents and caretakers.
150
 The question therefore arises whether and 
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if so, under which circumstances children themselves can give informed consent to 
testify or disclose medical records in ICC proceedings? 
 
Bearing the above in mind, it should also be remembered that, at the same time, 
Chapter One pointed out that the children involved in ICC proceedings, thus far, 
have been mainly adolescents and not very young children. It can therefore be held 
that the need to obtain informed consent of child witnesses in ICC proceedings 
mainly arises from two particular circumstances. 
 Firstly, as anticipated before, when the parents or legal guardians are not at the 
disposal of the child – a scenario that is not unlikely during or in the aftermath of 
armed conflicts.  
 Secondly, the informed consent is to be obtained from the child when a conflict 
of interest is likely to exist between the child and the caretakers. This possibility is 
not unlikely as a similar need exists in national proceedings which can, to a certain 
extent be compared with the proceedings before the ICC. This is the case with 
domestic adoption cases. A conflict of interest between the parent and the child has 
been an issue in such cases.
151
 Similar situations might arise before the ICC. This is 
because a conflict of interest between, e.g., a former child soldier and his or her 
caretaker is not unlikely to occur when parents or legal guardians refuse to support 




That there might indeed be a need to obtain the consent of a child has already been 
recognised in the course of proceedings before the SCSL. It has been acknowledged 
in particular that the child’s consent is to be obtained in addition to parental 
consent.
153
 UNICEF prepared the Principles for child protection and participation 
in transitional justice. The Principles request that, 
 
 ‘[c]hildren have the right to participate in decisions affecting their lives. The 
Participation of children should be voluntary, with the informed consent of the child 
and a parent or guardian.
154 
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An indication that the Victims and Witnesses Unit is also of the view that a child’s 
consent might be necessary to be obtained is visible in relation to the disclosure of 
medical records. A report of the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the ICC established 
that the disclosure of medical records is clearly to be consented to by the child and 
the next of kin or legal guardian of the minor child. It is not sufficient to only obtain 
the consent of the legal caretaker.  
 
‘When seeking informed consent to disclose medical records, the patient should be 
informed of the nature of the information to be revealed, to whom it will be revealed, 
the purpose for which the information will be used and the consequences. In order to 
be able to provide informed consent the individual, or in the case of a minor also the 
legal guardian, should be able to comprehend, retain, believe and balance the 




While the foregoing example refers to the need to obtain in addition to the 
caretaker’s consent the informed consent from the child in order to disclose medical 
records, one can raise the question whether the combined consent of the adult and 
the child should not generally be preferred when the minor cannot be expected to be 
capable of providing an informed decision on his or her own. 
 
More recently, UNICEF similarly underlines the need to obtain the consent of the 
child witness.
156
 Does this mean that both the child and the adult consent is to be 
given, or, alternatively, could, as has just been anticipated, there also be situations 
in which the consent of the child is sufficient? The latter implies that there could be 
situations in which adult consent is not necessary at all.  
 Bearing in mind that the evolving capacities of the child are understood to be 
dynamic, it is indeed imaginable that adult consent could be dispensable. Secondly, 
though related to the above, is the question whether in situations in which adult 
consent is necessary, this consent is limited to the next of kin or legal guardian. 
Such limitation could be problematic as persons from these two categories might 
not necessarily be at the disposal. It might also be the case, as has been elaborated 
upon before, that a conflict of interest exists between the child and the next of kin or 
legal guardian. It is then necessary to examine whether, and if so, which persons 
would be suitable to provide the necessary consent. Community members or child 
rights NGO’s could, for instance, come into consideration. 
 One may conclude that the need to obtain the consent of the next-of-kin or legal 
guardian when adolescents wish to participate as witnesses can, bearing in mind the 
evolving capacities of the individual minor, not generally be upheld. It rather seems 
to be adequate to examine on a case-by-case basis whether such adult consent is 
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dispensable when a child could indeed be presumed to be able to provide informed 
consent. 
 
2.4.2 Protection of the child witness 
 
The need to protect witnesses prior and during testimony in international criminal 
proceedings is obvious. Taking into account that witness testimony before the 
International Criminal Court will generally be conducted during conflict or post-
conflict, witnesses are in need of procedural protection in order to prevent that their 
testimony threatens their well-being.
157
 This threat may not only arise from the 
presence of the accused, but may also, considering the potential risk-of 
retraumatisation, exist when actors who engage with the witness, such as the Judges, 
Prosecutors, the Registry, in particular staff from the Victims and Witnesses Unit 
(VWU) and lawyers do not adequately address and accommodate the witness. The 
Rome Statute and the respective rules regulate to a certain extent the protection of 
witnesses. Uncertainty exists, however, as regards the question when exactly is 




Particular in relation to child witnesses and in addition to the general aspects and 
concerns relating to witness protection, there might be a special need that the 
involvement of the child witness in the course of the investigation phase but also 
when the child appears in the court room is accommodated by child-sensitive 
protective measures. Disregarding the child’s need to benefit from particular 
measures of protection might not only entail the risk of re-traumatisation during 
testimony, but also prevent the child from giving a credible testimony. In order to 
minimise the negative implications of being questioned on the traumatic 
experiences and being close to the accused, protective measures may constitute an 
adequate and necessary tool which aims to comfort the child witness in the court 
room. 
 
An early example of the awareness regarding the need to apply child-specific 
procedures and in particular protective measures can be found in the mandate of the 
Liberian and Sierra Leonean TRC. Sections 24 and 26 of the Liberian mandate state 
that, 
 
 ‘[t]he TRC shall consider and be sensitive to issues of human rights violations, 
gender and gender-based violence […] and that special mechanisms are employed to 
handle women and children victims and perpetrators, not only to protect their dignity 
and safety but also to avoid retraumatization. […] The TRC shall take into account 
the security and other interests of victims and witnesses when appearing for hearing, 
design witness protection mechanisms on a case-by-case basis as well as special 
programs for children and women both as perpetrators and victims under burdens of 
                                                 
157
  Eikel 2012, at 97-98. 
158









trauma, stigmatization, neglect, shame, ostracization, threats, etc. and others in 
difficult circumstances who may wish to recount their stories either in privacy or 




Turning next to the legal regime of protective measures under the ICC system, 
Article 68(1) points out in this regard that the Court is called upon 
 
  ‘to take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological 
well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.’ 
 
In accordance with the principal rule which is provided for in Rule 86 RPE, the 
Court should take into account the needs of all witnesses, in particular children. In 
this regard, the Victims and Witnesses Unit has an important task. The VWU is 
mandated to assist the Court in the protection of witnesses and victims who appear 
in the courtroom.
160
 The Unit should, in particular, 
 
‘give due regard to the particular needs of children, […]. In order to facilitate the 
participation and protection of children as witnesses, the Unit may assign, as 
appropriate, and with the agreement of the parents or the legal guardian, a child-
support person to assist a child through all stages of the proceedings.’
161 
 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC provide for a variety of general 
protective measures. Upon request of the parties or participants, the relevant 
Chamber may, for instance, order the redaction of identifying information and the 
use of voice distorting technology – measures which could be ordered in order to 
prevent risks for the witness as the identification of the witness by the accused 
could threat the well-being of the witness.
162
 Article 68(2) of the Rome Statute 
explicitly calls for in camera proceedings when children give testimony – a 
potential method which could be applied in order to prevent the child witness from 
being re-traumatised. Other measures which could be applied when children give 
testimony can be found in Article 69(2) of the Rome Statute. This provision allows 
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‘the giving of viva voce (oral) testimony or recorded testimony of a witness by 
means of video or audio technology, as well as the introduction of documents or 
written transcript.’ 
 
In addition, the RPE explicitly refer to children as witnesses who might be in need 
of special measures such as in camera, redaction of identifying information or ex 
parte hearings.
163
 Rule 88 also refers to special protective measures which may in 
particular be applied to traumatised children. In this regard, a legal representative, 
psychologist or family member may be allowed to also attend the hearing. It can be 
concluded from the aforementioned that the responsibility to accommodate the 
child in the course of the court-proceedings through the application of protective 
measures lies with the respective Bench and the Registry, in particular the Victims 
and Witnesses Unit.  
 
The ICTY was the first international criminal tribunal which recognised the child as 
a vulnerable witness who is in need of particular procedural protection.
164
 The 
application of protective measures was, due to the lack of procedural regulation, left 
to the discretion of the particular Bench in each case. In the practice of the ICTY, 
protective measures have been applied to witnesses of the age of 21 or under.
165
 The 
Trial Chamber in the Tadic case elaborated on the particular vulnerability of 
children and their need of specific protection alongside the example of domestic 
practice in relation to child victims of sexual assault. The Chamber held that, 
 
‘[f]our of the witnesses who are sought to be protected by the confidentiality 
measures ordered by the Trial Chamber are allegedly victims of, or witnesses to, 
cases of sexual assault. The Prosecutor has requested, in Prayer 7, pursuant to Rule 
75 (B)(i)(c), that all of the pseudonymed witnesses be permitted to give testimony 
through closed circuit television and thereby be protected from seeing the accused. 
This is intended to protect them from possible retraumatization. The Trial Chamber 
regards such measures as particularly important for victims and witnesses of sexual 
assault. 46. […]. The need to show special consideration to individuals testifying 
about rape and sexual assault has been increasingly recognized in the domestic law 
of some States. (See id. at 22-28, and see Brief of Professor Chinkin at 5-6.). […] 
South Africa allows the use of closed circuit television in cases of sexual offences 
where a child witness is involved. (See Joint U.S. Brief at 23.) In the United States, 
several of the constituent states allow closed circuit television in the courtroom, and 
the Supreme Court held in Maryland v. Craig that one-way closed circuit television 
can be used without violating the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when the 
court finds it necessary to protect a child witness from psychological harm. (497 U.S. 
                                                 
163
  Arts. 68(2), (5) Rome Statute, Rules 87(3), 88 RPE. 
164
  The ICTY underlined in this regard the need for particular protection of children, see, e.g., The 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A “Dule” (IT-94-1-T), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion 
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 10 August 1995, paras. 45-48. See 
also, Tolbert, ‘Children and International Criminal Law: The Practice of the International Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)’, Arts & Popovski 2006, at 151-152. 
165









836 (1990).) 48. Another such method is the use of depositions and video 
conferences. For example, in the United States thirty-seven constituent states permit 




Such an approach can also be found in the procedural rules of the SCSL which 




A question which is not answered in the procedural rules under the Rome Statute 
relates to the eligibility of child specific measures of protection: which witnesses 
are entitled to benefit from child specific measures of protection? International 
practice might therefore serve as a useful yardstick. As far as the eligibility of the 
child witness for specific measures of protection is concerned, the SCSL established 
that child witness related measures of protection, such as voice-distortion, were not 
limited to children below the age of eighteen years at the moment of testimony. 
Instead, it applied a broader age concept of this category.
 168
 If the Prosecution was 
uncertain about the age of young witnesses, their classification was determined 
upon the belief that the potential witnesses were former child soldiers.
169
  
 In practice, Trial Chamber II followed the categorisation of the Prosecution and 
applied protective measures for the listed witnesses in the child category, even if 
they were above the age of eighteen.
170
 Such practice indicates that the Court 
handles a separate category for young witnesses. A deeper inquiry into the age of 
the young witness was not deemed necessary.
171
  
 On the other hand, Trial Chamber I of the SCSL applied a stricter approach by 
requiring a vulnerability assessment of persons above the age of eighteen before 
applying child-specific protectionist measures.
172
 The practice of this Chamber 
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underlines once more that children and young persons can be placed within a 
separated category of witnesses to which child-specific measures may be applied.  
 
Having been a child at the moment of crime commission but having reached 
majority in the meanwhile did not therefore exclude a young witness’s eligibility 
for child-specific protective measures. Granting young persons above the age of 
eighteen child-specific protective measures indicates that the Special Court felt (at 
least in some instances) a need to treat these young witnesses as children as far as 
their procedural protection was concerned. 
 
In light of the limited available practice of the ICC, it seems that the Prosecution 
recognises former child soldiers (irrespective of their age at the moment of 
testimony) in terms of protection, as witnesses of particular vulnerability. The 
Prosecutor underlined, for instance, the need to recognise that former child soldiers 
are vulnerable witnesses in his opening statement in the Lubanga case.
173
 The nine 
young witnesses called by the Prosecution in this case were all classified as 
vulnerable witnesses – irrespective of whether they were children or young adults at 
the moment of testimony.
174
  
 The practice in the Lubanga case therefore indicates that the Office of the 
Prosecutor and Trial Chamber I recognise former child soldiers (irrespective of their 
age at the moment of testimony) as particularly vulnerable witnesses in terms of 
procedural protection. 
 
The protective measures the Court ordered in relation to the first child witness in 
the Lubanga case were threefold: voice and face distortion were applied and the 
witness was referred to by means of a pseudonym. As a special measure, a support 
person accompanied the child witness.
175
 In the course of the examination by the 
prosecution, the child witness changed his account by stating that what he said 
before was not true and in particular, that he had lied about being recruited as a 
child soldier.
176
 Due to the behaviour of the child witness, Trial Chamber I saw an 
urgent need to order additional measures.
177
 The Chamber recognised that, 
 
‘[o]ne of the difficulties that’s been brought to our attention is the possibility, and I 
(the Presiding judge) put it no higher than that, that the witness has been simply 
overwhelmed by the number of different people who have been speaking to him and 
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The findings of Trial Chamber I are to some extent surprising, since the same 
Chamber held in an earlier decision that, 
 
‘[t]here must be awareness of the particular characteristic of a witness which may 
cause the court environment to be particularly foreign and uncomfortable. In the 
context of the present case, for example, particular attention should be paid to any 
children who are called as witnesses to ensure that their psychological well-being is 
considered as a matter of paramount importance, pursuant to Article 68 of the Statute 




In this case, the confrontation of the child witness with the accused in the court 
room had a negative impact on the child’s ability to testify. A prior awareness that 
care is necessary when children provide testimony and therefore ordering those 
protective measures which could have prevented direct eye-contact could have 
prevented the strong reaction of the witness. Bearing in mind that the relationship 
between children and adults is of a hierarchical nature, despite differences 
depending on the regional environment, the confrontation in the courtroom is also 
dominated by this vertical relationship.  
 It might be necessary, bearing in mind the aforementioned example of the 
Lubanga case, to ensure that the courtroom setting is adjusted to the particular 
needs of the child. Such adjustment, though the application of protective measures 
could, for instance, ensure that the child witness does not have direct eye contact 
with the accused. The expert witness on child soldiers and trauma specifically 
underlined in this regard, that – irrespective of the traumatic experiences – children 
should not testify when the alleged perpetrator is present. According to the expert 
witness, 
 
‘African children in general, but child soldiers in particular have been socialized in 
highly hierarchical, for the latter even life-threatening environments during their 
childhood and time in captivity. Even in a normal context, an African child will 
rarely have been asked to talk about personal experiences or reveal autobiographical 
memories in detail to an adult listener; especially not to a stranger. A commander 
will always be an anxiety-including figure; a chief commander is often even 
perceived as a person with supernatural powers. […] It needs to be understood that 
children are conditioned by the military hierarchy and are reticent to betray their 





Barbara Bennet Woodhouse illustratively refers to the practice of the US Supreme 
Court by stating that, 
 
‘Although the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution typically requires that a 
criminal defendant has the opportunity to confront witnesses testifying against him 
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at trial, the Court has approved the use of television monitors to present the 
testimony of young children who may be frightened by the prospect of confronting a 
defendant in person. The Court has continued to interpret rules of evidence broadly 





The presence of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was indeed partially relevant for the initial 
recantation of the statement of the first Prosecution witnesses.
182
  
 Furthermore, UNICEF already warned in 2002 that the giving of testimony is 
likely to harm the child if the particular needs of the child are not taken into 
account.
183
 UNICEF underlined that, 
 
‘[p]articular attention should be paid to the likely effect on children of testifying in 
front of the person accused of causing them harm. Thus measures designed to shield 
the child from seeing the accused could be employed, such as sight-screens to 
separate child witnesses and the accused, or using closed-circuit television or video 
links that allow children to testify from outside the courtroom. In addition, while the 
right to a fair trial dictates that testimony must be tested to ensure it is as accurate as 
possible, children should never be exposed to the aggressive forms of questioning 




Bearing in mind that UNICEF explicitly suggested (based in particular on the 
experience of child witness examination under national jurisdictions) that the child 
witness should not have direct eye contact with the accused, it seems that the ICC 
did not properly assess the implications for the first child witness in the Lubanga 
case.
185
 Whether similar challenges have been dealt with before the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone could not be examined as the relevant court records are not as 
publicly available as the ICC court records. 
 
While the respective Bench and the Victims and Witnesses Unit thus carry a 
statutory responsibility as regards the protection of child witnesses in the course of 
the court-room proceedings, a responsibility to protect is also recognised, while not 
as such being explicitly regulated under the RPE, prior to the involvement of the 
young witnesses in the courtroom setting. Noteworthy in this regard is the Court’s 
strategy in relation to victims. The 2009 Report of the Court on the strategy in 
relation to victims stresses that, 
 
‘[i]nterviews with investigators and any other interactions between victims and staff 
members of the Court must be carefully managed in order to avoid retraumatisation 
or other problems. The OTP will conduct assessments before interviewing 
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vulnerable witnesses in order to determine if they are physically and psychologically 
fit to go through the interview, and will ensure that a psycho-social expert is 
available in case an intervention is needed. The OTP, as well as other relevant 
organs and bodies of the Court, will also ensure that their staff receive training on 




Clearly, this approach constitutes an attempt by the Court to ensure better 
protection of child witnesses by requesting that particular treatment is expected 
from the Registry and the OTP when conducting interviews with vulnerable 
witnesses. An equivalent as regards the responsibility of lawyers and legal 
representatives has not yet been formulated, while, considering the 
aforementioned, there might also be a corresponding need as regards these actors. 
 
Related to the protection of the child witness is the risk of self-incrimination. 
Appearing as a child witness in relation to the crime of recruitment might lead to 
self-incrimination or threat of national criminal proceedings against the child if 
domestic law allows for the criminal prosecution of minors in this crime context. It 
is analysed in this regard whether the risk of self-incrimination and threat of 
domestic criminal proceedings against the child witness constitutes a factor which 
should lead to the exclusion of child witness testimony. It is to be remembered that 
self-incrimination or the potential of domestic proceedings equally exists for adult 
witnesses. A corresponding principle as the principle of the best interests does, 
however, not exist for adults. While adult witness participation thus is not assessed 
on the basis of a best interests principle, it may, taking into account the risk of self-
incrimination and the threat of domestic criminal proceedings, lead to an exclusion 
of child witness testimony from the outset. 
 
The discussion held during the previously addressed testimony of the former child 
soldier indicated that the fear of the child witness to face criminal proceedings 
before national courts in the DRC made the child change his account.
187
 
 In this specific case the fear of the child witness was unfounded as the criminal 
prosecution of minors for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide is 
excluded under Congolese law. The Chamber discussions established, however, that 
child witnesses in other situations before the ICC may nevertheless be exposed to 
such a risk as the possibility of domestic proceedings might exist when being 
provided for in national criminal codes – a possibility which might be provided for 
in societies which share the view that the criminal prosecution of former child 
soldiers is to be provided for.
188
 Accordingly, while the fear of the young witness in 
the Lubanga case was unfounded, it cannot be said that child witnesses in general 
cannot be expected to face domestic prosecutions as a result of their statement 
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within the course of ICC proceedings. As a consequence, the risk of self-
incrimination and the possibility of domestic criminal proceedings against the 





The possibility of self-incrimination is in particular not unlikely when former child 
soldiers testify on international crimes. A prior assessment before in-court 
testimony of the best interests of the child witness in the light of the other rights of 
this particular child, such as the right to ‘object to making any statement that might 
tend to incriminate’ (Rule 74(3)(a) RPE) might have been helpful. It could have 
prevented, in particular, the confusion during testimony.
 190
 Accordingly, if the 
child is likely to incriminate him or herself, involvement in proceedings before the 
ICC cannot straightforwardly be considered to be in the best interests of the child. 
This is because national criminal prosecutions could be opened on the basis of the 




Can a child be considered to be a credible witness? Child witness testimony is 
accompanied by a number of factors which could be assumed to be decisive for the 
child’s credibility to provide truthful testimony in international criminal 
proceedings. The trustworthiness of the young witness and the likelihood that the 
child has been traumatised in the course of the conflict are important in this regard. 
A child-sensitive approach might be adequate in order to enable the child to provide 
truthful testimony. Furthermore, various measures are at the Court’s disposal to 
enhance the credibility of young witnesses. Those measures which played a role in 
the currently most advanced case, the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
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2.5.1 Factors influencing the credibility of the child witness 
 
The Lubanga case raises the pertinent question whether children should be deemed 
incapable to act as credible witnesses at the ICC because of a possible lack of 
trustworthiness which could be related to their immaturity or potential previous 
traumatisation in light of the nature of the cases that come before the ICC. This 
question will be addressed in light of existing literature, scholarly views on this 
matter as well as views offered by the Bench. In addition, it will be analysed 
whether other case-specific procedural matters led to the finding of incredibility in 
the Lubanga case, which do not necessarily have broader ramifications beyond this 
case. 
 
The following analysis thereby aims to discuss the question whether children, 
bearing in mind their evolving capacities, can be considered to be a credible witness. 
In addition, the section has as an objective to also further the debate on whether 
child witness participation is in the best interests of the child and if so, how to 
welcome the child in a child-sensitive manner in the court room. Child witnesses 
could, for instance, benefit from witness familiarisation measures. Child-specific 
procedural accommodation might also be necessary when the accused is in the court 
room and the child at risk is to have, for instance, direct eye contact with the 
accused. The trustworthiness of the child and the impact of conflict situations are 
addressed in turn. 
 
2.5.1.1 Trustworthiness of the child witness 
 
If doubts exist in relation to the trustworthiness of the child due to the fact that 
children are, compared to adults, more at risk of being influenced if not even 
manipulated by others before and during testimony, the calling of children into the 
witness is to be thought through. Furthermore, as children might not understand the 
importance of telling the truth and tend to lie child testimony might not at all be 
considered trustworthy.
191
 It could also be argued on the other hand, that a general 
assumption that children are not credible witnesses due to their young age is not 
accurate. Instead, as the maturity of the minor witness is understood to grow in a 
dynamic process, child witnesses cannot generally be considered not trustworthy. 
 
The judgment of Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case, which has been upheld by 
the Appeals Chamber on 1 December 2014, raises the specific question whether 
child witnesses should indeed be called into the witness stand.
192
 In this case, the 
Chamber refused to rely on evidence provided by former child soldiers. The 
Chamber explained in relation to each former child soldier why it was unable to 
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rely on the testimony. The reason for exclusion was always found to be the result of 
the unreliability of the witnesses’ statements. In relation to witness P-0298, for 
instance, the Chamber held 
 
‘Notwithstanding the prosecution’s suggestion that P-0298’s initial testimony was 
merely the result of his anger, the evidence overall before the Chamber creates a 
real doubt as to his honesty and reliability. Additionally, the real possibility exists 
that he was encouraged and assisted by P-0321 to give false evidence. P-0298 is 




The ruling invites a reconsideration of the actual importance of child witnesses in 
international criminal proceedings. Trial Chamber I and the Appeals Chamber have 
been convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo has recruited 
children below the age of fifteen years without relying on evidence provided by 
child witnesses. The statement that child witness testimony is to be the condition 
sine qua non in selected cases might therefore not be valid. Child witness testimony 
could even be said to be not as relevant as argued by the Office of the Prosecutor in 




The credibility of the child witness has, prior to the existence of international 
criminal proceedings, been addressed within the course of domestic proceedings.
195
 
The approach of the United States, for instance, has been explained by Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse who clarified that,  
 
‘[t]he changing status of children is also reflected in their role as witnesses in court 
proceedings. Traditionally, children were deemed incompetent to testify because 
they could not appreciate the oath, required of all witnesses to tell the truth. The 
modern rules allow admission of very young children’s testimony and allow judges 




The general recognition of the child as a potential credible statement provider is 
also reflected in the procedural rules of the SCSL and ICC by not questioning his or 
her reliability.
197
 Neither has age been introduced as a factor which determines 
whether children are capable of providing truthful testimony.
198
 Paragraph 18 of the 
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UN Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of 
Crime underlines in this regard that, 
 
‘[a]ge should not be a barrier to a child’s right to participate fully in the justice 
process. Every child should be treated as a capable witness, subject to examination, 
and his or her testimony should not be presumed invalid or untrustworthy by reason 
of the child’s age alone as long as his or her age and maturity allow the giving of 





Scholars have noted in relation to domestic practice that, leaving the capacity of 
very young children to give a statement aside, the age of the child is not decisive for 
the child to provide testimony. Children are not less capable than adults of 
providing truthful testimony.
200
 This does not diminish the need that all actors who 
engage with the child witness are trained in particular skills in order to ensure that 
the child is adequately addressed.
201
 Domestic practice established that an 




Instead of age, other factors have been acknowledged as relevant when determining 
a child’s maturity. The developmental stage, a constrained ability to concentrate due 
to a psychological disease, the shamefulness of the traumatic experience, the 
magnitude of traumatic events or the educational background of the child have been 
mentioned as important aspects when assessing the ability of the child to give 
truthful testimony.
203
 Next to the traumatic experience of the child (which is 
addressed in more detail below), failing to take into account the child’s specific 




Turning next to the case law of the ICC, it is noted that the analysis focuses on the 
practice in the Lubanga case. Only in this specific case did child witness testimony 
play a major role in the course of the proceedings. In line with the foregoing, the 
presiding judge of Trial Chamber I, for example, reminded the Defence of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo to formulate questions in a more child-suitable manner.
205
 When the 
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witness repeatedly stated that he did not understand the question posted by the 
Defence, Judge Fulford held that, 
 
‘I think the rather formal procedure that certainly works when questioning bankers 
and financiers and others of formally putting your case may work with witnesses of 
that kind. I think for others, who are completely unused to trial proceedings of this 
nature, it is actually quite a difficult concept to understand and to know what the 
appropriate response is. […] I think a more direct form of questioning is better than 




This position underlines that the Chamber is aware of the fact that questions must 




The appearance of the first Prosecution witness in the ICC proceedings against 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, on the other hand, gives rise to questioning the generally 
presumed credibility of child witnesses. This case shows in particular that children 
can easily be influenced by others in relation to their testimony. Witness 298 started 
his testimony on 28 January 2009. He initially explained that he had been recruited 
on his way home from school. At a later stage in his testimony, he recanted his 
earlier statement concerning his recruitment and held that it was not true and that he 
had been trained by someone regarding the statement he had provided. After an 
adjournment of his testimony for two weeks, the same witness continued on 10 
February 2009 when he announced – contrary to his previous statement – that his 





The Defence of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo underlined in the opening statement of 27 
January 2010 that, 
 
‘the Defence intend to provide the Chamber with the results of our inquiries, in 
particular, we intend to demonstrate that all the individuals who were presented as 
child soldiers, as well as their parents in some cases, deliberately lied before this 
Court. The Defence intend to show that six of them were never child soldiers. The 
seventh lied about his age and the conditions in which he enrolled and the eighth 




During the proceedings, the Defence challenged the testimony of the nine witnesses 
called by the Prosecution who held that they had been child soldiers.
210
 Numerous 
contradictions between the statements of child witnesses and the witnesses called by 
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the Defence have been established.
211
 The Defence team argued in particular that 
four intermediaries of the Prosecution were  
 
‘involved in soliciting false testimony from all prosecution witnesses who were 




In response to the allegations raised by the Defence of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Trial Chamber I, recognised the potential relationship between the reliance of the 
Prosecution on intermediaries and the alleged false statements of the child witnesses. 
The Chamber ordered the Prosecution to disclose the identity of intermediary 143 
and the appearance of intermediaries 316 and 321.
213
  
 In the course of the proceedings it became clear that these intermediaries 
(human rights activists) had established contact between the child witnesses and the 
Prosecution.
214
 For protectionist reasons, the Office of the Prosecutor decided to 
communicate with the witnesses through intermediaries. The Prosecutor argued that 
direct contact between the Prosecution and the child witnesses could, according to 
the Prosecution, constitute a threat to the well-being of the witnesses.
215
 The 
practice of the Prosecution in relation to intermediaries has been summarised as 
follows by Trial Chamber I: 
 
‘from the outset of the investigation, human rights activists gave the investigators the 
names of potential witnesses, since they had “seen these people and they knew what 
they were going to say”. Because of their long-term presence, it was considered that 
the activists were better placed than the investigators, and particularly it did not 
cause any surprise when the activists spoke with representatives of MONUC or had 
discussions with villagers. The investigators could not move about freely without 
being threatened and witnesses were endangered if the investigators spoke directly 
with them. As a result, the investigating team or some of the activists suggested the 
latter should act as intermediaries. Therefore, from early on, even with the assistance 
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of the intermediaries, the investigators were restricted as to the timing and the 




In its judgment, Trial Chamber I decided that, 
 
‘given the pattern of unreliability as regards the witnesses introduced by 
Intermediary 143 and called to give evidence during the trial (P-0007, P-0008, P-
0010 and P-0011), the Chamber accepts that there is a real risk that he played a role 
in the markedly flawed evidence that these witnesses provided to the OTP and to the 
Court. Bearing in mind this consistent lack of credibility as regards the trial 
witnesses he introduced to the investigators, and particularly focussing on the 
cumulative effect of their individual accounts, it is likely that as the common point 
of contact he persuaded, encouraged or assisted some or all of them to give false 
statement. The Chamber accepts that the accounts of P-0007, P-0008, P-0010 and P-
0010 were or may have been truthful and accurate in part, but it has real doubts as to 
critical aspects of their evidence, in particular their age at the relevant time. 
Although other potential explanations exist, the real possibility that Intermediary 143 




The Chamber did not only assess the potential influence of intermediaries. Trial 
Chamber I examined in detail the credibility of each former child witness who gave 
testimony on his or her alleged recruitment. The Chamber’s conclusion in relation 
to witnesses P-0007 and P-0008 illustrates that the testimony of former child 
soldiers have not been relied upon mainly because of contradictions in relation to 
the name and age of the witnesses, but also as regards facts concerning their 
recruitment and stay in the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC). The Chamber 
recalled that, 
 
‘[i]n August 2005, the witness (P-0007) apparently told the IEC that his year of birth 
was 1986, and he gave them a name that differed from the one provided by him to 
the prosecution. His birth certificated (dated November 2005) records the year of his 
birth as 1990. Although the witness gave his names in evidence, he explained that 
his parents, brothers and sisters call him by different names, and later in his 
testimony he indicated that he had used two further names. He also stated that he 
was born in 1987 […]. In these circumstances his reliability is profoundly called into 
question, given the considerable, and essentially unexplained differences as to the 
date of birth of this witness, in his oral testimony and in the documentary evidence. 
The witness gave contradictory testimony concerning the names of his father. […] It 
is suggested by the defence that P-0007 gave an implausible account regarding 




In relation to witness P-0008 Trial Chamber I pointed out that, 
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‘he gave a name that differs slightly from the one on his voting card. He said he was 
born in 1989 and he provided the names of his parents. P-0008’s testimony before 
the Court on this issue partially contradicts the information on his birth certificate 
(obtained by P-0143 [intermediary] on 11 August 2005), which states that he was 
born in 1991 and lists names for his parents that, to an extent differ from those given 
in Court. The witness’s electoral card indicates that he was born in 1987. P-0008 
suggested that soldiers from the UPC forcibly enlisted him at the beginning of 2003, 
whilst he was attending school. He underwent military training for two weeks at the 
UPC camp in Irumu, at the conclusion of which he was deployed as a bodyguard. He 
fought at the battles of Libri and Barrière. However, this account, viewed overall, is 





The Chamber furthermore ruled that, 
 
‘documentary evidence tends to demonstrate that P-0007 and P-0008 lied about 
having attended school in a particular town in the year 2001-2002 and at the 
beginning of the 2002-2003 academic year, because the records establish they were 
both at school in a different location. [...] Witnesses P-0007 and P-0008 were re-
interviewed by the prosecution on 7 and 8 January 2010, following their evidence 
before the Chamber. They accepted that the family relationships were significantly 
different from the description provided by each of them earlier. […] During their re-
interviews with the prosecution, P-007 and P-008 accepted that they had lied about 




In conclusion Trial Chamber I held that, 
 
‘[t]he Chamber’s assessment of these two witnesses is that the weaknesses and 
contradictions in their evidence (particularly as to their ages and true identities) 
along with the evidence of D-0012 undermine the reliability of their testimony. The 
difficulties with their accounts are not satisfactorily or sufficiently explained by fears 
for their safety or that of their family. The Chamber is unable to rely on the evidence 




The Chamber concluded that it could not rely on any statement provided by alleged 
former child soldiers in the Lubanga case.
222
 The general standard which Trial 
Chamber I applied when assessing the relevance of the oral evidence provided by 
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witnesses reflects that the Chamber applied a comprehensive assessment which also 
addressed the particularities of child witnesses: 
 
‘When evaluating the oral testimony of a witness, the Chamber has considered the 
entirety of the witness’s account; the manner in which he or she gave evidence; the 
plausibility of the testimony; and the extent to which it was consistent, including as 
regards other evidence in the case. The Chamber has assessed whether the witness’s 
evidence conflicted with prior statements he or she had made, insofar as the relevant 
portion of the prior statement is in evidence. In each instance the Chamber has 
evaluated the extent and seriousness of the inconsistency and its impact on the 
overall reliability of the witness. The Chamber has made appropriate allowance for 
any instances of imprecision, implausibility or inconsistency, bearing in mind the 
overall context of the case and the circumstances of the individual witnesses. For 
example, the charges relate to events that occurred in 2002 and 2003. Memories fade, 
and witnesses who were children at the time of the events, or who suffered trauma, 
may have had particular difficulty in providing a coherent, compete and logical 
account. […] The Chamber called a psychologist who gave expert testimony on the 





Each testimony of child witnesses has thus carefully been assessed. Trial Chamber I 
did not exclude their testimony from the outset. Additional legal consequences, 
besides the refusal of the Chamber to rely on the statements provided by these 
witnesses were only formulated in relation to those child witnesses who were also 
participating as victims in the course of the criminal proceedings. The Chamber was 
no longer convinced that the these participants were victims of the charged crime. 
Thus those children who gave evidence as witnesses in the criminal proceedings 
while participating as victims at the same time, were also to be excluded from 
further participation.
224
 The Chamber did not rule further on possible legal 
consequences for the child witnesses for providing false information. Instead, the 
Judges only pointed out in this regard that the possibility to instigate proceedings 
against the intermediaries under Article 70 of the Rome Statute for alleged offences 




Keeping in mind that next to the Lubanga case, the experience of the ICC in 
relation to child witnesses is thus far rather limited it is stated with the necessary 
caution that nevertheless more accuracy during the investigation phase, in particular 
better monitoring of intermediaries by the Prosecution by, for instance, introducing 
a transparent procedure and qualification requirements for the appointment of 
intermediaries, could perhaps have made a difference and enabled the Chamber to 
rule other than not relying on these testimonies. In the end, the entire exclusion of 
children’s testimony in the Lubanga case might give rise to at least two questions. 
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Firstly, are, according to the Chamber, children in general or child soldiers, as 
particular group of child witnesses, prone to be unreliable witnesses or was the 
unreliability only the result of inadequacy of the Prosecution’s investigations and 
strategy and should no general conclusion be drawn from this? Secondly, is child 
testimony in fact actually indispensable when crimes committed against children 
are prosecuted?  
 With regard to the first question, the Chamber clearly states that it disapproves 
of the inaccuracy in the selection of child witnesses by heavily criticising the 
Prosecution for its delegation of investigative tasks to intermediaries. It did not 
generally exclude the use of child witnesses. The Chamber unmistakably 
formulated its dissatisfaction. It stated that, 
 
‘[t]he Chamber is of the view that the prosecution should not have delegated its 
investigative responsibilities to the intermediaries in the way set out above, 
notwithstanding the extensive security difficulties it faced. A series of witnesses 
have been called during this trial whose evidence, as a result of the essentially 
unsupervised actions of three of the principal intermediaries, cannot safely be relied 
on. The Chamber spent a considerable period of time investigating the circumstances 





With regard to the second question, it is important to note that the conviction of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was instead based on statements provided by adult 
witnesses (NGO workers or witnesses closely related to Lubanga) and documentary 
evidence, in particular video footage.
227
 The evidence of child witnesses was thus 
not necessary in order to achieve a conviction – child witness testimony was not 
relied upon at all, despite the fact that it considered a case in which children were 
the only direct victims.  
 Since the exclusion of child witness testimony was mainly the result of 
inaccurate research done by the Prosecution prior to the children’s testimony, it 
seems to be too drastic to conclude that child witness testimony is also beyond the 
Lubanga case not important at all. Instead, there might, after careful assessment, be 
cases in which the testimony of children could be considered to be highly relevant 
when, for instance, children are the only witnesses. Cases in which sexual violence 
has allegedly been committed against children might constitute such cases. 
 
In contrast to the judgment in the Lubanga case, the SCSL did rely on former child 
soldiers’ testimony in its judgments after assessing the credibility of the witnesses. 
Trial Chamber I, for instance, in the case of The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Seay, 
Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao held that,  
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‘[s]everal of the witnesses who testified were former child combatants who had been 
captured by the RUF at ages as young as ten. Many of these child witnesses 
experienced serious physical and mental trauma both during and after the war. Many 
were forced to consume or use drugs throughout their time in the RUF. Due to the 
fact that the events they attempt to recount took place largely during their childhood, 
their ability to recall such events is compounded by the passage of time. This means 
that such witnesses generally experienced difficulty in remembering specific details 
about such events, and various minor discrepancies are identifiable in their evidence. 
However, the Chamber has generally accepted the evidence of former child soldiers, 




Without ignoring the fact that some testimony of former child soldiers contained 
discrepancies, Trial Chamber I clarified in its judgment that evidence which related 
to acts and conduct of the accused (thus not describing the personal experiences of 
the child witness) could only be relied upon when supported by corroborating 




Accordingly, while maturity factors (and not age as such) of the individual witness 
are to be examined in order to assess the relevance of the testimony, the ICC did not 
refuse to rely on child testimony due to a presumed lack of maturity. Instead, the 
Chamber held in the Lubanga case, that while maturity as such might put children 
at risk of manipulation, it does not constitute a cause to exclude their testimony. 
Instead, the misuse of children by others as a result of their developing maturity can 
be seen as a factor which made the Chamber exclude child testimony. In other 
words, such practice seems to recognise that children, despite being minors, can 
indeed, if their evolving capacities permit for this, provide credible testimony. 
 
2.5.1.2 Impact of conflict situations and trauma 
 
It is generally agreed that PTSD, can have an impact on the ability of the child to 
recall and describe traumatic events in judicial proceedings.
230
 Next to the 
trustworthiness factor of the child witness, conflict situations as such might 
therefore bear particular consequences for child witnesses’ credibility. Conflicts 
may traumatise children. Experiencing violence in the course of large scale violence 
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 Research underlines that the effects of armed conflict on the well-being of the 
child are far-reaching.
232
 Numerous scholars have pointed out that children are 
especially at risk of suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by 
the traumatic events experienced during conflict situations. This is particularly 
because armed conflicts may destabilise the protective environment of children. 
Armed conflict may lead to major changes in their social environment, such as 




 The particular vulnerability of children is reflected in the disproportionate 
consequences of the full or partial denial of their fundamental needs.
234
 Violations 
of basic needs during childhood frequently lead to permanent damage.
235
 Research 
on Palestinian children suffering from PTSD caused by the Al-Aqsa Intifada in the 
Gaza Strip established that, 
 
‘[t]he most prevalent types of trauma exposure for children in “hot” areas (those in 
which there is a great deal of shooting) are: for those who had witnessed funerals 
94.6%, witnessed shooting 66.9%, saw a friend or a neighbor being injured or killed 
61.6% or were tear gassed 36.1%. […] Traumatic experiences among children led to 
a high level of neurotic symptoms and behavioral problems: 80% were moody; 63.3% 
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Children that have witnessed the most violent acts and have had their rights, such as 
their rights to family life, education and health care, violated, often experience the 
psychological consequences of such actions throughout their entire lives.
237
 In this 
regard, medical science holds that, 
 
‘[d]epending upon the developmental stage, level of cognitive and emotional 
maturity, and limited coping strategies, the psychological reactions in children are 





The need to distinguish between adults and children is furthermore justified by the 
factor of the young age of children. It is established that the younger the child, the 
more likely are scatter and long-lasting effects of the traumatic experience.
239
 
 It has, however, also been argued that, depending on child specific-
characteristics, such as intelligence, coping skills and temperament, children might 
be resilient to the negative implications of armed conflict. In particular the dynamic 
developmental stadium of the child might constitute a protective feature which can 
lead to an enhanced resilience of the child.
240
 Drumbl points out that child soldiers 
should not be seen as one group. Instead, he calls for an intra-group assessment as 
not necessarily all children might have suffered to the same extent. This approach 
mirrors a critical re-assessment of the image of the child soldier as victim.
241
 
 Furthermore, post-traumatic stress disorder constitutes a major threat to the 
healthy development of the child and leads in particular to a delay in 
development.
242
 Studies on post-war refugees established that PTSD was/is 
observable in 30% to 70% of adolescent refugee populations.
243
 The final report of 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission similarly describes the 
long-lasting effects of gross human rights violations. It held that, 
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‘Political and community violence characteristically expose children and adolescents 
to suffering long after the event. Whilst many are able to recover with the support of 
friends, family and community; others may suffer lasting psychological damage. […] 





It is also to be kept in mind that child witness testimony as such may also pose 
another risk for the well-being of the child (secondary victimisation) as the witness 
has to recapitulate the negative experiences during testimony.
245
 On the other side, 
child testimony may also bear positive implications such as the possibility to talk 





Due to the impact PTSD can have an impact on the ability of the child to recall and 
describe traumatic events in judicial proceedings, it needs to be examined whether a 
traumatised child is also capable of providing truthful testimony.
247
 The difficulty 
of a young witness to recall, for instance, a particular period is exemplified by the 
following testimony before the SCSL: 
 
 
Q. And how long did you stay there? 
A. How long? 
Q. Yes, how long did you stay there? 
A. I am confused. 
Q. Have you forgotten? 
A. If you say a week, maybe I can remember. But when you talk about time, I 
cannot understand; I am confused. 
Q. Did you stay there for one week, two weeks, three weeks? How many weeks did 
you stay there for? 
A. Three weeks.. 
Q. So when did you join the CDF? 
A. I joined the CDF between '97 and '98. I do not know the right month that I 
joined the CDF. At that time I was a small boy.
248
 
                                                 
244
  South African TRC Volume 4, at 271. 
245
  Dezwirek Sas, Wolfe & Gowdey 1996, 338-357; Avery 1983, 1-48. 
246
  The positive effects of child participation on the well-being of the child are particularly addressed 
in Chapter Six, as Part III. 
247
  The capability of the child to recall and describe traumatic events is, however, not only important 
with regard to the trustworthiness of the testimony of child witnesses before the SCSL and ICC, 
but also relevant when considering the credibility of child participants (Chapter Three) and child 
claimants (Chapter Five) in relation to their explanations as contained in the application form or 
even provided in person in the courtroom. Due to the fact that more extensive ICC practice exists 
with regard to the credibility of the child witness and the impact of trauma on the ability of the 
child to provide testimony, this particular issue is addressed in the current Chapter. 
248
  The Prosecutor of the Special Court v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, Santigie Borbor 
Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, transcript of 26 September 2005, testimony of Witness TF1-









As children are particularly likely to be called into the witness stand in relation to 
the recruitment crime (Article 8 Rome Statute), the child should, first of all, be able 
to recall his/her experiences and to testify about the particular moment of the 
alleged recruitment.  
 
The expert witness (psychologist) on child soldiers and trauma who has been 
invited by Trial Chamber I of the ICC in the Lubanga case to report and testify on 
various issues concerning child soldiers and trauma pointed out that former child 
soldiers have difficulties recalling their experiences and the time or period when 
these took place.
249
 The expert witness underlined in her report that,  
 
‘a child or also an adult […] with a developed PTSD […], will find it difficult to 
narrate in detail a particular traumatic experience. The information is certainly not 
lost to the survivor and can be recovered in clear order, completeness and 
chronology. This might however in some cases call for a therapeutic testimonial 




This conclusion is backed up in academic literature and the practice of Trial 
Chamber I.
251
 It prompts questioning in particular whether, as will be elaborated 
upon below (section 2.5.3.1), witness familiarisation is indeed sufficient or whether 
witness proofing should be recognised and accepted as an exceptional measure 
needed to prepare children for their testimony.  
 
This Chamber, even prior to the report of the expert witness, addressed the 
difficulties of young witnesses to recall their exact age or to elaborate upon the 
precise moment of recruitment.
252
 In order to comfort a young witness in the 
courtroom, the presiding judge explicitly emphasised that the witness should not 
feel ashamed and thereby showed that he takes the difficulty of the child to recall 
memories during testimony into account. Judge Fulford stated that, 
 
‘[w]e understand that obviously with questions about dates and ages, particularly if 
they’re some years ago, you’re going to need to take time to think about them. Don’t 
be embarrassed about needing to think about when things happened and, obviously, 
do your best and answer the question if you can, but if you can’t remember any dates, 
of course you’ll say. […] These issues are important, and we’re grateful to you for 
your assistance. But don’t feel any embarrassment.’
253
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Accordingly, as with regard to the maturity factor, neither is the traumatisation as 
such, to date, recognised to generally prevent the child from giving truthful and 
credible testimony. In its judgment in the Lubanga case, Trial Chamber I did state 
that, 
 
‘[i]rrespective of the Chamber’s conclusions regarding the credibility and reliability 
of these alleged former child soldiers, given their youth and likely exposure to 




Accordingly, the combination of a child’s maturity and his or her potential exposure 
to traumatising situations do, in the Chamber’s view, constitute two factors which 
may constitute an incentive for manipulating children. 
 
2.5.2 Measures enhancing credibility 
 
The above permits the conclusion that the Court is of the view that children, despite 
their developing maturity and the potential impact of conflict situations, can be 
considered to be credible witnesses. In turn, it is examined whether, and if so which, 
measures have been introduced by the Court in order to welcome the child in the 
court room and thereby enhance the child’s credibility. 
 
2.5.2.1 Witness familiarisation 
 
As the court environment can be considered to be alien to witnesses and child 
witnesses in particular, the preparation of witnesses by witness proofing or witness 
familiarisation could constitute effective measures prior to their testimony.  
 Witness proofing is understood to constitute a means of preparing a witness for 
testimony. The party who calls the witness meets the witness and discusses 
substantive matters of the testimony prior to the witness’s appearance in the court 




 Witness familiarisation, in contrast to the former, is understood to prepare the 
witness for testimony as regards the formalities of the court room proceedings. This 
preparation is intended to make the witness familiar with the court room setting in 
order to enable the witness to provide testimony.
256
 Accordingly, the latter does not 
entail any discussion of evidence which is to be provided by the witness. Trial 
Chamber V defined the terms in a rather recent decision as follows: 
 
‘The terms “witness preparation”, “witness proofing” and “witness familiarisation” 
are all used, sometimes interchangeably, throughout the submissions of the parties 
and the Victims and Witnesses Unit (“VWU”). In this Decision, the Chamber will 
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use the term “witness preparation” to refer to a meeting between a witness and the 
party calling that witness, taking place shortly before the witness’s testimony, for 
the purpose of discussing matters relating to the witness’s testimony. The term 
“witness familiarization” will be used to describe the support provided by the 
VWU to witnesses as set out in the Registry’s “Unified Protocol on the practices 





It will be established in the following paragraphs that the legal basis for witness 
familiarisation can be found in the Rome Statute and the respective rules. A legal 
basis for witness proofing is less straightforward. 
 Looking for a legal basis for the practice of witness proofing, the Rome Statute 
constitutes the first source which is to be examined. Guidance on this aspect can be 
found in part VI of the Statute. This part regulates the trial proceedings. Concerning 
the general organisation of the proceedings, Article 68 of the Statute addresses inter 
alia the protection and participation of witnesses in the proceedings. Paragraph 1 
states in particular that 
 
‘[t]he Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.’ 
 
Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute in conjunction with human rights law could be 
referred to as a legal basis for witness proofing. Firstly, this provision unmistakably 
states that the Court’s task is to protect witnesses. Secondly, the relevance of human 
rights law and the possibility to be referred to in the context of ICC proceedings has 
been explained in the first chapter. Human rights law can therefore be relevant in 
the context of ICC proceedings. Thirdly, as witness proofing can be said to aim ‘to 
protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of 
victims and witnesses’, the referral to human rights law does not seem far-
fetched.
258
 After all, human rights law seeks to pursue similar protective goals as 
have been formulated in paragraph 1 of Article 68 Rome Statute. 
 Despite the possibility that witness proofing could indeed be provided with a 
legal basis which can be found in the Rome Statute and human rights law, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I and Trial Chamber I rejected the possibility to prepare witnesses for 
testimony by witness proofing – a practice which departs from the permissive 
approach taken by the ad hoc Tribunals and the SCSL.
259
 Before the 
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aforementioned Court and Tribunals, the practice of witness proofing was used as 
pointed out in the Limaj case in order to ‘re-examine the witness’s evidence to 
enable more accurate, complete and efficient testimony’.
260
 The Prosecution 
underlined in its submission to Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case that witness 
proofing serves in particular the purpose to establish the truth and should therefore 
indeed be used by prosecution and defence teams. A refreshment of the memory of 
the witness by the means of witness proofing is understood to also remind the 
witness of the importance to tell the truth.
261
 Bearing in mind the earlier addressed 
difficulties of former child soldiers to recall their memory and the concerns about 
young persons’ ability to understand the importance of telling the truth, one could 
argue that as regards minor witnesses, the Court should depart from the prohibitive 
position of Pre-Trial Chamber I and Trial Chamber I as regards witness proofing. 
Preparing young witnesses for testimony by means of witness proofing could 
constitute a means to further the credibility of the witness. The risk of re-
traumatisation during witness proofing could, as suggested by the Prosecution, be 
minimised by seeking the assistance of child professionals.
262
 This assistance 
should, however, not as suggested by the Prosecutor be provided by experts from 
within the Office of the Prosecutor, but should be given by qualified staff members 
of the Registry as this organ is impartial and not at risk of overseeing the best 
interests of the young witness due to the professional commitment of prosecution or 
defence teams. Furthermore, the earlier addressed risk of manipulation of the child 
could further be prevented if not the party who intends to call the witness prepares 
the witness for testimony but an independent organ of the Court carries out this task. 
 The practice in the Lubanga case, however, did not permit such approach. The 
Prosecution was therefore prohibited from discussing the content of the witnesses’ 
testimony prior to the court session. The Chambers ruled that witness proofing with 
respect to substantive parts of the testimony is not provided for in the Rome Statute 
and the respective Rules.
263
 The provisions request instead that in the case of 
testimony, appropriate protective measures are applied to (traumatised) children 
(see section 2.4.2).
264
 By explaining the reasons of its restrictive approach as 
regards witness proofing, Trial Chamber I pointed out that the aforementioned 
objectives, namely to establish the truth and to refresh the memory of young 
witnesses can be achieved by witness familiarisation as the latter also includes this 
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objective and possibility to review the earlier made statement without, however, 
taking away the equally important spontaneity of the testimony.
265
 The suggested 
restrictive approach of Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber I cannot be said to reflect the 
overall approach of the ICC. Trial Chamber V, in line with the Prosecution’s 
argumentation in the Lubanga case, issued a decision at the beginning of 2013 




Irrespective of the answer to the question whether witness proofing will be 
introduced as a general practice before the Court, it is argued that, witness 
familiarisation is crucial to make the witness, in particular young witnesses familiar 
with the proceedings and court room settings.
267
 All Chambers, thus far, ruled that 
witness familiarisation has to be conducted by the Victims and Witnesses Unit of 
the Registry. Pre-Trial Chamber 1 held that the responsibility to familiarise 
witnesses with the Court proceedings is laid down in Article 43(6) of the Rome 
Statute in conjunction with Rule 17 RPE.
268
 Rule 17(2)(b) provides that the Victims 
and Witnesses Unit’s task with respect to witnesses is: 
 
‘(i) Advising them where to obtain legal advice for the purpose of protecting their 
rights, in particular in relation to their testimony; 
 
(ii) Assisting them when they are called to testify before the Court; 
 
(iii) Taking gender-sensitive measures to facilitate the testimony of victims of 
sexual violence at all stages of the proceedings.’ 
 
With respect to children, paragraph 3 underlines that, 
 
‘3. In performing its functions, the Unit shall give due regard to the particular needs 
of children, elderly persons and persons with disabilities. In order to facilitate the 
participation and protection of children as witnesses, the Unit may assign, as 
appropriate, and with the agreement of the parents or the legal guardian, a child-
support person to assist a child through all stages of the proceedings.’ 
 
In order to familiarise witnesses with the proceedings before the Court, Trial 
Chamber I also underlined that specific attention must be paid to the particular 
vulnerability of the child as such. The Chamber held that, 
 
‘[t]here must be awareness of the particular characteristics of a witness which may 
cause the court environment to be particularly foreign and uncomfortable. In the 
context of the present case, for example, particular attention should be paid to any 
children who are called as witnesses to ensure that their psychological well-being is 
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considered as a matter of paramount importance, pursuant to Article 68 of the 




It has become clear that two factors are particularly important when it comes to 
child witness testimony. Firstly, the impact of armed conflicts in combination with 
the particular vulnerability of the child places the child in a particular position. This 
position is not limited to children’s need for specific protection in substantive terms. 
Instead, children, including child witnesses, also find themselves in a particular 
procedural position. Child witness testimony is therefore to be held in a manner 
which reflects that child-specific aspects are taken into account. Secondly, the 
evolving capacities of the child, which mirror the dynamic progression of the child 
from an immature to a mature legal person calls for another child-specific treatment 
of child witnesses.  
 
Bearing these thoughts in mind one may raise the question whether, at least with 
regard to children, the strict limitations concerning witness familiarisation in ICC 
proceedings as suggested by Pre-Trial Chamber I and Trial Chamber I sufficiently 
accommodates child testimony. In other words, it might be necessary to reconsider 
the possibility to at least permit witness proofing in relation to child witnesses as 
the formalistic means and methods of familiarisation might not be sufficient in 
order to ensure that children are capable of providing credible testimony. This is 
because a lack of child-specific preparation for the testimony entails the risk of not 
taking the two abovementioned factors into account. On the other side, it is also to 
be kept in mind, as has been pointed out before, that children are, due to their 
developmental status, at risk of being manipulated or influenced by others if being 
prepared for testimony in particular when the preparation techniques go beyond the 
rather formalistic preparation in the context of witness familiarisation. A general 
applicable clear cut position as regards witness proofing of child witnesses should 
therefore not be taken. Instead, a case-by-case assessment, again, is advisable.  
 
2.5.3.2 Age determination 
 
The determination of the age of a child witness or participant is particularly relevant 
when being called to testify on his/her recruitment as a child soldier (victim 
witness).
270
 Making use of age determination techniques could constitute a method 
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which could enhance the credibility of the witness by proofing a witnesses’ alleged 
age.  
 Obviously, only those witnesses who were below the age of fifteen years at the 
time of recruitment might provide evidence on the alleged crime as a direct victim. 
The Prosecution in the Lubanga case held in the closing statements that, 
 
‘the Prosecution presented nine former child soldiers as witnesses. They had to 
remember and relive yet again the details of the horrors that they were trying to 
forget, to leave behind. They had to tell this Court and, indeed, the whole world the 
miseries they had suffered. They are not on record, and we hope we can help them to 
understand that they are not alone, that the failure to protect them will not be 
repeated by this Court. […] [a]ll of the former child soldiers participating in this trial 
have no doubt undergone psychological damage because they lived through an 
atrocious experience and traumatizing because they were soldiers. Many of them – 
many of these former child soldiers underwent physical damage and wide range of 




For the Defence counsel, an attempt to question and disprove the evidence of the 
established age submitted by the Prosecution (or child participant) constitutes a self-
evident defence strategy when arguing that this specific element of crime is not  ed. 
The Lubanga Defence underlined in this regard concerning a Prosecution witness 
that 
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 ‘[l]es témoins D01-0005 et D01-0006, [EXPURGÉ], confirment que W-0010 n’était 




The reason why age determination receives particular attention in international 
criminal proceedings is that armed conflicts often make it impossible to refer to 




The age determination of former child soldiers has already confronted the SCSL 
with major difficulties.
274
 In order to broaden its knowledge on age determination 
assessments, the Special Court invited an expert witness on child soldiers to various 
cases. The witness testified inter alia on age determination and gave an opinion on 
the official age determination process that was undertaken during the disarmament 
process in Sierra Leone.
275
 This testimony could have provided interesting insights 
into the assessment standards of the SCSL. These insights were not accessible, 
since the entire testimony was given in closed session.  
 The overall approach of the SCSL towards age determination is also not visible 
from publicly available documents. From reading selected testimonies of former 
child soldiers which are publicly available, it seems that the SCSL relied in 
particular on situational circumstances (such as reference to a particular (rainy) 
season, school year or information provided by the parents to the witness) as 
described by the witnesses in order to determine their birth date.
276
 Defence 
criticisms on the circumstantial assessment of the age of alleged child soldiers are 
reflected in the closing arguments.
 
Defence counsel in the case of The Prosecutor of 
the Special Court v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, for 
instance, underlined that,  
 
‘[o]ne point I would like to make straight away is that the evidence and the exhibits 
invariably refer merely to child soldiers without particularizing the age group of 
children which are subject matter of the indictment. Most of the evidence that has 
been given in this respect does not specify that it refers to children below the age of 
fifteen but rather just to child soldiers […].’
277
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Similarly, the conviction of alleged perpetrators by the ICC requires that the 
Prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the crime has been 
committed.
278
 This requires not only that children are below fifteen years of age but 
also that perpetrators knew or should have known that the children were below the 
age of fifteen years at the moment of recruitment.
279
  
 In this context, the Defence counsel of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo contested the age 
of Prosecution witnesses who were called to testify on their recruitment as child 
soldiers as to counter argue that the elements of the recruitment crime have been 
established. Such Defence strategy is, for instance, reflected in the questioning of 
witness 10: 
 
Q:  If I were to suggest that you were enlisted by the APC and not the UPC in 1999 
until the year 2003, what would you say? Do you agree? Is that untrue? 
A:  I know nothing about what you’re saying. I was enlisted by the UPC. What 
you’re talking about, I know nothing about that. 
Q:  If I were to suggest that – well, let me rephrase that. If you re-think about the 
period when you joined the ranks of the UPC, rather than being 13 years of age, 
isn’t it true that in fact you were much older than that and most likely already an 
adult?  
[…] 
A:  I told you that when I was enlisted in the UPC I was 13 years old. I don’t 




At a later stage in the Prosecution case, Trial Chamber I – upon request of the 
Prosecution – invited two medical expert witnesses on age determination.
281
 The 
experts prepared an opinion, which establishes the age of the nine victim witnesses 
called by the Prosecution.
282
 Both underlined in their testimony that the 
determination of the age of a person is not a straightforward exercise. The expert 
witness pointed out that, 
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‘At the present time we consider that there may be one year of variation between 
the actual age and the estimated bone age. That is why we generally specify an age 
bracket. […] This is why the intra-and inter-individual variability is so significant, 
but in our clinical use the method what really happens is that somebody comes 
saying he’s 12. A colleague wants us to look at the bone age and see whether this is 
compatible with alleged age. If we find that he’s 10 or 14, to within a year, we’re 
going to say that his pathology is slightly above or slightly under his actual age, 




When being asked by a legal representative to answer whether the current age 
determination technique establishes a reliable age, the expert witness replied that, 
 
‘[i]t gives us an age bracket with a notion of probability, but it would be a mistake to 
want to use this method to have an absolutely sharp assessment of the age. We 
currently do not have the medical means to give you such precision. It gives a fairly 




The expert underlined that, to date, the age of a child can only be assessed based on 
x-ray images of their bones, in particular images of the wrist and hand, 
supplemented by a dental assessment.
285
 The age of a very young child (3 months) 
and an ‘adult’ (17-year-old girl, 19-year-old boy) based on x-ray images can be 




 Assessing the exact age of girls and boys between the ages of fifteen and 
seventeen/eighteen years of age is less easy to determine for three major reasons: 
Firstly, expert witness Catherine Adamsbaum pointed out that a precise age cannot 
always be assessed due to intra variability between different medical disciplines 
which may lead to different age determinations of up to one year. Secondly, inter-
individual variability is also not unlikely – notwithstanding the fact that the 
individual variability of the examining doctor is deemed to be less than one year. 
Thirdly, the age determination atlas referred to when assessing the age is based on 
images which are older than 50 years and limited to the white population of 
Northern America; an African equivalent does not exist.
287
 It was also held that 
social and economic factors, such as diseases and insufficient nutrition also have an 
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impact on age determination.
288
 As a result of these factors, the variability is greater 




The expert witnesses concluded in regard to the victim witnesses who had 
undergone age examinations that two of them were between the ages of fifteen and 
sixteen years at the moment of examination (December 2007 and January 2008) 
while the others were at least nineteen years.
290
 The period in which Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo has been charged with the recruitment of children lasts from early 
September 2002 to 2 June 2003,
291
 and 13 August 2003 respectively.
292
 Relying on 
the reports of the experts and counting back from the determined ages, the 
witnesses would therefore have been approximately between nine and fourteen 
years, with a majority of the witnesses close to the latter age at the moment of 
recruitment. 
 
Considering the lack of precision with regard to those witnesses who were at least 
nineteen years at the moment of x-ray examination, the probability remains that 
these young witnesses were above the age of fifteen at the moment of recruitment. 
The Defence of Lubanga submitted in this regard that Trial Chamber I has to assess 
evidence relating to the age determination of child witnesses with caution.
293
 
 Since the Rome Statute does not criminalise the recruitment of children above 
the age of fifteen years, the Bench in the Lubanga case was confronted with the 
difficulty of determining whether the alleged recruitment of those witnesses indeed, 
constitutes a crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and 




It can be concluded that medical science does not enable the Court to draw definite 
conclusions regarding the age of young witnesses. Bearing this lack of preciseness 
in mind one, may question whether children should expose themselves to the 
necessary examinations if in the end, the Court may not be able to use the medical 
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Children have appeared as witness before the ICTY, the SCSL, the ICC and TRCs. 
As has been pointed out throughout this chapter, the particular focus on the case of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo does not permit drawing definite conclusions. Tendencies 
are nevertheless visible.  
 The analysis established that age as such is not referred to as exclusionary factor 
for child witness testimony. It has also been pointed out that child witness 
testimony is not necessarily limited to minors. Instead, one may also speak of ‘child 
witnesses’, when a young adult witness gives evidence about events that took place 
at a moment when the witness was a minor.  
 In contrast to the actual appearance of child witnesses in the court room is the 
fact that child witness testimony is not extensively regulated in the Rome Statute 
and the respective rules. As a result, specific aspects relating to the legal status, 
such as children’s ability to provide informed consent, the need to benefit from 
child specific protective measures, and the credibility of the child have not 
extensively been reflected in the procedural regulation. These aspects, however, 
appeared to be of particular relevance in the practice of the ICC. Based upon the 
analysis made, it is held that there is indeed a need to introduce a special regime 
which regulates child witness testimony in ICC proceedings. In particular because 
both the potential immaturity and the impact of conflict situations might bear 
negative implications for the credibility of the child.  
 In this regard, the immaturity of the witness and his or her (potential re-) 
traumatisation have been recognised by the procedural laws and the practice of the 
Court to require a particular child-sensitive response. At the same time, it has 
become clear that, bearing in mind the discussion on the maturity of the child 
witness and the risk of manipulation, children cannot generally be presumed to be 
indispensable witnesses even if crimes have been charged to which children had 
become direct victims. 
 It is to be noted in this regard that even if one third of the prosecution witnesses 
in the Lubanga case amounted to former child soldiers, the introductory hypothesis 
that child witnesses might be indispensable is disproven. The judgment of Trial 
Chamber I established that the calling of child witnesses, even if child-specific 
crimes such as the recruitment crime have been charged, cannot generally be 
considered a conditio sine qua non for a successful conviction. A conclusion which 
is supported by the Appeals Chamber Judgment of 1 December 2014 as also this 
judgment upheld the conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.
295
 
 In line with the foregoing, it is furthermore concluded, that even if the child is 
said to be generally capable of providing truthful testimony, measures to enhance 
the child’s credibility might be necessary. This is because child-specific factors, 
such insufficient preparation for the testimony might have an impact on a child’s 
ability to provide credible testimony. The decision takers are therefore invited to 
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reassess whether an exception to the prohibition of witness proofing is called for 
when children give testimony. 
 In sum, it has become clear that the maturity of the child and the impact of 
conflict situations, in particular the likelihood of being traumatised, are to be 
examined when assessing whether child participation is in the best interests of the 
individual child. As exemplified by the unreliable testimony of young witnesses in 
the Lubanga case, giving testimony might not necessarily be in the best interests of 
the child. Being made subject to manipulation and subsequently being revealed as a 
lying and therefore unreliable witness cannot be considered to have a positive effect 
on the child. It stigmatises the child as being manipulative and a liar.  
 At least as far as the Lubanga case is concerned, the participation of child 
witnesses may even have negative implications for the image of former child 
soldiers. All child witness testimony has been unreliable. The perception that 
former child soldiers, or perhaps even children as such, are not to be considered as 
credible witnesses (and persons) could be reinforced. A perception which 
contravenes the research which has established that child testimony can, in principle, 
be used. The entire exclusion of the child witnesses’ testimony could also give rise 
to further stigmatisation of former child soldiers and hinder their reintegration in 
post-conflict societies. Taking the Lubanga judgment into account, it is underlined 
that all parties involved have to assess the question whether the participation of 
child witnesses is still to be considered in their best interests if, in the end, their 














With the establishment of the ICC, for the first time in the history of international 
criminal law, victims can participate in international criminal proceedings.
296
 The 
possibility of victim participation in criminal proceedings constitutes a novelty and 
special feature of ICC proceedings.
297
 Children may also participate as victims. The 
participation as victim in ICC proceedings is not limited to the course of the 
criminal proceedings. As child claimant, children may also participate in the 
reparation proceedings. This capacity is further explored in Chapter Five. Instead of 
being limited to the role of beneficiary of substantive protection, the participation in 
the proceedings as victim participant and/or claimant, empowers the child to pursue 
his or her personal interest – this presupposes, however, that the investigator started 
investigations in a particular situation and that victims can prove, amongst others, a 
causal link between the harm suffered and the charges. In contrast to the procedural 
capacity of the child witness, the involvement of the child in these capacities is, 
without disregarding the two aforementioned potential constraints, less determined 
by a prosecutorial or defence strategy. 
 
The first case concerned the recruitment of children as war crime. Children are the 
direct victims of this crime. It is no surprise, therefore, that children participated as 
victims in this case. This opportunity constituted a tool which enabled the child to 




After a brief reflection on victim participation and an overview of actual child 
participation in ICC proceedings, this chapter examines three aspects of child 
participation in light of the first practice at the ICC: firstly, it examines the victim 
requirements as codified under the Rome Statute when applied to children; 
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secondly, the chapter analyses constraints which may hinder children’s effective 
access to the criminal proceedings; finally, it analyses to what extent the modalities 
of victim participation might require adjustment when children participate. Each of 
the forgoing aspects thereby analyses whether a distinct approach compared to adult 
participants is necessary when children participate in the course of the criminal 
proceedings. 
 
The specific research questions addressed in this chapter read as follows: how are 
the victim requirements applied to children? To what extent is the application 
procedure child-sensitive, and does it take account of the evolving capacities of the 
child. When children succeed in applying for participation, the follow-up question 
is to what extent is the procedure governing the pre-trial and trial phase sufficiently 
child-sensitive? Finally, which modalities of victim participation are particularly 
(in)appropriate for children? 
 The previous chapter particularly addressed those legal aspects which should be 
taken into account when considering the question whether child witness 
participation in criminal proceedings is in the best interests of the child. The current 
chapter aims to focus more specifically on the question of whether and how child 
participation in criminal proceedings before the ICC is provided for in accordance 
with the evolving capacities of the child and whether a distinct procedural treatment 
is necessary for child participants compared to adult participants. As has been 
explained in Chapter One, the principle of the evolving capacities might provide 
guidance for answering the question whether participation in ICC proceedings can 
be considered to be in the best interests of the child. 
 
3.2 VIEWS ON VICTIM PARTICIPATION 
 
Discussions concerning victim participation in the criminal proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court have been held since the drafting process of the Rome 
Statute.
299
 Scholars who are in favour of victim participation argue in particular that 
victim participation in the course of international criminal proceedings strengthens 
the transparency of international criminal justice in relation to victims.
300
 As a 
lesson to be learned from the lack of victim participation in the proceedings before 
the ad hoc tribunals, participation of victims in ICC proceedings brings victims’ 
personal experiences and suffering into the court room setting.
301
 The presence of 
victims thereby informs all parties involved and the Court, but also informs the 
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public of the harm they experienced.
302
 In particular within the ‘no peace without 
justice’ debate it has been held that victim participation may contribute not only to 
the personal healing process of the individual victim but also to national 
reconciliation processes and the establishment of peace.
303
 In sum, these voices 
welcome the possibility of victim participation in ICC proceedings. The 
participation of victims is recognised as a development which fills the gap of the 
earlier criminal courts and tribunals with regards to victims of international crimes. 
 In contrast to this applauding position, other scholars share the view that victim 
participation in the criminal proceedings is rather problematic.
304
 It is argued that 
criminal proceedings before the ICC are not the right forum for victims of 
international crimes.
305
 The lack of procedural clarity as regards the modalities of 
participation have been pointed out as constituting a particular risk for the fair trial 
of the accused.
306
 In particular since the accusatorial nature of the criminal 
proceedings before the ICC does not leave room for the participation of a third 
protagonist in addition to the defence and prosecution. As a result of victim 
participation, the accused could be said to be confronted with a second prosecutor 
as allegations raised by victims also have to be counter argued. Furthermore, the 
critics point out that the potentially large number of victims is difficult to 
accommodate in the course of criminal proceedings without delaying the process as 





It can be concluded from the foregoing brief overview that the views concerning the 
added value of victim participation in the criminal proceedings before the ICC are 
divided. For the following discussion of child victim participation one should 
therefore keep in mind that the debate about victim, including child participation in 
the criminal proceedings before the ICC is still on-going. It is therefore that the 
present research, besides the aforementioned objectives of the current chapter, also 
aims to provide further ingredients as regards this academic exchange. 
  
3.3 CHILD VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN ICC PRACTICE 
 
Including the Lubanga case, five out of the current eighteen cases (in eight 
situations) before the ICC include the war crime charge of the recruitment of 
children under the age of fifteen years.
308
 The possible existence of child victim 
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participants that may seek access to the ICC may, however, not be limited to these 
five cases. Instead, all cases pending before the Court charge crimes of which 
children could have become victims – such as charges of inhuman treatment, sexual 
slavery, rape, attacks against schools or direct attacks against the civilian population 
(see section 1.2, Chapter One).
309
 The participation of children in the proceedings 
before the ICC might therefore not be limited to those individual cases that 
prosecute the recruitment of child soldiers. Thus far, child participation has in 
particular been addressed in the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and in the 
proceedings against Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui.
310
 
 The overall number of child victim participants in the first case before the ICC, 
the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, amounts to 129 victims who 
successfully applied for participation.
311
 Among these were approximately fifty 
child victims who were below the age of eighteen years when the application was 
filed.
312
 The majority of the remaining victims that successfully applied for 
participation were former child soldiers that turned eighteen before filing their 
application, but were a child at the time they were victimised.
313
 The high 
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percentage of child participants can be explained by the fact that the only crimes 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo has been accused of concern the conscription, enlistment 
and active use of children below the age of fifteen years in hostilities.
314
 The only 




3.4 APPLICATION OF VICTIM REQUIREMENTS TO THE CHILD 
 
To participate in proceedings, children as adults must meet the criteria of 
victimhood. Article 68(3) of the ICC Statute regulates the notion of victimhood.
316
 
This provision, by not distinguishing between different categories of victims, also 
includes children as potential participants. It states that, 
 
‘[w]here the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit 
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings 
determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial 
to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such 
views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims 





In order to participate in ICC proceedings, individuals need to be recognised as 
victims. Rule 85(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court defines victims as, 
 
‘natural persons who have suffered harm as result of the commission of any crime 




The drafters of the ICC RPE gathered their inspiration for the victim definition from 
the UN General Assembly 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice of 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. 
319
 Art. 1 of the Declaration states that,  
                                                                                                                       
two accused have not only been charged with the recruitment crime (as in Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) 
but are also allegedly responsibility for the commission of other crimes falling within the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. About eight former child soldiers participated in 
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‘“Victims” means persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, 
including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or 
substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that 
are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member States […].’  
 
This Declaration formed the basis for the later 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law.
320
 As the RPE of the ICC, no distinction is made between adult 
and child victims. Principle no. 8 defines victims as  
 
‘persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of 
their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations 
of international human rights law, or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the 
term “victim” also includes the immediate family or dependants of the direct 
victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in 




In the first decisions relating to these provisions, Pre-Trial Chamber I, whose 
practice has been followed broadly by other Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers, held that 




o The victim must be a natural person 
o who has suffered harm 
o as a result of a crime 
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The procedural capacity of the victim participant does not exist as a matter of right. 
Instead, it constitutes a potential right (depending on the competent Chamber’s 
approval (Article 68(3) Rome Statute)).
323
 In case of recognition, victim 
participants, including children, do not become true parties to the criminal 
proceedings (such as the Defence or Prosecution).
324
 Instead, the relevant Chamber 
decides not only upon the approval or rejection of the application, but also on the 
concrete modalities of victim participation when convinced that the personal 




3.4.1 Natural person 
 
First of all, victims who wish to participate must be a natural person – a human 
being.
326
 According to Pre-Trial Chamber I, anyone who is not considered to be a 
legal person is a natural person.
327
 Rule 85 RPE does not distinguish between 
different age categories of victims. Thus, all children – irrespective of their age – 






The person who wishes to participate must have suffered harm. This may be of a 
material, physical or psychological nature.
329
 The notion of harm within the 
meaning of the ICC Statute and its RPE is considered as being direct or indirect in 
nature.
330
 Direct harm constitutes harm that is the result of crimes charged. Indirect 
harm may be caused by a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court that is allegedly 
committed against one person (the direct victim) but at the same time causes harm 
to another person (the indirect victim).
331
 While Rule 85 RPE does not stipulate that 
indirect victims are included in the victim definition, this aspect was ruled upon by 
Trial Chamber I in the decision of 18 January 2008 in the Lubanga case. The 
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Chamber clearly stated that indirect victims are included in the victim definition 
and may therefore be recognised as participants.  
 
The Chamber ruled that,  
 
‘[i]n relation to the link between the harm allegedly suffered and the crime, whereas 
Rule 85(b) of the Rules provides that legal persons must have “sustained direct 
harm”, Rule 85(a) of the Rules does not include that stipulation for natural persons, 
and applying a purposive interpretation, it follows that people can be the direct or 




This particular issue was confirmed and further elaborated on by the Appeals 
Chamber, which stipulated that both, direct and indirect victims must establish that 
they have suffered ‘personal’ harm. The Appeals Chamber concluded that it, 
 
‘confirms the finding of the Trial Chamber to the extent that the Trial Chamber 
determined that harm suffered by victims does not necessarily have to be direct and 
amends the decision to include that harm suffered by a victim applicant for the 




Next to the recognition of the child as a direct victim, the child participant may 
therefore also be recognised as an indirect victim. This is at issue when the harm 
suffered by the direct victim gives rise to harm suffered by the child. When, for 
instance, the parents of a child died and their death is the result of a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court, the child can be considered to be an indirect victim. 
Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Bemba case, established in this regard that due to the 





3.4.3 The jurisdiction criterion 
 
The alleged crime must constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute provides that the current jurisdiction of the Court 
covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes (jurisdiction 
ratione materiae).
335
 In addition, the application to participate in the criminal 
proceedings must establish that the victimisation took place within the jurisdiction 
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ratione temporis (Article 11 Rome Statute) and the jurisdiction ratione personae or 
loci (Article 12 ICC Statute).  
 One specific crime is limited to a particular group of direct child victims.
336
 This 
is the war crime of child recruitment as enshrined in Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 
8(2)(e)(vii) Rome Statute.
337
 Both provisions and the corresponding Elements of 
Crimes request that the direct victims were under the age of fifteen years at the 
moment of conscription, enlistment or direct use in hostilities.
338
 
 Furthermore, children can – irrespective of their specific age at the moment of 
crime commission – also qualify as direct victims of various crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, such as torture, inhuman treatment or sexual slavery. This is 
because the elements of these crimes are not restricted to the particular age of the 
victim. As the travaux préparatoires do not refer to any age limitation with the 
exception of the war crime of child recruitment, it seems that the age of the child 
victim has not been recognised as being of particular relevance during the drafting 
process in relation to the elements of crime. 
 
3.4.4 The causality criterion 
 
Pre-Trial Chamber I elaborated in its decision of 17 January 2006 that causality 
between the harm suffered and the crime must be proven.
339
 The Chamber held that 
applicants must establish at an investigative (situational) stage, 
 
‘that there are grounds to believe that the harm suffered is the result of the 
commission of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court. However, the 
Chamber considers that it is not necessary to determine in any great detail at this 
stage the precise nature of the causal link and the identity of the persons responsible 




Thereby, the Pre-Trial Chamber introduced a distinction between participation at 
the investigation (situational) stage and trial (case) stage.
341
 Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
whose practice has also been followed by Pre-Trial Chamber III, underlined that,  
                                                 
336
  The ICC refers to the Convention on the Rights of the Child standard, see, among others, ICC-
02/04-01/05-252, para. 20. For further discussion on the impact of the extensive number of 
victims seeking to participate, see Heikkilä 2004, at 152-154. 
337
  See, among other decisions concerning child victims of the recruitment crime, ICC-01/04-505, 
paras. 91, 93, 95, 97, 99. 
338
  Arts. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the 2002 Elements of Crime of the International Criminal 
Court. See for further information on this particular crime, Cottier & Zimmermann 2008, at 466-
475 (paras. 227-234). 
339
  ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, para. 94. 
340
  Ibid., para. 94 ; No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr, para. 4; ICC-01/04-01/06-601, at 9. 
341
  ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, para. 65. The Chamber held that it ‘considers that the Statute, the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations of the Court draw a distinction between situations 
and cases in terms of the different kinds of proceedings, initiated by any organ of the Court, that 
they entail. Situations, which are generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some 








‘[t]he Single Judge will therefore refrain from analyzing the various theories on 
causality and will instead adopt a pragmatic, strictly factual approach, whereby the 
alleged harm will be held as “resulting from” the alleged incident when the spatial 
and temporal circumstances surrounding the appearance of the harm and the 





Accordingly, in this decision, Pre-Trial Chamber II suggested a pragmatic instead 
of a formalistic approach when considering causality. 
 At trial stage, thus when the accused is already identified, the Appeals Chamber 
held that victims wishing to participate in the trial proceedings against Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo must establish that the harm suffered is linked with the charges 
against the accused.
343
 The causal requirement at trial stage between the harm 
suffered and the charged crime has also, for instance, been restated in the 
proceedings against Jean Pierre Bemba.
344
 Thus far, the ICC did not distinguish 
between children and adults when examining the causality requirement. 
 
3.4.5 The evidentiary standard used 
 
As the burden of proof rests on those who apply for participation, victims are 
requested to submit convincing pieces of evidence in order to prove their 
victimisation. Various Chambers addressed in their decisions the evidentiary 
standard to be complied with in the pre-trial and trial phase of the proceedings. 
 Pre-Trial Chamber I elaborated in the earlier addressed decision of 17 January 
2006, 
 
‘that there are grounds to believe that the harm suffered is the result of the 




At trial stage, a higher standard was chosen. Victims were requested to establish 
reasonable grounds to believe that they have become victims of a crime charged.
346
 
With regard to the standard at trial stage, Pre-Trial Chamber I held in its decision of 
29 June 2006 that the evidentiary standard is stricter. The Chamber ruled that, 
 
‘the [a]pplicants must demonstrate that a sufficient causal link exists between the 
harm they have suffered and the crimes for which there are reasonable grounds to 
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believe that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo bears criminal responsibility and for which the 




The grounds to believe and reasonable grounds to believe standards of proof have 
been introduced in very early decisions and were similarly – though not necessarily 
with the same terminology – applied by other Chambers.
348
 
 Pre-trial Chamber I ruled in the Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
case that prima facie evidence is sufficient in order to establish that those who 
applied for participation in the criminal proceedings, including children, are victims. 
The standard of prima facie permits a presumption in favour of the victim who 
applies for participation if convincing evidence is submitted.
349
 It is for this reason 
that Pre-Trial Chamber I pointed out that an assessment of the credibility of the 
victim statement is not made at this early stage. Why this conclusion is particularly 
relevant for the child is addressed in more detail in turn. The Chamber held that, 
 
‘[c]onsidering further that the applicants are only required to demonstrate that the 
four requirements established by rule 85 of the Rules are met prima facie and that 
therefore the Single Judge’s analysis of the Applications “will not consist in 
assessing the credibility of the [applicants’] statement[s] or engaging in a process of 
corroboration strictu sensu”, but will assess the applicants’ statements first and 
foremost on the merits of their intrinsic coherence, as well as on the basis of the 




In the same tenor. Pre-Trial Chamber II, whose practice has also been followed by 
Pre-Trial Chamber III, underlined that,  
 
‘[a]s regards the method of examination and the required standard of proof, the 
Statute does not set forth general rules on the basis of which the reliability of 
relevant elements is to be assessed […]. Accordingly, in the absence of any such 
rules, the Chamber has broad discretion in assessing the soundness of a given 
statement or other piece of evidence. Such an assessment has to comply with the 
general principle of law that the burden of proof of elements supporting a claim lies 
on the party making the claim. […].’
351
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Accordingly, the credibility of the child is assessed at the pre-trial phase of the 
proceedings, but alongside criteria which are not set forth in the statutory rules. 
Instead, the Chamber is of the view that it has a broad discretion in this regard. 
 
As regards the evidentiary standard at trial stage, Trial Chamber I also adopted a 
pragmatic approach based on the prima facie standard at trial stage. It was found 
that this standard was met despite the fact that inconsistencies existed concerning 
the birth date of some victims as set out in the application form and the submitted 
documents. The decision of Trial Chamber I stipulated furthermore, that the 
credibility of the victim is assumed as long as the provided documents do not 
indicate another conclusion. The assessment of the Chamber is of a nature which is 
also known in civil proceedings, as it assumed compliance with the criteria of Rule 
85 RPE unless it is disproved. Trial Chamber I underlined that, 
 
‘[t]he Chamber has carefully weighed the inconsistencies in each case, but in all the 
circumstances the differences do not, ipso facto, undermine the credibility of the 
applicants’ assertion as to his or her age in the application form, supported by 
documents that have been provided such as student identity card, election cards and 
birth certificates. In the view of the Chamber, the material when considered overall, 
proves, prima facie, the identity and age of the applicants in accordance with the 




Hence, Trial Chamber I underlined that generally speaking, a prima facie standard 
of evidence is adopted in order to determine victim status.
353
  
 Following the practice at pre-trial stage, Trial Chamber I did not examine the 
credibility of the victim’s statement. The same Chamber underlined that this 
assessment must be distinguished from a higher evidence test. It held that, 
 
‘[it] needs to be stressed that this is a prima facie conclusion, rather than one that is 




Also noteworthy in this regard is that the Appeals Chamber held in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen on 
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23 February 2009 that, a case-by-case analysis is necessary in order to determine 




3.5 CHILDREN APPLYING FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
The procedure to be followed when a victim wishes to participate in the criminal 
proceedings before the ICC is elaborated in the RPE of the Court. Since the RPE do 
not distinguish between adult and child victims, children applying for participation 
have to comply with the procedural requirements as set out in Rules 89-91 of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It will be established in turn that when children 
apply for participation, additional procedural particularities arise.  
 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Rule 89 provide that, 
 
‘(i)n order to present their views and concerns, victims shall make written 
application to the Registrar, who shall transmit the application to the relevant 
Chamber. Subject to the provisions of the Statute, in particular article 68, 
paragraph 1, the Registrar shall provide a copy of the application to the Prosecutor 
and the defence, who shall be entitled to reply within a time limit to be set by the 
Chamber. Subject to the provisions of sub-rule 2, the Chamber shall then specify 
the proceedings and manner in which participation is considered appropriate, 
which may include making opening and closing statements.’ 
 
The Chamber, on its own initiative or on the application of the Prosecutor or the 
defence, may reject the application if it considers that the person is not a victim or 
that the criteria set forth in article 68, paragraph 3, are not otherwise fulfilled. A 
victim whose application has been rejected may file a new application later in the 
proceedings.’ 
 
The use of the joint application form which is made available by the Court (and 
which has also been suggested to be used in order to request reparations) is not 
compulsory. It is sufficient that the victim who applies for participation provides the 
Court with the information in writing as pointed out in Regulation 86 of the 
Regulations of the Court and asked for in the ‘Request for Participation in 
Proceedings and Reparations at the ICC’ (hereinafter ‘the application form’).
356
 In 
relation to the application form the Registry pointed out that,  
 
‘experience showed that these two forms (originally there were two separate 
application forms) were sometimes confusing for victims, who sometimes filled in 
one instead of the other, or believed that in completing an application for 
participation in proceedings they were also applying for reparations. It was 
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therefore decided to merge the two forms under RoC 86(1) and RoC(1) into one 
common form, which was approved by the Presidency in 2010. The new forms 
were not used by the majority of applicants in the Lubanga case, since their 





In contrast to the other Trial Chambers of the Court, Trial Chamber V introduced a 
different application procedure. It held that the procedure contained in Rule 89 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is only to be complied with as regards  
 
‘victims who wish to present their views and concerns individually by appearing 
directly before the Chamber, […] other victims, who wish to participate without 
appearing before the Chamber, should be permitted to present their views and 
concerns through a common legal representative without having to go through the 
procedure established by Rule 80 of the Rules. […] Victims who do not wish to 
present their views and concerns individually and directly to the Chamber, but 
rather to express those views and concerns solely through common legal 
representation, will not be required to submit an application under Rule 89(1) of 
the Rules. However, these victims may, if they so wish, register with the Registry, 
indicating their names, contact details as well as information as to the harm 
suffered. The Registry shall enter these victim registrations into a database, which 
it will administer and make accessible to the Common Legal Representative. The 
purpose of this registration is threefold: first, to provide victims with a channel 
through which they can formalize their claim of victimhood; second, to establish a 
personal connection between the victim and the Common Legal Representative, 
enabling victims to provide their input and allowing the Common Legal 
Representative to give relevant feedback to the victims; third, to assist the Court in 





The standard application form contains eight parts (A-H) which are briefly 
addressed in turn. Part A of the application form requests personal information 
about the victim, such as name, birth date, or information about the person acting on 
behalf of the victim. Part B asks for information about the alleged crime(s) and Part 
C to do so in regard to injury, loss or harm suffered. Victims can choose under Parts 
D and E in which specific, or perhaps even all stages of the proceedings (criminal 
and/or reparation), they wish to participate. Part F requests information about the 
legal representation of the victim. Finally, Part G asks the victim whether he or she 
would be concerned if their identity were to be revealed to the Defence or the 
Prosecutor and Part H requests the signature of the person applying for participation 
and also, if applicable, the signature of a third person acting on their behalf. Victims 
may choose to be represented before the Court by a legal representative. Rule 90 
RPE states that,  
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‘1. A victim shall be free to choose a legal representative. 2. Where there are a number of 
victims, the Chamber may, for the purposes of ensuring the effectiveness of the 
proceedings, request the victims or particular groups of victims, if necessary with the 
assistance of the Registry, to choose a common legal representative or representatives. In 
facilitating the coordination of victim representation, the Registry may provide assistance, 
inter alia, by referring the victims to a list of counsel, maintained by the Registry, or 
suggesting one or more common legal representatives. 3. If the victims are unable to 
choose a common legal representative or representatives within a time limit that the 
Chamber may decide, the Chamber may request the Registrar to choose one or more 
common legal representatives. 4. The Chamber and the Registry shall take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that in the selection of common legal representatives, the distinct interests 
of the victims, particularly as provided in article 68, paragraph 1, are represented and that 
any conflict of interest is avoided. 5. A victim or group of victims who lack the 
necessary means to pay for a common legal representative chosen by the Court may 
receive assistance from the Registry, including, as appropriate, financial assistance. 6. A 
legal representative of a victim or victims shall have the qualifications set forth in rule 22, 
sub-rule 1.’ 
 
Completed forms should be sent to the Victims Participation and Reparations 
Section (VPRS) or to one of the Field Offices of the ICC.
359
 Victims, including 
children, are encouraged to fill in the application form as completely as possible. 
This implies that the competent Chambers nevertheless consider applications that 
are not fully completed. 
 




Turning next to the technicalities of the procedure when children apply for 
participation in the criminal proceedings, it is noted that children have to comply 
with additional requirements compared to adults. Adults are only requested to 
comply with the four requirements of Rule 85 RPE when accessing the ICC. 
Children have to comply with two additional requirements that are not called for in 
the statutory rules. These requirements relate to the legal (in)competence of the 
child to file an application and the related condition that another person should act 
on behalf of the child. Both aspects have been introduced by various Chambers of 
the ICC and have also been included in the amended application form. Paragraph 3 
of Rule 89 RPE states that, 
 
‘an application may also be made by a person acting with the consent of the victim, 
or acting on behalf of a victim’ (emphasis added).  
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Neither the Statute nor the RPE require that applications of a child shall be made by 
a person acting on behalf of a child. It is the application form which requires that 
the child meets two additional conditions. Firstly, it states that, 
 
‘[u]sually a victim will apply for him/herself. In some cases this is not possible, for 
example because the victim is a child or is disabled […]. In such cases, another 
person may be permitted to act on behalf of the victim. The victim should consent to 





Secondly, a child’s application must contain proof of relationship between the child 
and the person acting on his/her behalf.
362
 The Booklet Guide explicitly states that 
failing to do this will mean that the application has been invalidly presented.
363
 
These requirements have been incorporated into the application form through the 




Practice of the Pre-Trial Chambers 
 
Applications submitted by a minor have been rejected by Pre-Trial Chambers I and 
II.
365
 The Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber I held that, 
 
‘Applicant a/0332/07 is a minor who submits a complete application on his own 
behalf; a student card is submitted as proof of identity; the date and location of the 
alleged crime(s) are sufficiently indicated on the application […]. As Applicant 
a/0332/07 is a minor, however, his application must be submitted by a person who 
has attained the age of majority. Since the present application was submitted by 




Pre-Trial Chamber II in its decision of 10 March 2009 held that, 
 
‘the principle of ensuring the expediency of the proceedings makes it appropriate to 




According to this Chamber, if minors themselves submit applications, they may be 
excluded for reasons of judicial economy. 
 Pre-Trial Chamber I established that applications submitted by persons who are 
neither the next-of-kin nor legal guardian of a minor 
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‘must contain the consent of the next-of-kin or legal guardian that an application has 




Practice of the Trial Chambers 
 
Trial Chamber II applied a more relaxed and therefore preferable approach as 
minors succeeded in filing an application on their own behalf. This Chamber is not 
of the belief that minor applicants should be prohibited from filing an application 
under Rule 89(3) RPE. It pointed out that a case-by-case assessment, in particular 
taking into account the maturity and powers of discernment of the child was 
appropriate.
369
 Age itself has not been referred to as an exclusionary factor. By 
taking into account the maturity and powers of discernment of the child, this 
Chamber evaluates the capacity of the individual child. The Chamber does not 
explain how, against which yardstick, it takes its conclusions as regards the capacity 
of the child. It can therefore not be concluded whether the principle of the evolving 
capacities of the child would have been used by the Chamber as a yardstick. This 
principle aims to ensure that the child’s limited autonomy is gradually to be 
enlarged in order to increase his/her own participation in the decision-making 
process (Chapter One). Regardless of the lack of direct reference, this permissive 
approach indicates that the Chamber takes the individual circumstances of 
particular children into account when deciding upon their application for 
participation. 
 A similar permissive approach has been adopted by Trial Chamber I in the 
Lubanga case.
370
 The Chamber pointed out that it is generally of the view that child 
applications should be submitted by a person acting on behalf of the child. It held at 
the same time that the Rome Statute does not request that child applicants who are 
close to eighteen years of age are obliged to have a person acting on their behalf 
who fulfils the next-of-kin or legal guardian requirement. It stressed that other 
persons may also act on behalf of the child. This has been argued alongside the 
example of former child soldiers who are often separated from their family. It has 
also been recognised that large-scale crises may prevent children from proving 
kinship or guardianship. Moreover, it stipulated that the concept of legal 
guardianship itself may not exist as, for example, is the case in Eastern Congo. Trial 
Chamber I therefore ruled that it determines on a case-by-case basis whether the 
person acting on behalf of the child can be considered as suitable.
371
  
 The Chamber did not establish criteria for the suitability of a third person. As a 
result, the question is left unanswered as to whether, for instance, child rights NGOs 
are potentially organisations that can submit an application on behalf of the child. 
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This specific discussion is currently being held with regard to collective 
communications submitted by NGOs under the optional protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child which establishes an individual complaint mechanism.
372
 
There might be a justified fear that child rights NGOs acting on behalf of the child 
might support children’s applications in order to promote their own organisational 
objectives. For this reason, monitoring mechanisms could be installed in order to 
prevent such abuse. It is to be kept in mind, that such abuse is also not unlikely 
when individuals act on behalf of the child. Accordingly, a carful assessment is 
already indispensable in cases in which individuals act on behalf of the child. 
Monitoring when NGOs act on behalf of children can therefore be presumed not to 
be so different from the monitoring of individual persons acting on behalf of the 
child. The Committee on the Rights of the Child held in General Comment No. 6 
that, 
 
‘[r]eview mechanisms shall be introduced and implemented to monitor the quality of 
the exercise of guardianship in order to ensure the best interests of the child are 





 Trial Chamber I also introduced an exception to the condition that applications 
must be submitted by a person acting on behalf of the child. It held that applications 




 The Chamber did not rule that children below the age of eighteen years are 
generally recognised as being competent to submit an application for participation 
without a person acting on their behalf if they are mature and capable of 




The approach taken by the Trial Chambers compared to the position adopted by the 
Pre-Trial Chambers is preferred by the author for the above mentioned reasons. 
This does not mean that all questions have been addressed. These decisions still 
raise the questions whether, firstly, the Chambers were entitled to introduce the 
additional requirements that a person who has attained the age of majority and is the 
next-of-kin or legal guardian has to submit an application on behalf of a minor 
applicant. Secondly, is there a legal basis to restrict applications submitted by 
                                                 
372
  UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Second Session, Working Group on an optional 
protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Second session, Geneva, 6-10 December 
2010, Proposal for a draft optional protocol prepared by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Open-
ended Working Group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to 
provide a communication procedure, explanatory memorandum, UN Doc. A/HRC.WG.7/2/2 
(2010), paras. 9-14. 
373
  General Comment No. 6, para. 35. 
374










minors for reasons of judicial economy? Even if a justification could be found by, 
for instance, referring to the fact that an exclusion is justified because of the 
procedural differences at pre-trial and trial stage, an explicit argumentation is to be 
provided for by the Court. It is to be noted that, on the basis of Rule 89(2) RPE, 
rejected applicants are free to submit a new application for participation at a later 
stage in the proceedings. Furthermore, other Chambers of the Court are not bound 
by this practice in terms of precedents.
375
 
 As a result of this specific treatment, orphans or children separated from their 
families might have unequal access to the International Criminal Court, because 
they are unable to fulfil the guardianship requirement compared to other children 
and adults. The wording of Rule 85 RPE enables all individuals to potentially 
qualify as a victim. It seems that the specific treatment when children apply for 
participation falls short of providing for a child-sensitive examination of 
applications submitted by particular groups of children. It seems furthermore that 
the specific circumstances of the individual child applicant are not taken into 
account. Does the exclusion of child applicants for this particular reason therefore 
fail to adequately (or perhaps even not at all) address the evolving capacities of the 
individual child which could (depending on the particular case) make the request to 
establish guardianship dispensable? 
 Without further explanation and reference to a legal basis, a rigid exclusion 
based in particular upon the age of the child (younger than 18 years old), entails the 
risk that the Court does not sufficiently take into account the evolving capacities of 
the individual child which call for a growing involvement of the child in accordance 
with his/her capabilities (Chapter One). An illustrative example of such exclusion 
would exist in relation to child-headed households. A child who leads a child-
headed household (a phenomenon which is not uncommon in conflict situations) 
would, in light of this approach, neither be able to submit an application on his/her 
own behalf nor on behalf of his/her siblings and other dependents. It is also to be 
remembered in this regard, that disadvantaged children who lost or have been 
separated from their parents and live in a country in which an armed conflict is 
ongoing often are unable to establish guardianship.
376
 
 The possibility that children thus can participate in criminal proceedings leads 
again to the question whether participation can be considered to be in the best 
interests of the child – bearing in mind in particular the above addressed 
disadvantages of victim participation. When discussing this question the following 
aspects are to be kept in mind from a legal perspective: Despite the lack of a clearly 
developed procedural legal status of the child in the course of international criminal 
(and equally reparation) proceedings, the possibility to be involved in such 
proceedings should not be underestimated for numerous reasons. Firstly, when the 
most fundamental rights of the child are violated, and the immediate caregivers or 
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the State cannot protect the child,
377
 the international procedural capability of 
remedying the violations constitutes the only available remedy in order to restore 
justice.
378
 The restoration of justice is of outstanding relevance during or in the 
aftermath of armed conflict and large scale violence.
379
 Moreover, restoration of 
justice is not a progress that is limited to adults. Within this phase, children’s 
involvement constitutes an added value to the overall process of conflict resolution 
and is part and parcel to a sustainable peace.
380
 The Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict underlined in the 2010 report 
that, 
 
‘[t]o attempt transitional justice processes without involving children not only fails 
to comply with the Convention on the Rights of the Child – the most universally 
ratified international instrument – it also compromises the outcome of those 
processes.  
 
The imperative of child participation in transitional justice has gained both credence 
and clarity in past years. The importance and potential of transitional justice for 
children is evident. At the same time, it is more widely recognized that their views 





The legal competence of the child to apply for participation is therefore also to be 
seen in light of the fact that the recognition of children as ‘key stakeholders in rule 
of law initiatives’ is due, as clearly underlined by the United Nations Secretary-
General who underlined in the UN Approach to Justice for Children that, 
 
‘[a]ccess to justice, though increasingly recognized as an important strategy for 
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Bearing the aforementioned in mind it is also to be noted that recognising on the 
one side the legal competence of the child to file an application for participation 
introduces at the same time the possibility of various procedural difficulties and 
the potential to expose children to additional risks, such as abuse of their 
caregivers, representatives or lawyers and, last but not least, re-traumatisation. 
Risks, however, do not diminish the laudable effects of granting children the 
choice of whether to participate.
383
 Moreover, the likelihood of procedural 
difficulties that exist, for instance with regard to age and ability to give informed 
consent do not constitute a justification for limiting the child’s exercise of his/her 
human rights, in particular the right to a remedy. It is notable in this regard that 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child enables all children, regardless of their 




What has become clear from the aforementioned is that procedural regulation 
should be introduced under the Rome Statute in the near future in order to clarify 
under which circumstances and conditions children are to be recognised as being 
legally competent to file an application for participation in the criminal proceedings 
before the Court. The current lack of procedural regulation entails the risk that 
neither the child nor the legal representative can evaluate prior to the actual 
application whether a child at all will be recognised to be legally competent to file 
an application.  
 
3.5.2 Child-specific evidence 
 
Of particular relevance for the current chapter are the forms of evidence which 
children who wish to participate may submit in support of an application for 
participation in the criminal proceedings.
385
 While the crime-related evidentiary 
standard of Rule 85 RPE applicable to all victims who apply for participation is 
briefly described above (section 3.4.5), this section examines in particular the 
practice of the Court which introduced the requirement that additional 
administrative evidence has to be submitted when children apply for participation. 
 Firstly, reading Rule 85 RPE together with Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) 
of the Rome Statute and the application form, it becomes clear that the child is 
requested to identify him/herself and in particular needs to prove that he/she was 
below the age of fifteen years at the time of the alleged recruitment in order to 
qualify as a victim of the recruitment crime.
386
 Secondly, the child is required to 
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present evidence which ascertains kinship or legal guardianship between the child 
and the person acting on behalf of the child. While the requirement of proof of legal 
guardianship has also been introduced for applicants with disabilities, proof of 
kinship only exists with regard to the minor child applicant.
387
 
 The procedural rules of the International Criminal Court are silent with regard to 
this administrative evidence. Reference to the Chambers’ practice is therefore, 
again, indispensable in order to determine (if possible) the approach of the ICC to 




Proof of identity in practice 
 
The Court practice established that providing evidence to prove identity is a major 
difficulty for children.
389
 The qualification as a direct victim of the recruitment 
crime, for example, presupposes that the child can provide sufficient evidence that 
he or she was below the age of fifteen at the time of recruitment.
390
 The difficulty 
for victims in general, including children, to fulfil this requirement has been 
addressed by Pre-Trial Chamber II. It recognised that proof of identity might not be 
possible as illustrated by the Ugandan conflict. The Chamber stated that, 
 
‘in a country such as Uganda, where many areas have been (and, to some extent, still 
are) ravaged by an ongoing conflict and communication and travelling between 
different areas may be difficult, it would be inappropriate to expect applicants to be 
able to provide a proof of identity of the same type as would be required of 




Also, the 2008 draft ICC Strategy in Relation to Victims acknowledges that even 
the making of a photocopy of identity documents in order to prove identity can be 
impossible.
392
 From reading the application form it becomes clear that victims can 
establish their identity by submitting documents such as a passport, driver’s license, 
letter from a local authority or a tax document.
393
 Children, in contrast to adults, are 
usually not likely to be in possession of these documents. It is interesting to 
examine in this regard the practice of Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Situation of 
Uganda.  
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 The Chamber requested the Victims Participation and Reparation Section 
(VPRS) to examine carefully the availability of identification documents under 
Ugandan law.
394
 VPRS concluded in a report that there was an overall lack of 
identification documents issued by the Ugandan legal and administrative system.
395
 
It furthermore stated that children do not usually obtain identification documents. 
Obtaining a passport requires that, 
 
‘an applicant must fill in an application form, seek endorsement from different 
prescribed offices, pay a processing fee of not less than 30 US Dollars and undergo a 




This is a procedure which a child, in particular younger children, cannot be 
expected to follow. This is because a child is not only confronted with a financial 
burden, but also the physical inability to travel on his/her own and the overall 
dependence on the person(s) taking care of him/her.
397
 In contrast to the ability of 
adults to establish identity by relying on a range of documents as listed in the 
application form, the Ugandan example demonstrates that many children are not 
likely to be able to establish their identity by relying on any of the documents 
mentioned. The lower threshold for proving identity as introduced by this Chamber 
is therefore a welcome step. The Chamber recognised that a child can establish 
identity and age indirectly by submitting a document which establishes a link 
between the parent and the child. The Judge stipulated that,  
 
 ‘[t]his report should also provide information about the existence and obtainability, 
in the Ugandan legal or administrative system, of documents establishing the link 





Similarly, another Chamber explicitly provided for a lower threshold by accepting 
documents such as family registration booklets, pupil identity cards, school 
documents and documents issued in rehabilitation centres for children associated 
with armed groups in order to identify a minor applicant.
399
 Also the statement by 
two witnesses is recognised as being reliable in order to establish a child’s identity. 
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It can be concluded from this practice that the Court is aware of the fact that 
children might encounter difficulties when trying to prove identity.  
 
Proof of kinship or legal guardianship in practice 
 
The previously addressed practice of the Chambers pointed out that children face 
particular difficulties when they have to prove kinship or legal guardianship. Armed 
conflict might render it impossible to obtain the relevant evidence. Furthermore, the 
Chambers recognised that there might be domestic systems which do not have a 
system of legal guardianship (be it a de facto or de iure shortcoming).  
With regard to proof of kinship or legal guardianship, Pre-Trial I Chamber I, 
requested ‘sufficient evidence’. The Chamber ruled that, 
 
‘[c]onsidering that the Chamber is also of the opinion, in light of the statement by 
the applicant and, in particular, in light of the documents appended to this 
application, that it has sufficient evidence to establish a familial relationship between 




A further step in terms of transparency was taken by Pre-Trial Chamber II. This 
Chamber introduced in the Situation in Uganda a list of documents, which may be 
relied upon in order to adequately prove the link between the child and the person 
acting on the child’s behalf. The Chamber clarified that it 
 
‘will accept as proof of such link any of the following documents: (i) “short” birth 
certificate or “long” birth certificate, (ii) birth notification card, (iii) baptism card, (iv) 
letter issued by a Rehabilitation Centre, (v) letter from a local Council, (vi) affidavit 




A similar flexible approach based on the prima facie standard was implemented at 
trial stage. Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case held that 
 
‘the overall material provided by these applicants provides a sufficiently reliable 
indication of their age and identity […]. In particular, the Chamber accepts that the 
documents and the other material prove, prima facie, that the applicants were under 
the age of fifteen at the time of the relevant events, as well as the identity of those 
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These approaches of the various chambers underline that the Court takes the child-
specific particularities into account and is thus aware of the fact children wishing to 
participate are also in practical terms to be treated differently compared to adults in 
order to enable this particular group to participate. 
 
3.5.3 Categories of child applicants 
 
Trial Chamber I introduced a distinction between child who apply for participation 
and other applicants when deciding upon victim participant status. This Chamber 
distinguished between different groups of applicants before assessing the criteria of 
Rule 85 RPE. In the decision of 15 December 2008, in which the Chamber focused 
on victims’ applications to participate in the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, it divided the applications into two major groups A and B before considering 
the individual applications.
405
 The former referred to those applicants who were 
allowed to participate, while the latter were refused.
406
 Subsequently, the Chamber 
made a distinction between various sub-groups by stating that such a division is 
indispensable since each group of victims shares specific features.
407
 The Chamber 
held that, 
 
‘[f]or the purposes of this Decision, the Chamber has divided the applicants into 





Without elaborating further on the need to distinguish between different categories 
of applicants, the Chamber moved on to introduce various sub-groups. With regard 
to those applicants that were allowed to participate, the Chamber distinguished in 
particular between adult (or other) applications and child applications. 
 
Adult versus child applicants 
 
At least four of the eight sub-groups directly or indirectly relate to applications 
submitted by children. Group 1(d) refers directly to applicants who were children 
when their application was originally filed, but who are now adults or almost adults. 
Group 1(e) particularly relates to those applications where the date of birth is 
uncertain or the demobilisation date is a cause of concern. This is an issue which, 
by definition, only arises with regard to children, since only the recruitment crime 
as enshrined in Article 8 of the Rome Statute introduces age as an element of crime. 
Finally, the Chamber created a separate group of applications, 1(g), that were 
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submitted by children who at the moment of decision taking were still under 
eighteen and the application was not made by a person acting on their behalf. An 
indirect reference to child applicants can be found in relation to group 1(c) which 
relates to applications that were submitted on behalf of a victim and the person 
acting on behalf of the victim is not a relative or the legal guardian of the applicant 
– two aspects (kinship and legal guardianship) which are foremost relevant with 
regard to child applicants. An explanation for this differentiation by the Chamber 
was not provided for. 
 This categorisation of applications is remarkable for three reasons. Firstly, the 
Chamber clarified in this decision that the division of applications has neither an 
impact on other decisions of the same Chamber nor are other Chambers of the 
Court bound by it.
409
 Consequently, it is not possible to anticipate whether this 
Chamber or other Chambers will, in the future, categorise applications alongside the 
criteria established in the present decision or not. Secondly, in the view of the 
Chamber, such separation was necessary. It held that such separation was 
indispensable in order to properly decide on the applications. Thirdly, the 
procedural rules of the ICC do not introduce a division into various categories of 
applicants. Practical reasons might have been the rationale for distinguishing 
between different categories of applications on the basis of ‘common administrative 
issues’, such as proof of kinship or legal guardianship.  
 The foregoing analysis establishes that the statutory provisions do not recognise 
children as a particular group of applicants. Children, as other victims, have to 
establish that they have suffered harm as a result of a crime that falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The examination of the Court’s practice, on the other side, 
has shown that children are recognised as a particular group of applicants who are 
generally understood to be unable to submit an application for participation without 
the support of a third person.  
 
Boy and girl applicants 
 
In line with the forgoing section, the statutory provisions as such do not distinguish 
between boy and girl child applicants. A closer look at the practice of the Court, 
however, establishes, that child applicants might be distinguished as a result of their 
gender. This is because the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
provides for crimes which are gender specific. The gender of the child can therefore 
be decisive for qualification into a gender-specific group of applicants. While the 
gender of the child might bear implications for other capacities, such as the child 
witness, the most extensive court practice before the ICC can be found in relation to 
child participants. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC which particularly, 
though not exclusively, relate to the female gender are crimes which constitute 
sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
                                                 
409









pregnancy, enforced sterilisation and other forms of sexual violence as both war 




In the first case before the ICC, the criminal proceedings against Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, who has been convicted for having recruited children below the age of 
fifteen years, Trial Chamber I was confronted with the question as to whether 
female children fall within the definition of the recruitment crime. The entire 
problematic is the result of the fact that sexual violence has not been charged 
separately in the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The discussion arose 
when the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General for 
Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted an amicus 
curiae brief which addressed inter alia the issue of ‘[t]he interpretation, focusing 
particularly on the role of girls in armed forces, of the term “using them to 
participate actively in hostilities.”’ 
 The commentators of this crime state that active use in hostilities does not entail 
the same meaning as direct participation in hostilities. While the former is 
understood to be limited to specific hostile acts,
411
 the active use in hostilities refers 




 The Special Representative testified at a later stage in the proceedings on the 
question as to whether girls may fall within the definition of the elements of a crime 
even if they have not been directly involved in hostilities, but served exclusively in 
non-combat related roles, such as sexual slaves or as commander’s wives.
413
 
 The lack of a crime charged in the Lubanga case relating to sexual violence 
made the Special Representative underline that an interpretation of the recruitment 
crime limited to male children would exclude female children from essential 
protection with far-reaching consequences, not only at trial stage, but also in the 
reparation phase if not remedied in specific forms of reparations (Chapter Five). 
The Special Representative held that services provided by girls could constitute a 
form of criminalised behaviour within the meaning of the recruitment crime, 
because, 
 
‘[the] "using" crime creates a broad category for criminal liability. It proscribes the 
acceptance of a child's participation to support conflict. Children's participation takes 





According to the Special Representative, the direct participation of female children 
in hostilities is not a necessary precondition in order to fulfil the prescribed 
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elements of crime – an interpretation which is in line with the United Nations policy 
for disarmament.
415
 This policy explicitly points out that members of armed forces 
and groups include girls which have been used for sexual services. The policy states 
that, 
 
‘[t]e majority of participants in DDR programmes are usually made up of members 
of armed forces and groups who served in combat and/or support roles. These 
members are usually mostly men, but there are often also women, boys and girls. 
 
Although most members will have been actively engaged as combatants, many will 
have carried out logistic tasks and worked as cooks, porters, messengers and 
administrators, or have been women and girls used for sexual exploitation. This is 
often the case for women and children. Those have been associated with armed 





Subsequently, the Special Representative underlined that the recruitment of girls for 





‘“A child associated with an armed force or armed group” refers to any person below 
eighteen years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or 
armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls 
used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not 





In her conclusion, the Special Representative called upon Trial Chamber I to 
explicitly interpret the recruitment crime as including female child soldiers who 
have not directly participated in hostilities.
419
 In the view of the Special 
Representative, such interpretation is indispensable in order to ensure that female 
children, who served as sexual slaves, are not excluded from the group of potential 
child victims of the recruitment crime. 
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 After the submission of the amicus curiae brief, the testimony of the Special 
Representative and previous evidence provided by three witnesses at the trial, the 
legal representatives of victims participating in the trial requested Trial Chamber I 
to modify the legal characterisation of the facts within the meaning of Regulation 
55 of the Regulation of the Court.
 
The legal representatives argued that, inter alia, 
the crime of sexual slavery should be included in the charges against Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo.
420
 The attempt of the legal representative to include sexual slavery 
within the charges anticipates that the labelling of female sexual slaves as child 
soldiers might not constitute the proper label. The Appeals Chamber however 
clarified that Trial Chamber I erred in its interpretation of Regulation 55 and that 
under the circumstances of the present case the suggested modification of the legal 
characterisation of the facts is impermissible.
421
 
 The unsuccessful attempt by the legal representatives to modify the legal 
characterisation of the facts by including the crime of sexual slavery calls for the 
careful assessment of the consequences of limiting the case against Lubanga to the 
war crime of child soldiering. The discussion which results from not having 
modified the legal characterisation of the facts has also been reflected in the 
previously addressed amicus curiae brief and relates particularly to the question 
whether the labelling as child soldiers blurs the distinction between the war crimes 
of the recruitment of child soldiers and of sexual slavery. Michael Kurth argued in 
this regard that, 
 
‘[a]lthough the ICC has not explicitly ruled on the matter yet, it seems that such 
conduct would indeed fall outside the reach of these crimes [Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) 
and Article 8(2)(e)(vii)] and should be covered by the war crimes of sexual slavery, 
as provided for in Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, 
instead. It is submitted that these provisions are eventually better equipped to match 




This conclusion was based on the argument that the active use of children in 
hostilities is to be understood to be limited to combat-related activities. The author 
referred in his argumentation to the drafting history of this crime. He pointed out 
that such restrictive understanding has also been reflected by the drafters. 
According to Kurth, the travaux préparatoires explicitly request that active 
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participation, while not being limited to acts of active fighting, does clearly not 
include acts which are evidently not related to combat.
423
  
 Despite this concern, the frequency of such use in present day combat situations 
supports the assumption that girls indeed are also – or even specifically – recruited 
for this specific purpose.
424
 Claiming that one underlying reason of recruitment is 
sexual slavery therefore aims to address the reality of the various roles that girl 
child soldiers fulfil today.
425
 The recent attention paid to the multiple roles of girls 
in combat could explain why sexual slavery as a purpose of recruitment has only 
occasionally been recognised. Abigail Leibig criticised in this regard that, 
 
‘[t]he focus on children serving in combat positions overshadows the experiences of 
many children who are abducted or recruited into armed forces and then forced into 
serving as domestic and sexual slaves; in many cases, girl soldiers experience these 




Similarly, Susan Tiefenbrun is concerned that, 
 
‘[t]he trafficking of child soldiers is directly connected to sexual violence and the 




The lack of legal research has been pointed out by Alfredson: 
 
‘The theoretical consequence of the lack of research on this subject is a continuing 
lack of understanding of the internal environment of militaries - during conflict or 
peace - as a context for sexual exploitation. To date the small literature that is 
directly relevant to sexual exploitation occurring within militaries tends to discuss 
the phenomenon firstly as another horrific by-product of war accompanying the 
breakdown of moral and legal standards. While the chaos of the war context is 
undoubtedly part of the problem, it explains neither the logic of armed groups 
abusing their own members (potentially debilitating them from carrying out military-




The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees includes girls in the 
definition of child soldiers by defining child soldiers as.  
 
‘any person under eighteen years of age who forms part of an armed force in any 
capacity and those accompanying such groups other than purely as family members 
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The Secretary General of the United Nations stated that, 
 
‘[t]here is little awareness of the extreme suffering that armed conflict inflicts on 
girls or the many roles girls are often forced to play during conflict and long after. 





In line with these positions Judge Odio Benito argues in her separate and dissenting 
opinion attached to Trial Chamber I’s judgment in the Lubanga case that, 
 
‘[a]lthough the Majority of the Chamber recognises that sexual violence has been 
referred to in this case, it seems to confuse the factual allegations of this case with 
the legal concept of the crime, which are independent. By failing to deliberately 
include within the legal concept of “use to participate actively in the hostilities” the 
sexual violence and other ill-treatment suffered by girls and boys, the Majority of 
the Chamber is making this critical aspect of the crime invisible. Invisibility of 
sexual violence in the legal concept leads to discrimination against the victims of 
enlistment, conscription and use who systematically suffer from this crime as an 




The recognition that sexual violence can constitute a consequence of child 
recruitment is not only favourable in order to adequately address the realities of 
combat situations, but also for another reason. This inclusion fills an impunity gap 
in international criminal justice as regards war crimes, such as sexual violence, 
committed against a specific group of child victims.  
 
It is argued that, even if sexual violence had been charged separately in the case at 
issue, a group of child victims of sexual violence remains which would not have 
been able to qualify as victims of the war crime of sexual violence (Articles 
8(2)(b)(xii) and 8 (2)(c)(vi) Rome Statute). In these cases, a legal lacuna would 
exist. This could prevent child victims from participating in the proceedings before 
the ICC and might also make way for impunity under international criminal law. It 
could prevent perpetrators from being convicted for acts of sexual violence when 
having recruited children for this particular purpose.  
 In order to support this argument it is necessary to ask who is considered to fall 
within the category of ‘protected persons’ under International Humanitarian Law. 
Michael Cottier held that, 
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‘[International Humanitarian Law] typically protects persons and objects belonging 
to one of the parties to the conflict from certain abusive or overly destructive 
conduct by an adversary party to the conflict.’
 432
 (Emphasis added) 
 
Similarly, Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld state that International 
Humanitarian Law, in particular the Law of Geneva  
 
‘serves to protect persons who, as a consequence of an armed conflict, are in the 





As a consequence of the forgoing, war crimes can only be committed against 
protected persons who belong to the population of the other party to the conflict.434 
A similar line of argumentation has been adopted by the Defence of Bosco 
Ntaganda. The Defence asserted that 
 
‘that the crimes committed by members of armed forces on members of the same 
armed force do not come within the jurisdiction of international humanitarian law 
nor within international criminal law. Customary international law applying to all 
armed conflicts, be it international or non-international , is made up of several 
principles that are intended to protect civilians and making a clear distinction 
between civilians and combatants. Such law also sets out rules relating to the ways 
in which war is waged. International humanitarian law is not intended to protect 
combatants from crimes committed by combatants within the same group. Such 
crimes come under national law and human rights law. Thus, the charges found in 




It is helpful in this regard to remember that the criminalisation of breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law by the codification of war crimes in the respective 
statutes paved the way for individual criminal responsibility.
436
 International 
criminal responsibility may not exist for any act committed during armed conflict, 
but is limited to those acts which have been criminalised under international 
criminal law, such as war crimes under the Rome Statute. Moreover, only acts 
committed against ‘protected persons’ can be considered as breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law. Crimes committed against persons who do not 
belong to the adversary party per definition fall outside the group of potential 
victims of an international crime. It can be presupposed, that the majority of child 
victims, who have been recruited solely for sexual purposes will – in many cases – 
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not belong to the adversary. This has also been the case in the proceedings against 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The Registry pointed out that, 
 
‘[t]here are a number of other important features of the Lubanga case which should 
also be noted at the outset. The first concerns the ethnic character of the conflict in 
the region. The Union des Patriotes Congolais being mostly comprised of members 
of the Hema ethnic community, is alleged to have drawn child soldiers 
predominately from this ethnic group with the result that, should reparations be 
awarded in the case, the majority of victims will be from one side of an ethnic 




Accordingly, sexual violence committed against children belonging to the same 
conflict party can never constitute the war crime of sexual violence, since these 
children fall outside the concept of ‘protected persons’ under International 
Humanitarian Law within the meaning of the war crime of sexual violence. 
 
In contrast to the aforementioned interpretation, Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda pointed 
out in the proceedings against Bosco Ntaganda that due to the particular position of 
child soldiers under international humanitarian law, child soldiers, in particular 
recruited girls, can also become victims of the war crime of sexual violence – be it 
not simultaneously when directly participating in hostilities. The Chief Prosecutor 
argued that, 
 
‘[w]hile it is generally the case that IHL regulates conduct directed towards those 
external to a military force rather than to those internal to a military force, this 
general proposition does not constitute an irrebuttable presumption. Indeed, the 
prohibition on conscripting or enlisting child soldiers or allowing children to 
directly participate in hostilities is an exception to the general proposition precisely 
in order to provide non-derogable protections for children as a particularly 
vulnerable group. Critically, these war crimes can only be perpetrated by members 
of a military force against victims which are from the same military force. The 
protections attached to children contitue to apply during armed conflict: while 
soldiers may forfeit protection from attack by directly participating in hostilities, 
this does not impact on their other legal protections. This includes their protection 





Pre-Trial Chamber III confirmed on 9 June 2014 the charges against Bosco 
Ntaganda including the war crime of sexual violence allegedly committed against 
child soldiers. The Chamber held in this regard that, 
 
‘children under the age of 15 years lose the protection afforded by IHL only during 
their direct/active participation in hostilities. That said, the Chamber clarifies that 
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those subject to rape and/or sexual enslavement cannot be considered to have taken 
active part in hostilities during the specific time when they were subject to acts of 
sexual nature, including rape, as defined in the relevant Elements of Crimes. The 
sexual character of these crimes, which involve elements of force/coercion or the 
exercise of rights of ownership, logically preclude active participation in hostilities 
at the same time. Accordingly, the Chamber finds that UPC/FPLC child soldiers 
under the age of 15 years continue to enjoy protection under IHL from acts of rape 
and sexual slavery, as reflected in article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute. The Chamber is, 





While at first sight, this position clearly constitutes a child-sensitive approach as it 
enables in particular recruited girls, who have not been directly involved in acts of 
hostilities to qualify as victims of sexual violence, a few critical notes are necessary. 
The inherent legal problem according to the present author in relation to this 
interpretation relates to aspects of evidence in procedural practice and a blurry 
application of the principles of protected persons and distinction under international 
humanitarian law – despite the child-sensitive aim of providing children below the 
age of fifteen years a wider range of protection.  
 
It might not constitute a difficulty to distinguish theoretically between the moment 
of direct participation in hostilities and the moment of victimisation as a result of 
sexual violence from the victims or even perpetrators position. In practice, however, 
this might not be such an easy exercise, in particular when evidence is to be 
submitted in the course of criminal proceedings which usually take place after a 
certain period of time has passed. Furthermore, does this interpretation a contrario 
imply that at the moment of crime commission these victims regain their protected 
persons status also in relation to hostile acts from the other party? In other words, 
are these children at the moment of crime commission not any longer legitimate 
targets because of having regained their civilian status despite, for instance being at 
a place which qualifies as a military objective and being dressed as a combatant? If 
so, does this mean that a hostile attack from the other party to the conflict being 
performed at the same moment when sexual violence against a young recruit is 
committed (for instance a surprise attack during night), constitute an attack against 
a protected person and thus qualifies as a war crime under the Rome Statute? 
Finally, when exactly do these victims of sexual violence regain their status as 
combatant? Again an important aspect in particular for the perceptive of the other 
party to the conflict. 
 
Without further qualification, the possibility to switch from the status of a 
legitimate target as a child soldier to a protected person when becoming the victim 
of sexual violence constitutes a vague interpretation of the principles of protection 
and distinction under international humanitarian law – a departure which, without 
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further explanation and clear delimitation leads to legal uncertainty and lack of 
transparency not only under international humanitarian law but also under 
international criminal law. 
 
Despite losing sight of the general need to provide children with sufficient 
protection also in terms of international criminal law, the author suggests that a 
transparent and legally convincing alternative is suggested by Cottier who argues 
that the only exception within international criminal law that criminalises certain 
acts committed against persons belonging to the same conflict party is the crime of 
recruitment. Cottier addressed this particularity of this crime. He stated that, 
 
‘[t]he two offenses defined under article 8 para. 2(b)(xxvi) Rome Statute comprise 
two particularities distinguishing them from most other war crimes. First, they 
primarily protect children against their own authorities as is clear from the essence 
of article 8 para. 2(b)(xxvi). Perpetrator and victims of these war crimes thus may 
belong to the same party to the conflict. This criminalization of acts committed 
against or ‘vis-à-vis’ persons belonging to the same party to the conflict deviates 
fundamentally from the general thrust of international humanitarian law and the 
law of war crimes, which typically regulate acts committed against persons 
belonging to an adversary party to the conflict. Relations between a State and its 
own nationals are more characteristically the subject of human rights law. […]  
 
However, the wording of the provision in no way excludes its application to the use 
enlistment or conscription of children belonging to another party to the conflict or 
indeed of any other child. It would not make sense to protect children belonging to 
the same party to the conflict but not those not belonging to that party. These 
considerations apply to both the use of children to participate actively in hostilities 




The war crime of child recruitment is thus not limited to the narrow interpretation 
of ‘protected persons’ under International Humanitarian Law. It has become clear 
why the concept of this crime should encompass children recruited for the particular 
purpose of sexual slavery. In case of non-inclusion, children who have solely been 
recruited for purposes of sexual slavery are at risk that their suffering falls outside 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It is therefore argued that the 
inclusion of this particular group of child victims serves to close the legal lacuna in 
relation to children solely recruited for sexual purposes. 
 It needs to be noted at the same time, that if these children qualify as child 
soldiers they might – as a consequence of their combatant status – constitute 
legitimate military targets under International Humanitarian Law.
441
 The inclusion 
of children which have solely been used for sexual purposes therefore provides on 
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the one side for additional protection, but on the other side entails the risk of being 
lawfully targeted. 
 
It can be concluded that, as pointed out by the United Nations Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the 
interpretation of the recruitment crime as enshrined in the Rome Statute is to be 
interpreted broadly in order to cover today’s tasks and roles of female child soldiers, 
but also to prevent impunity of perpetrators. The ICC should generally recognise 
that numerous tasks carried out by girls which do not directly relate to combat 
activities fall within the ambit of this particular crime. Limiting the crime of child 
recruitment to combat related purposes disregards the realities of today’s armed 
conflicts and the multiple functions of female child soldiers. An interpretation of the 
‘using crime’ which is restricted to combat-related, messenger or porter activities 
therefore neglects the experiences of many female children during combat.
442
 
Instead, a broad interpretation reflects that the ICC does take into account the 
realities of combat as described by the former Secretary-General of the United 
Nations: 
 
‘For many, however, entry into an armed group meant being subjected to sexual 
abuse. A number of accounts indicate that the sexual abuse started in the training 
camps, with instructors being responsible, and persisted throughout the training. […] 
In some cases, sexual abuse, when it did occur, was of limited duration or was 
carried out in a sporadic manner, with different perpetrators depending on the 
situation at hand. Other girls were subjected to a more regular pattern of sexual 
abuse, effectively repeated rape, over longer periods, assigned to one military officer 
for example. These girls are commonly referred to as “war wives”. In many ways the 
girls suffer a double jeopardy, many reportedly serving both as fighting elements in 
active combat and concomitantly being used to satisfy the sexual appetites of their 





The practice of Trial Chamber I with regard to female child witnesses who testified 
on their experiences as child soldiers establishes its awareness of today’s combat 
realities.
444
 The SCSL by contrast, has only questioned one young female witness 
on this particular crime since its establishment.
445
 The Sierra Leonean and Liberian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, on the other hand, collected the statements 
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of numerous female child victims not only on sexual violence but also on their 
recruitment as child soldiers.
446
  
 Whether other ICC Chambers will explicitly include sexual violence within the 
recruitment remains to be seen. The elements of the crime of recruitment, in any 
case, do leave sufficient room for such an interpretation. 
 
3.6 GENERAL MODALITIES OF PARTICIPATION 
 
Pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, victims may present their views and 
concerns. In order to participate at a particular moment, the victim must establish 
that his or her ‘personal interests’ have been affected.
447
 It has earlier been 
explained that the Court distinguishes between participation at situational and case 
level.
448
 The modalities of participation can therefore also be addressed by 
distinguishing between the possibility of participating in the different stages of the 
proceedings before the ICC. In turn, an overview of the core modalities of 
participation is provided for.  
 The Rome Statute and the respective procedural rules do not provide extensive 
explanation on how victims may participate. The specific modalities of child 
participation are neither addressed. The case law of the Court is therefore mainly 
assessed in order to shed light on the concrete modalities of participation. It will be 
seen that child specific modalities of participation have neither been reflected upon 
in the respective practice. 
 
Participation at situational/investigational level 
 
The decision of Pre-trial Chamber I of 17 January 2006 addressed the modalities of 
victim participation at investigational level in more detail. The Chamber held that in 
line with Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, victims may in particular present their 
views and concerns and file documents.
449
 In this regard, they may participate in 
public hearings.
450
 Similar approaches as regards the modalities of participation at 
situational level can be found in the situation of Uganda and Darfur (Sudan).
451
 Pre-
Trial Chamber I ruled in particular that, 
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‘victims’ guaranteed right of access to the Court entails a positive obligation for the 




Related to Article 68(3) is the possibility of participation based upon Article 19(3) 
of the Rome Statute. This provision entails the possibility for victims to participate 





Participation at pre-trial stage 
 
At pre-trial stage, participation in particular takes place within the context of 
confirmation of charges hearings. The legal representative may participate in the 
hearing, and upon the discretion of the Chamber, even during in camera or ex parte 
hearings.
454
 Important to note is that, in contrast to victim participation at the trial 
stage, victims are not allowed to introduce evidence into the court record at pre-trial 
stage.
455
 At the confirmation of charges hearing, the possibility to make opening 
and closing statements and the request for leave to intervene during the hearing are 
of particular importance in this regard.
456
 In accordance with Rule 91(2) the victims’ 
representative may be present and participate at the hearing. The competent 
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Chamber may, however, be of the view that the intervention where necessary 
should be limited to written observations and submissions. 
 
Participation at trial stage 
 
Explicit reference to the modalities of participation at trial stage can be found in 
Rule 89(1) RPE which provides for the possibility of opening and closing 
statements.
457
 A particular opportunity constitutes the possibility to participate in 
person. In this matter, the case law established that victims may testify under 
oath.
458
 In addition to the possibility that victims’ legal representatives attend and 
participate in the hearings, written submissions may be filed by the 
representatives.
459
 Furthermore, victims have access to the case index and may 
introduce evidence if the Chamber is of the view that this will assist in the 
determination of the truth.
460
 Also important to note, is the possibility that the legal 
representative of the victims may question witnesses.
461
 This procedural 
opportunity enables victims, through their legal representative, to ask questions 
which might provide supportive evidence which could, for instance, also be referred 
to at a later stage during the reparation proceedings. Victims are thus able, by 
providing their legal representative with the necessary information, to raise 
questions which are important to them while being less relevant for the other parties. 
 
Participation at interlocutory appeals 
 
The participation of victims at interlocutory appeals is limited to presenting their 
views and concerns if their personal interests are affected on those matters which 




As the specific modalities of child participation are not at all explicitly addressed in 
the procedural regulation it seems that the drafters of the Rome Statute and the 
entire ICC system did not expect that, as far as the modalities of participation are 
concerned, there is a need to draw particular attention to child participation. This 
may be because the drafters did not at all expect that children would ever 
participate.  
 Having addressed the general modalities of participation during the various 
stages of the criminal proceedings which are relevant for all victims and bearing in 
mind the silence of the law as regards child specific aspects, one may raise in 
particular the question whether there should be child-specific modalities when 
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children participate. In order to answer this question, one needs to address how 
child victims participated thus far. 
 
3.7 CHILD-SPECIFIC MODALITIES OF PARTICIPATION: THE 
REPRESENTATION OF THE CHILD 
 
Thus far, child victims participated in ICC proceedings through their legal 
representative. Generally speaking, the legal representation of the victim participant 
in international criminal proceedings constitutes a novelty. Only through the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court has light been shed on this unique 
opportunity for victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
463
 The 
uniqueness is based on the fact that prior to the establishment of the ICC, victim 
participation in international criminal proceedings was not only very limited but 
furthermore did not enable victims on a statutory basis to have a legal representative 
at their disposal. The procedural rules of the International Criminal Court do not 
separately address the representation of child participants. This section proceeds in 
two steps: firstly, it describes the general rules applicable to the legal representation 
of victim participants; secondly, it analyses the specific question concerning the 
representation of the child. It is examined in particular whether there is a need to 
child-specific representation which is to be distinguished from the representation of 
adult participants. 
 
3.7.1 General rules governing the representation of victims  
 
In order to facilitate their participation, participants can freely choose – thus, not 
being obliged – to hand over their legal representation.
464
 Rule 89 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence provides that, 
 




The second possibility of representation before the ICC is common legal 
representation. This particular form of representation is an option for the competent 
Chamber when victims participate in large numbers, which could negatively impact 
the effectiveness of the proceedings.
466
 While victims themselves can make the 
decision on individual representation by a particular legal representative, common 
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legal representation constitutes a discretionary power of the Chamber. In 
accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 90, the Chamber may  
 
‘request the victims or particular groups of victims, […] to choose a common legal 
representative or representatives.’ 
 
When selecting common legal representatives, the Chamber is called upon to ensure 
that, 
 
‘the distinct interests of the victims, particularly as provided in article 68, paragraph 




A common language of the representative and the victims and a common country of 
origin are – as suggested by various Chambers, such as Pre-Trial Chamber III and 
Trial Chamber I – decisive for the selection of common legal representatives.
468
 
Factors such as geographical closeness of victims, common crimes allegedly 
committed against a particular group of victims and the existence of common 




 While all victims, if accepted for participation, may participate in the 
proceedings by presenting their views and concerns in accordance with Article 68(3) 
Rome Statute, particular forms of participation, such as the questioning of witnesses 




 The specific moment of the commencement of legal representation has been 
interpreted broadly by various Chambers of the Court. Pre-Trial Chamber II in the 
Bemba case, for instance, underlined that, 
 
‘[w]ith a view to providing as soon as possible legal representation to victims 
applying to participate in the proceedings, the Single Judge requests the Registry to 
provide the victims with assistance pursuant to rule 90(2) of the Rules. Where no 
legal representative has been appointed by the victims, the Office of Public Counsel 
for Victims shall, as assigned by the Registry, act as legal representative of the 
victims from the time they submit their applications for participation, until a legal 




Accordingly, the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) is to be appointed 
as legal representative for those victims who are not legally represented when filing 
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their application for participation. This implies that even before being recognised as 
victims within the meaning of Rule 85 RPE, participants may benefit from legal 
representation even if they do not appoint a legal representative out of their own 
motion. The foregoing practice illustrates that the Chambers encourage, if not even 
request as indicated by the use of the verb ‘shall’ in relation to the appointment of 
the OPCV, participants to engage with the Court through a legal representative. 
 Thus, in principle, victims participate – when recognised as participant – 
through their legal representative.
472
 It has been explained before that, in order to 
participate at a particular moment, the legal representative must establish that the 
‘personal interests’ of his/her clients are affected.
473
 The statutory rules do not 
provide guidance on whether individuals may appear in person, without a legal 
representative in the courtroom. During a status conference in the Lubanga case, 
however, Trial Chamber I clarified that,  
 
‘[i]t needs to be remembered that this is a court of law and, in particular, this is the 
criminal trial of an accused, and the presumption is that those who participate in the 
proceedings will be lawyers, lawyers acting for individuals or for bodies, for entities. 
 
If individuals are to be allowed to participate in person, there would have to be 
cogent, indeed powerful, reasons for that exceptional course to be waived, because it 
doesn’t need for us to say that the people without legal training coming to talk about 
very difficult things that have happened to them could have a real capacity for 
destabilising these court proceedings. So if proposals of this kind are to be made, 
they need to be made in writing, they need to be made fully, and they need to set out 
very clearly why it is both necessary and appropriate for individuals to be asking the 
Chamber to appear in person, to participate in person, rather than through the legal 
representatives who have been made available to them. At the end of the day, this is 
not a truth and reconciliation commission or a body of that kind. 
 




Victims’ participation in the courtroom is therefore in principle limited. Victims’ 
interests can be represented during the course of the criminal (and/or reparation) 
proceedings of the ICC in two ways: through single or joint/common legal 
representation. Trial Chamber I ruled a few days later that, 
 
 ‘[t]he Chamber is aware, however, that the personal appearance of a large number 
of victims could affect the expeditiousness and fairness of the proceedings, and 
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given that the victims’ common views and concerns may sometimes be better 
presented by a common legal representative (i.e. for reasons of language, security or 
expediency), the Trial Chamber will decide either proprio motu, or at the request of 
a party or participant, whether or not there should be joint representation of views 




Large numbers of participants might, therefore, explain why the Court prefers 
common legal representation.
476
 The wording of the aforementioned decision shows 
in particular that the Chamber does not only prefer but may even see the necessity 
to impose common legal representation. 
 
3.7.2 Representation of the child  
 
In its practice, as has been established in section 3.5.3, the Court has considered 
children as a separate group of participants. In the Katanga case, Trial Chamber II 
ordered the common legal representation of children and, in particular, the common 
representation of former child soldiers.
477
  
 The practice of Trial Chamber I and II introduced the idea of common legal 
representation of participants. Before Trial Chamber I, 120 or so participating 
victims in the Lubanga case were divided into three groups and accordingly 
represented by three teams of legal representatives. The Chamber justified its 
division by referring to the earlier mentioned general aspects (such as language, 
time, place and circumstances, crimes etc.).
478
 Two individual teams of legal 
representatives and the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (as a third team) 
represented the participating victims.
479
 Child participants in the Lubanga case, 
however, were not explicitly ordered to be separately represented. A possible 
explanation can be found in the crimes charged. Since the indictment of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo only charges the recruitment of children below the age of fifteen 
years (Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi), Article 8(2)(e)(vii) Rome Statute), the direct and 
indirect victims of the crimes are less likely to have conflicting interests when 
represented by one common legal representative. As previously underlined, the 
direct victims of this particular crime are those children who were below the age of 
fifteen years at the time of recruitment; indirect victims are those who suffer harm 
as a result of the victimisation of the direct victim, such as the parents of recruited 
children. Both direct and indirect victims thus share an interest in the prosecution of 
this particular crime and are likely to speak the same language and originate from 
the same country or even region. 
 A need for separate legal representation would therefore have exist if additional 
crimes, which introduce conflicting interests among victims, were also charged. 
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This is the case before Trial Chamber II. It – following the proposal of all legal 
representatives involved – ordered in the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui case the common legal representation of former child 
soldiers.
480
 The Chamber held that, 
 
‘[t]he proposal was said to be based on a ‘compromise’ between the legal 
representatives and consisted of three different ‘teams’ of legal representatives. The 
reason for having three different ‘teams’ was said to be the necessity of avoiding any 
conflict of interest. In particular, the group of victims who were identified as giving 
rise to a potential conflict of interest were the victims of the enlistment of child 
soldiers, who took an active part in the attack and may therefore also be seen as 
perpetrators. In its observations on the legal representatives’ proposal, the Registry 
subscribed to the view that there exists a potential conflict of interest between those 
victims who participated in the attack (the victims of the crime of conscription and 
enlistment of children under fifteen years of age and the fact that they were used to 
participate actively in hostilities) and the other victims. […] Falling outside of this 
large group (of the other victims), there is a small number of applicants who are 
former child soldiers, who allege to have participated in the attack of 24 February 





The possibility of conflicting interests between various groups of victims was 
therefore the rationale behind the introduction of separate legal representation. Two 
individual teams of legal representatives and the OPCV were appointed as legal 
representative.
482
 The OPCV served, in particular, as legal representative of those 
victims who were not represented otherwise. Trial Chamber II summarised and 
followed the practice of various Chambers by stating that, 
 
‘three Chambers have thus far deemed it necessary to request the Registry to appoint 
the Office of Public Counsel for Victims as the legal representative of the victims, 





The appointment of the OPCV as legal representative may, however, lead to a 
conflict of interests. In proceedings, such as those against Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Chui, where other crimes are charged besides the recruitment of children, the 
                                                 
480
  See also, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788, para. 7-9. 
481
  ICC-01/04-01/07-1328, paras. 5-6, 12c. 
482
  ICC-01/04-01/07-876. The Chamber was not convinced to establish a third group, see ICC-01/04-
01/07-1328, para. 12. See also, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788, para. 7. The decision states that, ‘[o]n 22 
July 2009, the Chamber ordered that the Registry, after consulting the Legal Representatives, 
assist the victims in the case in choosing a common legal representative. The Chamber also 
considered it necessary to divide the victims into two groups, the first group consisting of former 
child soldiers alleged to have participated in the attack on Bogoro on 24 February 2003, and the 
second consisting of all the other victims.’ ICC-01/04-01/07-1788, paras. 7-9. ICC-01/04-01/07-
1491, para. 27. 
483









OPCV is likely to not only represent former child soldiers (as in the Lubanga case). 
The OPCV might also represent the alleged victims of these child soldiers as the 
OPCV is the office which will be appointed by the relevant chamber as legal 
representative of those victims who are not represented otherwise.
 
Representing 
former child soldiers and their victims at the same time may cause conflicting 
interests despite the efforts of the OPCV to underline that this scenario is not likely 
since,  
 
‘[t]he Principal Counsel allocates staff members of the Office to each situation and 
case taking into account, inter alia, […] the need to avoid conflicts of interests. […] 
In this respect, the Principal Counsel respectfully suggest that one counsel should 
represent victims of different attacks, while another one should represent former 
child soldiers. Indeed, the appointment of these two counsel prevents any conflict of 
interests from arising amongst the victims. It also enables a legal representation 
taking into account the specificities of the two different categories of victims. […] 
The Principal Counsel informs the Single Judge that the resources of the Office at 




Attempts to avoid conflicting interests, by, for instance, establishing a Chinese wall 
within the OPCV are not promising. The small number of staff members available 
and the immense workload of the OPCV give rise to question of the effectiveness of 
such a construction. In its manual for legal representatives, the OPCV states that 
since its establishment in September 2009, 
 
‘the office has, as of July 2010, represented approximately 2000 victims and has 
submitted approximately 300 submissions in the various proceedings before the 
Court. The Office has also assisted 30 external representatives in all situations and 




Moreover, since all OPCV staff are situated in closely connected and shared offices 
at the premises of the ICC, the sustainability of a Chinese wall construction is even 
more likely to be unsuccessful. Secondly, for the same reasons mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, conflicts of interest could also arise between participants 
represented by the OPCV and those who are represented by individual legal 
representatives, who rely on the legal research and advice provided by the OPCV in 
accordance with Regulation 81(4)(a).486 
 Irrespective of the fact that the OPCV held before Trial Chamber I that, 
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‘[t]he Office tries to avoid conflicts of interest by ensuring that the teams 
representing particular individuals or groups of victims are not responsible for 




The Defence team and external legal representatives addressed this issue before the 
same Chamber and pointed out that the representation of victims by the OPCV 
constitutes a potential conflict of interests between those two categories of 
represented participants.
488
 Considering the large amount of victims participating in 
the current proceedings, entrusting the relevant Chambers with the task of avoiding 
a conflict of interests by deciding on a case-by-case basis when calling the OPCV to 
represent victims – as suggested by the OPCV – is difficult. This difficulty also 
remains when the Chambers are supported by the Victims Participation and 
Reparation Section.
489
 Conflicting interests may not always be visible at first sight. 
 Instead, as stated by various legal representatives, the Office of the Prosecutor 
and also the Defence in the Lubanga case, the task of the OPCV should be largely 
limited to legal research and providing advice to external legal representatives.
490
 
 Both the common legal representation of children and a potential of conflict of 
interests when representing this particular group of child participants is likely to 
reoccur before the International Criminal Court. Various pending cases before the 
ICC charge, besides the war crime of recruitment of children below the age of 
fifteen years, crimes which may be committed by the recruited child soldiers. As an 
alternative to the exclusion of the OPCV from all forms of legal representation (e.g. 
for those victims who do not have a legal representative), a practical solution would 
be to prevent the OPCV from acting as the legal representative of former child 
soldiers. 
 As regards the question of whether the common legal representation of former 
child soldiers (but also child victim participants in general) is in the best interests of 
the individual child, it is pointed out that such representation could bear a number 
of advantages for the participants. It is noted, however, that the actual advantage, 
bearing in mind the limited practice, cannot yet be established. The primary 
advantage of such representation could stem from the fact that the common interests 
of those children are bundled together – interests which reflect their common needs 
by virtue of being children. The legal representative could thus place the individual 
interests of, for instance, former child soldiers into the bigger picture of the criminal 
proceedings. The representative thereby draws the Court’s attention to the overall 
dimensions of child soldering (or being a child victim). Bundling the representation 
of children should furthermore be preferred, since such representation may enable 
the legal representative to collect information more easily due to his or her access to 
a wide range of information provided by the participants. Having better access 
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might be of particular importance when claiming reparations at a later stage 
(Chapter Five).  
 Furthermore, the common legal representation of former child soldiers, but also 
of children in general if not giving rise to inter-child conflicts of interests, is also 
preferable due to the limited financial sources available to children. As established 
below, the provision of legal aid for child participants is not ipso facto guaranteed. 
The common legal representation of children could, however, pave the way for pro 
bono representation of children. Free legal representation of children has also been 
called for in the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
on child friendly justice.
491
 
 On the other hand, the common legal representation of children constitutes a 
setback for the possibility to be individually represented in the proceedings as 
individual representation does not request the legal representative to look for a 
common denominator as regards the interests to be represented. Instead, the entire 
strategy of representation can then be based on the individual interest of the victim 
being represented. But as the Court is empowered to order common legal 
representation for reasons of judicial economy, exercising this particular right on an 
individual basis might anyway be excluded. 
 
In any case, child-focused common legal representation largely depends on the 
experience of the appointed lawyer. Sufficient training and practice on child rights 
issues is therefore indispensable and should be assessed by the relevant Chamber 
before appointing a legal representative to children.
492
 Such assessment could, for 
instance, be made by requiring years of practice experience of legal representatives 
particularly in representing minor clients. A similar request has also been 
manifested in the Guidelines of the Council of Europe on child friendly justice, 
which state that, 
 
‘[l]awyers representing children should be trained in and knowledgeable on 
children’s rights and related issues, receive ongoing and in-depth training and be 




The awareness of the Court to ensure that qualified legal representatives represent 
the interests of children has been restated in a report on the legal representation of 
victims of the Victims Participation and Reparation Section in the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya. VPRS underlined in its report that, 
 
‘[it] regrets that it was not ultimately able to identify appropriate representatives to 
speak specifically on behalf of victims who are children or young people. Of course, 
                                                 
491
  Council of Europe Guidelines 2010, IV. Child-friendly justice before, during and after judicial 
proceedings, A. General elements of child-friendly justice, para. 39. 
492
  www.vrwg.org/downloads/publications/DraftGuidelinesIntermediaries_Lawyers.pdf.  
493
  Council of Europe Guidelines 2010, IV. Child-friendly justice before, during and after judicial 








many if not all of the victim communities represented include children and youth, 
but in so far as the views of younger victims might vary from those of their older 
community leaders, these were not made visible in this process. This was due in 
large part to the short time period available which constrained efforts by the VPRS 




Accordingly, the need to have separate legal representation of children and ensuring 
that the search for legal representatives for them is not suffering from time 
constraints, has also been recognised in the aforementioned situation before the 
Court. The recognition of VPRS that the search for legal representatives who are 
experienced in child rights issues was mainly unsuccessful due to time constraints 
indicates that the ICC is advised to have child rights specialised legal 
representatives either within the OPCV or, as an alternative, have a short-list of 
potential external child rights lawyers at hand in order to ensure that children’s 
interests are from the outset of their involvement with the ICC properly represented. 
As neither the ad hoc Tribunals nor other international judicial institutions have 
been confronted with the need for legal representatives who are specialised in child 
rights issues, guidance on this child specific modality of participation is not 
provided for in the law and practice of the other international criminal proceedings. 
National experience in representing children could (in addition to the experience in 
representing victims in general) in this regard be a condition for being appointed as 
a legal representative of child victims. An additional or alternative requirement for 
appointment could be the completion of trainings and/or universal programs on the 
representation of children. It could be, on the other side, that lawyers who are 
experienced in representing children or having completed courses on this very 
specific field of law rarely exist. In such a case, the ICC is therefore encouraged to 
not only provide trainings for legal representatives in general (as is already the case), 
but also trainings which specifically address the representation of the child victim. 
 Bearing the aforementioned aspects in mind, it is concluded that the need for 
child adequate representation is not limited to cases such as the proceedings against 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui in which the recruitment of child soldiers is charged. 
Instead, it also extends to cases in which children have become victimised as a 
result of other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, the 
representation of children by legal representatives who are properly trained in this 
field is to be achieved in the proceedings before the ICC. If this is not the case, 
child participants might be at risk of not being represented in a manner which 
sufficiently focusses on those aspects which are inherent to be a child. 
 
3.7.3 Children expressing their views and concerns in the courtroom 
 
A request by victims to personally appear in the courtroom and give evidence was 
submitted by a legal representative of three participants on 2 April 2009.
495
 Among 
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these were two child participants who claimed to be former child soldiers.
 496
 
Despite the arguments raised by the Prosecution and Defence teams against such 
participation, Trial Chamber I allowed these three victims to personally give 
evidence while adjourning their request to present their views and concerns in 
person.
497
 The Trial Chamber underlined that the selection of specific victims to 
participate in person is to be based on facts. The Chamber held that, 
 
‘[f]act-specific decisions will be required, taking into account the circumstances of 
the trial as a whole. For instance, the personal contributions of a few victims are 
unlikely to have the same impact on the proceedings as when a large number of 
victims individually wish to express their views and concerns. To take an extreme 
example, if all the participating victims in this case (94) sought to present their views 
and concerns, depending always on the circumstances of their discrete interventions, 
that course may be antithetical to the fair trial of the accused. Accordingly, it will be 
necessary for the Chamber to consider these applications on their individual merits, 
balancing a wide variety of factors that will include the requirements and 




The children testified on their alleged recruitment and harm suffered. In contrast to 
the testimony provided by children in the witness capacity which was addressed in 
the previous chapter, the current witnesses’ testimony was not determined by 
question strategies of the defence and prosecution teams and thus provided for more 
extensive elaboration of their personal experiences. While most of the testimony 
was given in closed session to protect the identity of the witnesses (whether the 
closed session was also ordered because they were children cannot be concluded 
from the decision), parts of the questioning by their legal representative show that 
the opportunity to testify in the course of the criminal proceedings before the ICC 
was used by the legal representative to enable the participants to anticipate on their 
personal expectations. The possibility to express his/her expectations is especially 
relevant in regard to possible future reparation awards ordered by the Court. When 
asked about his expectations for his future, bearing in mind the harm suffered as a 
former child soldier, the witness stated that, 
                                                 
496
  ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, paras. 31-32. 
497
  Arguments raised by the Defense and Prosecution, ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, 26 June 2009, 
paras. 3-4, 5-7. In order to prevent unnecessary repetition, the Chamber held in the same decision 
that ‘[o]nce the three participating victims have completed their evidence, they will be in the best 
position, at that stage, to determine whether they wish to express their views and concerns 
personally on issues such as the harm they individually experienced and the approach to be taken 
to reparations, if they have chosen to give evidence on all relevant matters within their knowledge 
and experience, it may be more appropriate for any additional submissions (which may involve 
complex legal issues) to be advanced by their legal representatives. However, the Chamber will 
deal with the position of each victim following their evidence, once the individual circumstances 
of, and the detail of the requests from, each of these three participating victims are clear. At that 
stage the Chamber will determine, if relevant, when and by whom any views and concerns are to 
be presented, bearing in mind the situation of the victims and the need to ensure that the trial of 
the accused is fair’ (para. 40). 
498








‘[w]ell, I am a pupil today. My parents did not tell me to go – or show me how to go 
and finish. We were not fishers. And when I was a youngster, I was not given the 
time to go and wander around, so the only direction I was given was that of going to 





The desire to continue his studies draws Trial Chamber I’s attention to the personal 
wish of this participant at a stage in which reparation claims are not considered in 
detail. One may question whether such elaboration is, bearing the criminal nature 
and objectives of the proceedings in mind, adequate in the course of the criminal 
proceedings as the participation of the child in the criminal proceedings per 
definition does not enable the child to ever come into consideration for any form of 
reparations. Instead, the provision of reparations is limited to the reparation 
proceedings before the ICC (Chapter Five). On the other side, enabling the 
individual to address his/her personal claims in the course of the criminal 
proceedings constitutes an opportunity which lacks precedents in international 
criminal proceedings. It is noteworthy to remember that the form of reparation 
proceedings and the order of reparation awards by the ICC is, to date, still unclear 
and not yet put into practice (Chapter Five). Accordingly, the possibility to 
personally give evidence at this stage of the proceedings constitutes a particular 
opportunity for child victims to recall the harm done to them. Testifying at this 
early stage could constitute a form of satisfaction for the individual. The 
participation of former child soldiers in the capacity of participant in the course of 
criminal proceedings may draw the Court’s attention to those needs and experiences 
which have not been addressed during the questioning of witnesses who were called 
by the Prosecution or Defence. 
 Allowing and enabling children to participate in international mechanisms 
during or in the aftermath of conflict situations can have a positive effect on the 
overall well-being of traumatised children. The Committee on the Rights of the 
Child held that participation of children in judicial proceedings has particular 
positive effects: 
 
‘Children’s participation helps them to regain control over their lives, contributes to 




The positive effects of child participation are, as underlined by the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, not limited to procedures under national law. Accordingly, 
the Committee promotes a comprehensive participation of children which includes 
participation  
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UNICEF underlined with regard to children’s involvement in truth and 
reconciliation commissions that, 
 
‘[c]hildren’s statements to a truth commission can foster intergenerational dialogue 
about what happened during the conflict and what can be done to prevent further 
violence and victimization of children. This exchange can bring families together in 
the effort to restore peace and reconstruct the social fabric. While adult testimony 
about child rights violations helps paint a picture of the range and types of violations 




A similar, perhaps even the same, argumentation is applicable when the child is 
involved in judicial proceedings before the ICC as the statements provided by 
children unavoidably draw the Court’s, but also the parents’ and most likely also 
communities’ attention to the particular experience, needs and expectations of the 
child. Such statements could thus constitute a platform for further dialogue not only 
about the child but also with the child victim concerned. In line with the 
aforementioned and from a more general perspective, international law, especially 
the law of procedure, should therefore enable (without any coercion) and not 
prevent the child from participation in international procedures since a restrictive or 
even prohibitive approach neglects the recognition of the child as bearer of human 
rights and in particular as a bearer of the right to a remedy which includes the right 
to access to justice, receive reparations and access to information.
503
 International 
mechanisms are of particular importance due to often ineffective or non-existent 
national mechanisms during or in the aftermath of conflict situations. This omission 
was also underlined in the report of the United Nations open-ended working group 
that explored the possibility of an optional protocol to the Convention on the Right 
of the Child to provide a communications procedure: 
 
‘In many countries, children did not have access to effective remedies for the 
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However, it should be kept in mind that, as was elaborated upon in Chapter One, it 
is still being debated whether criminal proceedings as such are the right forum for 
this opportunity, in particular when considering the participation of children. After 
all, the participation of children in the criminal proceedings does not lead to an 
actual award of reparations. Purely being limited to story-telling might from a child 
perspective be not as satisfactory as actually benefitting from concrete forms of 
reparations. This is because the reflection on the benefits of storytelling might, 
depending in particular on the specific evolving capacities of the participating child, 
be difficult to conceive for a child participant. 
 The statement of the second former child soldier suggests the conclusion that 
participation at this stage enables them to elaborate on the consequences of their 
recruitment and their future expectations: 
 
Q:  Mr Witness […] what are the consequences of your time doing military service 
within the UPC? 
A:  Well, it wasn’t my – I wasn’t – I didn’t enroll of my own volition. 
Q:  Mr Witness. 
A: Yes? 
Q:  Are you satisfied with the time that you spent within the UPC armed group? 
A:  No, not at all. 
Q:  Since you’re not happy, what would you like for today and for the future for 
yourself? 
A:  Well, what I’m asking for is for help in resuming my education. 
Q: Now, when you say that you’re not satisfied with the time that you spent within 
the UPC, why is that so? 
A: No. I’m not happy. Why? Because they found me and I was a school child and I 




At the same time, the statement of this alleged former child soldier establishes that 
it cannot generally be assumed that all child participants are capable of formulating 
their expectations on the ICC proceedings. While the third (adult) participant who 
was invited to give evidence could clearly formulate his expectations from the 
proceedings before the Court, the second former child soldier replied when asked 
what he expected from this trial and his participation,  
 
‘[w]ell, I don’t have an answer.’
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Clearly, the young witness did not know how to address his expectations. This reply 
demonstrates that there is reason to question whether the participation of child 
victims in criminal proceedings can generally be considered the right forum for 
children bearing in mind the principles of the best interests and evolving capacities. 
This doubt is furthermore strengthened when considering the recent judgment in the 
Lubanga case. With regard to the former child soldiers who were allowed to give 
evidence as requested by their legal representative, the majority of the Chamber 
held that, 
 
‘[t]he evidence of a/0225/06, a/0229/06 […] contains internal inconsistencies which 
undermine their credibility. a/0225/06’s recollection of his abduction and military 
service lacked clarity, and he demonstrated uncertainty when questioned about the 
details of those events. […] a/0225/06 gave significantly unhelpful answers on 
occasion when questioned about the gaps and inconsistencies in his testimony. […] 
a/0229/06 was inconsistent in his account of his abduction and military service. […] 
He was often vague in his answers and he tended to respond by stating that he was 




This excerpt shows that the credibility of the child victim participants was 
examined in detail before coming to the conclusion that, 
 
‘it accepts that there is a real possibility that victims a/0229/06 and a/0225/06 […] 
stole the identities of Thonifwa Uroci Dieudonné (D-0032) and Jean-Paul Bedijo 
Tschonga (D-0033) in order to obtain the benefits they expected to receive as 
victims participating in these proceedings. The Chamber is persuaded there is 
significant weaknesses as regards the evidence of a/0225/06, a/0229/06, […] to the 
extent that their accounts are unreliable. Given the material doubts that exist as to the 
identities of a/0229/06 and a/0225/06 […], the permission originally granted to 
a/0229/06 [and] a/0225/06 […] to participate as victims is withdrawn. In general 
terms, if the Chamber, on investigation, concludes that its original prima facie 
evaluation was incorrect, it should amend any earlier order as to participation, to the 
extent necessary. It would be unsustainable to allow victims to continue participating 
if a more detailed understanding of the evidence has demonstrated they no longer 




Only after having examined the former child soldiers in person, the Chamber came 
to the conclusion that their statements are not only unreliable, but also that due to 
the significant inconsistencies in their statements, they were excluded from further 
participation in the proceedings. The Chamber was no longer convinced that the 
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reparation be linked – perhaps some people might doubt this – they could carry out an 
investigation to be able to establish guilt in this regard because, in our humble opinion, we 
consider that the charges which are put in terms of conscription and enlistment are insignificant 
when you consider what we have experienced in Mahagi territory.’ 
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participants were victims of the charged crime. For the same reasons, Trial 
Chamber I ruled that also the child witnesses with dual status, thus those children 
who gave evidence as witnesses in the criminal proceedings while participating as 
victims at the same time, were also to be excluded from further participation.
509
 The 
majority of the Chamber held in particular that, 
 
‘given the Chamber’s present conclusion as to the reliability and accuracy of these 




While this decision was taken in the course of the criminal proceedings, the general 
formulation of the Chamber as regards the right to participate might have 
implications for these child victims participation in reparation proceedings. The 
dissenting judge Odio Benito pointed out in her opinion in relation to the child 
victim witnesses with dual status that, 
 
‘32. [t]hese witnesses were subject to multiple interviews and strenuous 
examination and cross-examination, which took place on numerous occasions, 
during a period of time ranging from 2005 to 2009-2010. In all of these interviews 
and interrogatories they were asked to recall events that occurred between 2002 and 
2003. Although there is doubt as to the exact age of these individuals at the time of 
the events, it has been proven that all of them certainly children or adolescents at 
the time of their interviews with OTP investigators in 2005. Some of them could 
have also been under the age of 18 when they gave testimony in court in 2009-2010. 
These witnesses (and anyone under those circumstances) could explicably and 
logically have difficulties in recollecting events […]. In fact, with such elapses of 
time it would be suspicious if the accounts would remain perfectly alike and 
unchanged. Memory is faulty. This is more the case for children and adults having 
suffered any traumatic events. 
 
34. […] although I agree with the Majority of the Trial Chamber that the 
testimonies of these young individuals should not be used for the purposes of 
determining the individual criminal responsibility of Mr Lubanga, their victims’ 
status should remain unaffected. 
35. Additionally and critically, it is unfair and discriminatory to impose on 
individuals with dual status a higher evidentiary threshold (beyond reasonable 
doubt) as regards their victims’ status, while all other victims participating in the 
proceedings have not been subject to thorough examination by the parties and the 
Chamber, as these young persons have been. When reparations are evaluated, it 
will be up to the Trial Chamber to determine the criteria utilized in determining 
their final status. Consequently, I consider they should maintain their status as 




                                                 
509
  Ibid., paras. 478-484. 
510
  Ibid., para. 484. 
511









Child victim participants might therefore be better advised to limit their 
participation by not giving evidence in person and thus only being represented by a 
legal representative. It remains to be seen, however, how the Chamber in the 
Lubanga case, but also other Chambers in future reparation proceedings, will 
examine the reliability of victims’ claims. It goes without saying that the fairness of 
the proceedings against the (alleged) perpetrators requests an assessment of the 
reliability of children claims – the exact standard, however, is still to be developed. 
 If however, the examination of children’s claims is not made subject to such a 
thorough examination at reparation stage compared to the questioning of child 
participants within the course of the criminal proceedings, it could be assumed that 
child participation at the reparation stage is to be considered to be more in the best 
interests of the child than his or her participation during the criminal proceedings. 
Whether participation in the course of the reparation proceedings will indeed be of a 
less intensive nature remains to be seen.  
 It has become clear that the lack of procedural regulation in any case leads to an 
unclear procedural status of the child participant when giving evidence in the course 
of the criminal proceedings. In particular, potential risks, such as the risk of being 
excluded from further participation cannot, under the current system, be anticipated 
upon as illustrated by the Lubanga case. It is therefore argued that a streamlined 
practice and regulation is necessary in order to enable the child participant and the 
legal representative to evaluate prior to an actual involvement in person whether 
child participation should be applied for already during the criminal proceedings or 
whether it is advisable to participate in the reparation proceedings. 
 
3.7.4 Legal aid for the representation of the child 
 
Closely related to the legal representation of the child participant is the legal aid 
regime of the International Criminal Court. Rule 90(5) RPE states that, 
 
‘[a] victim or group of victims who lack the necessary means to pay for a common 
legal representative chosen by the Court may receive assistance from the Registry, 




The Registrar determines whether a victim is indigent and whether full or partial 
payment should be granted.
513
 Despite the lack of a victim indigence form, the 
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practice of the Court stipulates a child-sensitive attitude regarding the provision of 
legal aid.
 514
 The very first granting of legal aid by the Registrar to a victim was to a 
child participant in the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. In the decision 
of 3 November 2006 the Registrar decided to provide the minor claimant legal aid, 
considering that, 
 
’la victime étant mineure, elle doit être présumée ne pas disposer des resources pour 
prendre en charge tout ou partie des coûts lies à sa representation légale devant la 
Cour et qu’au surplus, l’examen préliminaire les informations qu’elle a fournies 
relativement à ses bien mobiliers, immobiliers et autres confirme qu’elle ne dispose 




Similarly, in the proceedings against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
the Registrar held in the case of one of the applicants that, 
 
‘it can reasonably be assumed that he does not have the means to pay for all or any 




Citing the facts that the victim was unemployed, did not have a house or home and 
was only supported by his family, in a preliminary review of the situation of the 




 In a more recent decision, Pre-Trial Chamber I in the case of The Prosecutor v. 
Bahar Idress Abu Garda in the Situation in Darfur, Sudan, also recognised the 
indigence of minor child participants.
518
 The Registry assumed the indigence of the 
minor siblings in the decision at issue.
519
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 This leniency only constitutes a preliminary provision of legal aid. It cannot be 
concluded from the practice whether the indigence of children is treated as equally 
as the indigence of adults. Accordingly, if a child-specific approach to indigence is 
not visible, this does not permit the conclusion that the Registry generally provides 
children with legal aid by virtue of them being children. It cannot be determined 
with certainty whether or not the Registry is of the view that all children should 
benefit from free legal aid as requested in the Guidelines of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on child friendly justice.
520
 The provision of 
legal aid is only considered on the basis of a preliminary preview of the situation of 
the child. 
 The importance of free legal aid to children is recognised not only on the 
European continent, but also in Africa. In Europe, Finland and Italy, for instance, 
grant child victims of certain crimes free legal aid without taking into account the 
possessions of the child victim or its caretakers.
521
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It has become clear that the procedural rules of the International Criminal Court do 
not prohibit a child from participating in the criminal proceedings. Practice has 
established that particular requirements have been introduced by various Chambers 
when children apply for participation – requirements which are not required to be 
fulfilled by other victims in order for them to be recognised as a victim within the 
meaning of Rule 85 RPE. Accordingly, a distinction between children and other 
categories of victim participants, especially adult participants, exists in the practice 
of the Court. By distinguishing children from other participants, various Chambers 
stated that children face particular difficulties such as, for instance, being required 
to provide proof of their identity. Those Chambers thereby recognised that 
difficulties exist not only as a result of the consequences of an armed conflict, but 
also because of child-specific aspects such as age. 
 In any case, large numbers of victims and a lack of procedural clarity should not 
immediately be used as arguments leading to the conclusion that child victim 
participation in criminal proceedings is not the correct forum for victims of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the court. Neither should the risk of endangering the 
fairness, impartiality and expeditiousness be seen as a reason for exclusion from the 
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outset. After all, as long as the Rome Statute provides for the possibility of victim 
participation on the basis of Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute without explicitly 
excluding minor victims from this procedural avenue, children should not be 
prohibited from applying for participation without a justification which is provided 
for in law. If children are to be excluded from participation in the criminal 
proceedings, such a decision should in particular mirror a case-by-case assessment 
of the situation of the individual child. 
 It has at the same time become clear that the participation of children in criminal 
proceedings may not generally be considered to be in the best interests of a child, in 
particular when children give evidence in person and are subjected to a thorough 
examination. The lack of maturity is one factor which could constitute a reason why 
this kind of participation is not adequate for minor participants. In this regard, if 
they are questioned about their alleged suffering it might also, as is the case with 
child witnesses, entail the risk of re-traumatisation. At the same time, it has also 
become clear that child victim participation can have positive implications for a 
child – be it from a personal perspective of the individual child or with regard to the 
broader objectives of transitional justice processes.  
 The procedural particularities which arise when children participate thus seem to 
suggest that the best interests of the child are to be considered on a case-by-case 
basis prior to their participation. It cannot generally be assumed that child 
participation is in the best interest of the minor. Instead, the evolving capacities of 
the individual child are to be carefully assessed. In addition to an assessment of the 
individual child, the Court, including all actors involved in the course of the 
criminal proceedings, should take sufficiently into account that child participation 
requests a sensitive response in practice which, thus far, is rarely addressed in the 
procedural regulation of victim participation. Experience and where necessary 
trainings on the procedural implications of child participation, in particular trainings 
on how to involve, address and protect the child in the course of the criminal 
proceedings thereby constitute an avenue which could ensure that children 
participate in a manner which is child-sensitive. Experience in representing children 
in domestic proceedings and special trainings aim to ensure that children are 
approached by all actors in a child-sensitive way as long as there is no 
corresponding procedural regulation under the Rome Statute and the respective 
rules which explicitly provides for procedural treatment of child participants in 






THE CHILD PERPETRATOR AND THE CHILD OF 








The current chapter focusses in more detail on the fact that children themselves can 
qualify as perpetrators of international crimes and the possibility to prosecute child 
perpetrators internationally. In addition, the chapter examines the procedural 
implications when a child of a(n) (alleged) perpetrator is involved in the course of 
the criminal proceedings before the International Criminal Court. 
 
Children participate as soldiers in hostilities.
523
 The phenomenon of child soldiers 
and their involvement in conflict situations is a continuing reality. Today’s 
estimated number of child soldiers amounts to more than 300,000 children.
524
 As a 
consequence of their recruitment, children have committed and continue to commit 
the most atrocious acts amounting to international crimes, such as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.
525
 The procedural capacity of the child perpetrator under 
international criminal law, to date, only concerns children between the age of 
fifteen and eighteen years at the moment of crime commission. The question raised 
with regard to this procedural capacity reads as follows: Are the best interests of the 
child taken into account when considering the international criminal prosecution of 
(alleged) child perpetrators? 
 
The capacity of the child of a(n) (alleged) perpetrator is not a strictly legal one. This 
is because it is derived from the child’s parent who is charged with or convicted for 
international crimes. Being the child of a(n) (alleged) perpetrator might bear 
numerous and far reaching consequences. The child is likely to be confronted with 
the factual and often lengthy separation from his/her parent considering that 
institutions, such as the ad hoc Tribunals or the ICC in The Hague, are situated far 
away from their home and proceedings (including detention) tend to last for several 
years. The parent’s involvement in criminal proceedings may also lead to 
stigmatisation and exclusion of the child in his/her community. In addition to these 
non-legal consequences, a number of issues arose in the practice of the ICC which 
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anticipate that certain decisions taken by the Court may have particular 
consequences for the child and may therefore require that the Court sufficiently 
takes into account that decisions addressed at the (alleged) perpetrator may have 
implications for the child. It is for this reason that this derived capacity – despite its 
limited procedural value – is nevertheless assessed as a procedural capacity within 
this research since it may give rise to questions concerning the best interests of the 
child. 
 
4.2 RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS 
 
The participation of children in hostilities can be traced back in history, but it has 
particularly increased during the past decades.
526
 The Cape Town Principles and 
Best Practices of 1997 propose actions to be taken by States and communities in 
order to prevent child recruitment, demobilise child soldiers and reintegrate these 
children into family and community life.
527
 The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers underlined once more in its Global Report 2008 that ‘where armed conflict 
does exist, child soldiers will almost certainly be involved.’
528
  
 Forced or voluntary recruitment is the result of different causes and is led by 
varying motivations.
529
 Children, particularly orphans, the unaccompanied, the less-
wealthy or those that come from a disadvantaged background who do not 
participate in an education system and who spend their free time on the streets, are 
at particular risk of becoming child soldiers because they do not benefit from the 
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 Furthermore, a child may not be able to oversee the consequences of signing up 
for voluntary recruitment. Above and beyond, recruiters prefer to use children 
because they can be easily influenced, coerced and controlled.
531
 One witness of the 
Prosecution in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Nathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui stated that,  
 
‘[il] préférait étre escortée [sic] par les enfants soldats ages de moins de 16 ans parce 




The existence of and trade in light weapons (predominantly AK 47s) enables 
recruiters to effectively use children in combat, since the light weight of such 
weapons means that they can be easily carried and handled by children.
533
 
Additionally, the large number of children among combatants can also be explained 




4.3 PROSECUTING THE CHILD 
 
Child perpetrators of crimes under international law were never charged with such 
crimes in international (judicial) proceedings. The first and only international 
mechanism that explicitly entails the jurisdictional mandate for the prosecution of 
alleged child perpetrators was the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Article 7 of the 
Statute stipulates that the Court has jurisdiction over minors who were between 
fifteen and eighteen years of age when the alleged crime was committed.
535
 
Consequently, on the one hand, the SCSL Statute recognises that children may be 
perpetrators but, on the other hand, lacks jurisdiction over child perpetrators below 
the age of fifteen years.  
 As regards those children who were between fifteen and eighteen years at the 
moment of crime commission, it was extensively discussed whether they should be 
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held criminally responsible under international law.
536
 Numerous arguments were 
raised in favour of and against the criminal prosecution of minors.
537
 The 
Prosecutor of the SCSL proclaimed in this context that he does not intend to start 
proceedings against minors regardless of his jurisdictional mandate, but instead – as 
is the case for the other international criminal tribunals – focuses on the ones who 
bear the greatest responsibility, while children, in principle, did not bear such 
responsibility in the Sierra Leonean conflict.
538
 He underlined that children who 
committed crimes are instead to be recognised as victims.
539
  
 At the time of writing, the last case before the Special Court for Sierra Leone – 
the trial of the former Liberian president Charles Taylor – reached the appeals 
stage.
540
 None of the cases brought has involved children in the capacity of a child 
perpetrator being charged with crimes within the Special Court’s jurisdiction.  
 The subsequent inclusion of Article 26 in the Rome Statute brought the 
discussion concerning the international criminal responsibility of the child before 
the ICC to an end by excluding persons below the age of eighteen from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.
541
 The international criminal prosecution of minors has thus been 
rejected. Considering the practice of the SCSL and the drafting history of this 
particular provision, it is also unlikely that children will be prosecuted at an 
international level for having committed international crimes before a future 
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international court or tribunal.
542
 Excluding minors from the jurisdiction of the ICC 
does, however, not imply that minors can principally not be prosecuted before 
national courts.
543
 It has been underlined by Clark and Triffterer that,  
 
‘taking into consideration that complementarity and thereby the priority of national 
criminal jurisdiction prevails anyhow, it appears not only justifiable but also 
preferable to leave the group under eighteen to the national courts. They are much 
better equipped to take care of the specific situation in which children have been 




International justice mechanisms have not been used and recognised as a forum to 
hold child perpetrators responsible. One may therefore conclude that the 
international criminal prosecution is not considered to be in the best interests of the 
child.  
 Instead, a limited number of national cases has been initiated against minor 
perpetrators. One of the few national examples of a case against an alleged child 
soldier exists in the practice of the United States in relation to Guantánamo Bay.
545
 
In 2007 a United States military commission charged Omar Ahmed Khadr, a 
Canadian citizen who was detained in 2002, with war crimes that were committed 
at the age of fifteen.
546
 Due to a plea deal, judicial proceedings were never held.
547
 
The Rwandan ‘1994 minors’ that have been detained for crimes committed during 
the Rwandan genocide constitute another example of national cases against child 
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 Compared to the overall number of perpetrators convicted for the 
Rwandan genocide, minor perpetrators constitute a very small group.
549
 The lack of 
a broadly established practice to prosecute minors for the commission of 
international crimes before domestic courts underlines that also under national law, 
child perpetrators are rather seen as victims of conflict situations instead of being 
seen as perpetrators.  
Notwithstanding the non-existence of international judicial proceedings against 
children in the capacity of child perpetrators, the fact that children committed the 
most heinous crimes of concern to the international community was recognised 
during children’s participation in non-judicial procedures of truth and reconciliation 
commissions like for instance in the TRCs of Sierra Leone and Liberia.
550
 
Remarkably, the mandate of the Sierra Leonean TRC points out that the 
Commission is vested with the task of implementing special procedures when 
children who committed international crimes participate.
551
 Cook and Heykoop 
pointed out that in order  
 
‘[t]o make sure that all children were treated equally as victims and witnesses before 
the TRC, the statement-taking forms for children omitted the section designated for 
perpetrators so that children were identified in the database only as victims or 
witnesses. This made it clear that the policy and approach of the TRC was to include 
children’s experiences in the findings of the Commission, but not to hold children 




For the first time in the history of TRCs’, the Sierra Leonean TRC explicitly 
referred to children who committed international crimes in its regulation and final 
report.
553
 The TRC Act of 2000 addressed the needs of child victims and introduced 
special procedures and measures for the protection of children who have committed 
these crimes.
554
 In its final report of 2004, the Commission pointed out that most 
                                                 
548
  Morrill 2005, 103, at 106. 
549
  Human Rights Watch, Lasting Wounds, Consequences of Genocide and War on Rwanda’s 
Children (2003), at 33, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/rwanda0403/rwanda0403-05.htm.  
550
  TRC Sierra Leone Vol. 3B, Chapter 4 Children and the Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone. Siegrist 
2006, 53-65. With regard to the TRC of Liberia, see Volume III, Title II, ‘Children, the Conflict 
and the TRC Children Agenda’, www.http://trcofLiberia.org/, at 65. The appropriateness of 
accountability of child perpetrators through alternative to judicial proceedings is also restated in 
the Key Principles for Children and Transitional Justice which provide that, ‘[a]ccountability 
measures for alleged child perpetrators should be in the best interests of the child and should be 
conducted in a manner that takes into account their age at the time of the alleged commission of 
the crime, promotes reintegration and potential to assume a constructive role in society. In 
determining which process of accountability is in the best interests of the child, alternatives to 
judicial proceedings should be considered wherever appropriate.’ UNICEF 2010b, 407-411, at 3.6. 
551
  Section 7(1)(4) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, Being an Act to establish 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in line with art. XXVI of the Lome Peace Agreement 
and to provide for related matters; http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2000-4.pdf. 
552
  Cook & Heykoop 2010, 159, at 171. 
553
  Ibid., at 164. 
554









children who have been found to have committed international crimes are also child 
victims.
555
 In addition to the general findings on this particular group of children, 
the TRC’s final report includes an entire chapter on children in armed conflict in 
which the substantive particularities regarding this specific group are addressed.
556
 
The Commission underlined that it does not aim to determine the guilt of former 
child soldiers. Instead, it does attempt to assess children’s role as “victim-
perpetrators” and thereby addresses the non-judicial accountability of the child.
557
 
In this regard, the TRC published statistical information on children who committed 
crimes during the Sierra Leonean conflict.
558
 The recognition of the fact that 
children have committed international crimes in the course of the conflict is thereby 
established in the TRC’s regulation and also reflected in its findings. Similarly, the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Liberia paid particular attention to these 
children. It recognised that the international prosecution of this particular group of 
children has not been recognised by the international community. Instead, the 
Commission invited former child soldiers to give a statement before the TRC. The 
criminal prosecution of children was advised to be regulated under national law or 




4.4 BEING THE CHILD OF A(N) (ALLEGED) PERPETRATOR 
 
Decisions taken by the Court and its organs may indirectly affect the child of a(n) 
(alleged) perpetrator and give rise to consequences which particularly affect the 
child. While qualifying such consequences as a victimisation of the child is 
considered a step too far, the Court should nevertheless be aware of the potential 
negative implications for the child. 
 In this regard, it needs to be noted that the term child in this context is 
understood as referring to the biological (or ‘legally’ recognised) minor child of the 
(alleged) perpetrator.
560
 This derived procedural capacity differs from the other 
procedural capacities of the child in the sense that it does not enable children to 
participate in the proceedings, but rather exists due to their parent’s procedural 
capacity as a(n) (alleged) perpetrator and detainee. 
 This capacity is of particular relevance concerning two issues. Firstly, being the 
child of a(n) (alleged) perpetrator bears consequences for the child and family life at 
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home. Enforcement measures, such as the freezing of assets, of course have 
implications for the family of the accused.
561
 If applied without sufficiently taking 
into account the particular needs of the child in his/her daily life such as the 
payment of school fees and other family allowances, the child is at risk of being 
negatively affected. Secondly, another issue which underlines that particular 
consequences arise for the child is mirrored in the organisation of family visits. The 
various institutions grant the accused and convicted parent the right to family 
visits.
562
 This right aims to serve the wellbeing of the detainee and enables the child 
to keep contact with the parent despite the detention of his/her parent.
563
 The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child stipulates in this regard that, 
 
‘[n]o child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her 




Article 9 paragraph 2 states furthermore that, 
 
‘States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both 
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a 




In practice, the organisation of family visits leads to various difficulties that might 
constrain the ability of the child to visit his/her parent – as illustrated by the various 
decisions made concerning family visits of the accused Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. These decisions addressed inter alia 
the number of family visits and the amount of members eligible for visiting their 
relative.
566
 The latter, for instance, is a father of six children. He argued that the 
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‘decision on family visits adopted by the Registrar contradicts her obligations in that 
it only allows for occasional family contact.’  
 
The Presidency of the ICC underlined in this regard that a 
 
‘detained person’s right correlates with the interests of other affected individuals 
such as those of his children of minority age who wish to have contact with their 
detained parent. […] the Presidency finds that, in the instant case, a positive 
obligation to fund family visits must be implied in order to give effect to a right 





This decision illustrates that some difficulties have been observed.
 568
 The questions 
which, to date, have not been addressed relate to the concept of a family and 
whether children of all spouses are eligible for family visits. Furthermore, visa 
issues still exist for children who wish to visit their parent. The introductory 
assumption that decisions taken by the Court and its organs may indirectly affect 
the child of a(n) (alleged) perpetrator and give rise to consequences which 
particularly affect the child is thus supported by the first decisions relating to family 
visits. 
 The ICC is also likely to be confronted with requests concerning the frequency 
and costs of family visits, in particular when the prisoner is indigent.
569
 These 
questions all have in common that they request child sensitivity by procedural 
awareness and regulation in order to ensure that the negative implications for the 
child can be limited or even prevented. For this reason when deciding on issues 
concerning the (alleged) perpetrator, it is indispensable to also take into account the 
best interests of the child and his/her rights as contained in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, in particular the child’s right to family life. The recognition of 
the right of the child to visit his/her imprisoned parents (when being in the best 
interests of the child) has been addressed particularly within the European context 
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by child rights organisations.
570
 It has been pointed out by the European Network 
for Children of Imprisoned Parents (Eurochips), an organisational network which 
monitors the treatment of children with imprisoned parents in Europe that, 
 
‘[a]cross the EU, good practice examples have been observed regarding support with 
family contact both on a regular basis, and in cases of an emergency with many 
examples of flexibility being offered by prison regimes in relation to visits to prisons. 
For example, in Poland, prisoners who have custody of children below 15 years of 
age can request one additional visit per month. In Poland and Denmark, it is also 
possible to combine a number of visits a month into longer ones – this means the 
visits will be rarer but may have a better quality, especially for families that have to 
travel considerable distances to visit their relative in prison. In many countries 
(including Italy, the UK, France, Poland, Sweden, Norway, Belgium), some prisons 
organize special visits for children with their imprisoned parent where they are able 
to spend quality time together; however these are sometimes linked to the prisoner’s 




In light of this national practice, the ICC is advised to facilitate regular contact 
between imprisoned parents and their children. In addition, the Court should 
provide for the organisation of family contacts and visits in the respective rules. 
This codification aims in particular to ensure legal transparency for detained 
persons about the possibility to see and stay in contact with their families. 
 It is also to be kept in mind that visiting parents in the detention facilities of the 
ICC in the Netherlands is likely to be expensive, if not even unaffordable for 
children. The European Network for Children of Imprisoned Parents examined the 
payment of such visits in the European area. It held illustratively held that, 
 
 ‘[t]he high cost and inconvenience of travelling to prisons (especially if using public 
transport), which are often a long way from where the family live and located some 
distance from public transport stops, deter many families from visiting. In the UK, 
the government’s Assisted Prison Visits Scheme provides a right to financial support 
for families on low income. In Sweden, the kommuns (municipalities) cover the 
travel costs of children visiting imprisoned parents. In Poland, financial support is 




While imprisonment during the course of ICC proceedings can be expected to be 
arranged in the majority of the cases in The Hague, Netherlands, imprisonment 
following a conviction could be taken over by any State Party which is willing to 
take care of convicted persons. This means, that convicted parents will not 
necessarily be imprisoned in the country of their origin. The regular arrangement of 
family visits therefore gives rise to certain costs (in addition to the practical 
difficulties of arranging family visits abroad). The ICC is thus called upon to also 
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provide for adequate regulation of the particular challenges relating to family visits 
abroad. 
 In general terms, the Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended in 
particular that, 
 
‘States parties ensure that the rights of children with a parent in prison are taken into 
account from the moment of the arrest of their parent(s) and by all actors involved in 
the process and at all its stages, including law enforcement, prison service 




Thus, domestic practice relating to family visits can provide guidance for the ICC 
when deciding upon family visits and should therefore be taken into account. 
Considering the financial aspects of family visits, it might, for instance, be 
appropriate to reserve a separate chapter within the budget of the ICC for children 
visiting their detained parent. It can be concluded that the arrangement of family 
visits is only one example which shows that contact in general is to be established 
by taking into account the rights of the child to be in contact with his/her parent. 
Accordingly, the ICC organs which are involved in decisions concerning family 
visits are called upon to ensure that during pre-trial and trial detention of the 
accused, child rights aspects are not forgotten. The case-by-case examination of the 
best interests of the child requires furthermore that such decisions are not limited to 
an assessment of the prisoner’s interest to see his/her family but also take into 




Children commit international crimes. The international criminal prosecution of 
minor perpetrators has, however, clearly been rejected under the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. The question which remains is how to deal with 
these child perpetrators at an international level while at the same time bearing in 
mind the best interests of the child. The practice of TRCs established that children’s 
commission of international crimes can be dealt with at an international level 
without a judicial forum. This practice has been pointed out to be of particular 
relevance within the post-conflict, reconstruction and reconciliation period. The 
exclusion of prosecuting minors under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court left at the same time no room for doubt that the international 
prosecution of children when having committed war crimes, crimes against 
humanity or the crime of genocide, is not accepted to be the proper forum for the 
adjudication of child perpetrators. 
 With regard to the procedural capacity of the child of a(n) (alleged) perpetrator 
it can be concluded that it is crucial that international criminal courts and tribunals 
recognise that the child may be negatively affected by decisions taken against 
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his/her parent in the course of international criminal proceedings. Although the 
freezing of assets and restrictions to family life may be justified within the context 
of criminal proceedings, the limited understanding of the particularities of the child 
limits or even prevents the child from visiting his/her parent or living in child-
adequate circumstances by, for example not being able to attend school due to a 
parent’s involvement in international criminal proceedings. In conclusion, this 
procedural capacity requests child sensitive awareness as regards the possible 
implications for children from the judges and the Registry of the ICC; but equally 
from defence lawyers representing the interests of their clients in relation to their 
family life. Finally, while this procedural capacity might be considered less relevant 
from a criminal law perspective, particular importance is derived from the 
perspective of child rights. The fact that the child may indeed fall within this 
procedural capacity requests an adequate legal response which sufficiently takes 
into account the particular impact of the parent’s involvement in international 
























5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
On the basis of Article 75 of the Rome Statute, a child who has become the victim 
of international crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute can, like 
adults, claim reparations in order to remedy the harm suffered.
574
 The opportunity 
to not only participate in the course of the criminal proceedings (Chapter Three) but 
also claim reparations, constitutes an additional opportunity for children to be 
involved in ICC proceedings by pursuing their personal interests. 
 
Reparations for international crimes claimed by a child constitute, in principle 
though, a twofold novelty: firstly, as with all victims of international crimes, until 
the establishment of the ICC, victims were unable to claim reparations before an 
international court or tribunal specifically mandated to adjudicate claims of this 
nature; secondly, children in particular have only occasionally been involved in 
other existing international or regional complaint mechanisms pursuing claims on 
their own behalf. Whether, however, the ICC will indeed be able to implement 
these two novelties in practice, remains to be seen. 
 
This chapter examines the participation of children in reparation proceedings before 
the ICC bearing in particular in mind that prior to the establishment of the ICC, 
victim participation was largely limited to the participation of adult victims. It has 
been established in the foregoing chapters that child participation in criminal 
proceedings may require procedural treatment which takes into account the 
evolving capacities of the individual child. A similar need, which requests child 
specific treatment from a procedural and substantive perspective, might also exist in 
relation to child participation in reparation proceedings. 
 The first case before the ICC, the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
draws particular attention to child soldiers. The recruitment of children below the 
age of fifteen years is the only war crime being charged in this case. In light of this 
uniqueness, also addressed in the course of the previous chapters, the current 
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chapter will scrutinise once more this specific case.
575
 The child sensitivity of the 
law and practice is thus specifically addressed in light of the possibility for children 
to claim reparations. The analysis also aims to establish to what extent the 
principles (from a procedural and substantive perspective), which have been 
developed in this specific case, are also relevant and can be applied more generally 
to children claiming reparations for harm suffered as a result of an international 
crime. 
 
The central questions which are examined in this chapter read as follows: how is the 
right to reparation applied to children in the proceedings before the International 
Criminal Court? The analysis examines to what extent is or should there be a child 
claimants participation which constitutes a modified or distinct approach to adult 
participation. It will be considered in particular whether it is necessary to adjust the 
procedures regulating reparation claims but also the substantive aspects of 
reparations specifically for child claimants. Moreover, it will scrutinise to what 
extent the participation of children in reparation proceedings is in the best interests 
of the child. Or, whether the participation of children as claimants can be 
considered not worthwhile because of not providing child victims with a 
meaningful international remedy? 
 
The chapter commences with a brief overview of the right to reparation – a right 
which finds its origin in human rights law and which in particular has been 
implemented by human rights institutions. Specific attention is paid to the question 
whether and if so how the human rights approach as regards the right to reparation 
is relevant for child participation in the ICC context. The discussion is followed by 
a brief analysis of the legal framework of ICC reparation proceedings. Afterwards 
the research focusses on the specific procedural aspects which played a role in the 
ICC’s practice in relation to child claimants. Taking the different civil nature of 
reparation proceedings as a starting point, the chapter zeroes in on those features 
that are of particular relevance to the child. In this regard, the chapter examines the 
child-specific forms of reparations from a procedural and substantive perspective 
(5.4.1). Then, the chapter focusses on the child and young adult’s eligibility as 
regards child-specific forms of reparations (5.4.2). Finally, selected issues 
concerning the implementation of reparation awards in relation to the child claimant 
are analysed (5.4.3). 
 
Based on earlier findings on the possible transfer of the approaches adopted by 
human rights institutions to ICC reparation proceedings, the practice of the ICC 
towards the child claimant is examined in particular in light of the practice of those 
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institutions and in particular Truth and Reconciliation Commissions which are 
experienced in child rights matters. 
5.2 THE CHILD AS BENEFICIARY OF THE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS 
 
The right to reparations 
 
The right to reparation is a general principle of international law. In 1928 the 
Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that, 
 
‘it is a principle, even a general conception of law, that any breach of engagement 




Accordingly, damage which is the result of a violation of a rule must be 
compensated. While this ruling concerned an inter-state dispute and the obligation 
of a state to compensate the other state in case of a violation, further analysis is 
necessary in order to determine whether and how individuals can rely on a right to 
reparations.  
 
The right to reparations has indeed been codified in international and regional 
human rights law.
577
 The first comprehensive and more general international legal 
document addressing the right to reparations for victims of gross violations of 
international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian 
law has been agreed upon by the General Assembly only in 2005.
578
 In Resolution 
60/147 the United Nations’ General Assembly adopted and proclaimed the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law.
579
 Principle 11 defines victims’ right to remedies 
as follows: 
 
‘[r]emedies for gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law included the victim’s right to the 
following as provided under international law: 
 
(a) Equal and effective access to justice; 
(b) Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; 
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(c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation 
mechanisms.’ 
 
The right to reparation is thus part of the right to an effective remedy.
580
 Principle 
15 provides specifically in relation to reparations that, 
 
‘[a]dequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote justice by 
redressing gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of 
the violations and the harm suffered. (…) In cases where a person, a legal person, or 
other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such party should provide 
reparation to the victim or compensate the State if the State has already provided 




Despite the fact that, to date, the right of individuals to reparations has been 
codified in human rights law, the question remains how victims of violations of 
international humanitarian law – a distinct branch of international law which applies 
to parties to an armed conflict – can claim reparations.
582
 It has repeatedly been 
pointed out that international humanitarian law does not provide a procedural right 
to claim reparations.
583
 A major step in order to provide victims of international 
humanitarian law with such a right has been taken with the UN Basic Principles. 
These are not limited to victims of violations of human rights law but include 
victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
584
 Another step 
further has been taken with the coming into force of the Rome Statute. Article 75 of 
the Rome Statute explicitly enables individuals (at the discretion of the Court) to 
claim reparations for having suffered harm as a result of international crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court. The procedural possibility for individuals to claim 
reparations for having become victims of breaches of international humanitarian 
law has thereby entered the field of international criminal law.
585
 The earlier 
addressed gap of a procedural possibility to claim reparations for having suffered 
harm as a result of a violation of international humanitarian law has thereby been 
closed to a certain extent, namely in relation to those violations which qualify as 
victims of an international crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
 
Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the United Nations’ General Assembly Basic 
Principles, despite their non-binding legal force, enjoy broad recognition. This 
recognition is, for instance, reflected in the fact that the ICC also refers to almost 
identical formulations in the Rome Statute and the respective rules as regards 
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reparation and in particular the available forms of reparation (5.3, 5.4.3).
586
 Further, 
the Court explicitly recognised the relevance of the UN Basic Principles in its case 
law. In the decision of 18 January 2008, Trial Chamber I ruled that, 
 
‘[i]n light of Article 21(3) of the [Rome] Statute, and taking into consideration the 
decision of the Appeals Chamber that it “makes the interpretation as well as the 
application of the law applicable under the Statute subject to internationally 
recognised human rights”, the Trial Chamber has considered the Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (“Basic Principles”) […].’
587 
 
Principles 19 to 23 of the UN Basic Principles refer to the following forms of 
reparation: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of 
non-repetition. The available forms of reparations under the ICC reparation 
framework, in particular with regard to child claimants, will be addressed in detail 
below (5.4.1). 
 
The child as a beneficiary of the right to reparations 
 
Bearing in mind the aforementioned aspects of the right to reparations one may 
raise the question whether the right to reparation is also a right of the child. It can 
indeed be assumed that the child is a beneficiary of the right to reparation.
588
 This 
assumption can be made as the UN Basic Principles do not distinguish between 
adults and children. Furthermore, in support of this assumption, it is noted that the 
Preamble of the UN Basic Principles also refers to Article 39 of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. Article 39 states that, 
 
‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and 
psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of 
neglect, exploitation or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts.’ 
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The reference in the Preamble of the UN Basic Principles to Article 39 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child underlines that children are also to be seen as 
beneficiaries of the right to a remedy and thereby also the right to reparation. 
 
Furthermore, the International Law Association also took position to this particular 
aspect. The Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict Committee adopted a 
declaration which specifically addresses the right to reparation for victims of armed 
conflict. Article 4 (2) of the Declaration of International Law Principles on 
Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict (The Hague, Resolution 2/210) also states 
that children are also to be seen as beneficiaries of the right to reparation. The 
Commentary on this paragraph underlines that, 
 
‘due account [is] to be taken of situations where victims are in no position to claim 
themselves, as for example when the victim is incapacitated or a minor child. In 
these situations, third persons might be legally entitled to claim on behalf of the 
victim. However, reparation has to be awarded to the victim.’ 
 
In the same tenor, the non-governmental organisation International Center for 
Transitional Justice held in a 2011 report that, 
 
‘[t]he right to reparations extends to all victims of gross human rights violations, 
including children. Few reparations programs have explicitly recognized children as 
beneficiaries, however, and others have struggled with effectively designing and 
administering child-sensitive reparations. Child-specific reparations are crucial 
because they reaffirm the rights of children in face of past violations, attempts to 




In similar words, the ICC Trust Fund for Victims pointed out that child victims’ 




Specifically in relation to victims of armed conflict, the Reparation for Victims of 
Armed Conflict Committee of the International Law Association underlined in 2010 
that, 
 
‘[i]n view of the relevant state practice and taking note of a strong majority among 
scholars, the Committee came to the conclusion that until most recently, international 
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Thus, the International Criminal Court, as the institution which is mandated to rule 
on reparations for the commission of international crimes, is the first and moreover 
the only permanent international criminal court, specifically mandated to rule on 




Having established that the child is indeed a beneficiary of the right to reparation 
one may turn to the second aspect of this paragraph, namely the possibility to 
transfer a human rights approach to ICC proceedings. Bearing in mind that the roots 
of this concept lie in general public international law and thus not as such in 
international criminal or international humanitarian law, the branches of law which 
are predominantly applied in the context of ICC proceedings, it is necessary to 
consider whether the findings of human rights institutions (as the institutions being 
most experienced in ruling on reparation claims which have been filed by 
individuals) can be referred to as a yardstick for the interpretation of the ICC 
reparation scheme. The ICC reparation scheme is, after all, in need of such a 
yardstick as a guiding procedural regulation and practice is almost non-existent. As 
the regional human rights courts are the judicial institutions with the most 
experience in applying the right to reparation, this chapter will refer to the practice 
of the European Court of Human Rights as one example of an experienced judicial 
institution in this matter.  
 
Article 34 of the ECHR, entitled ‘Individual applications’ provides that, 
 
‘[t] the Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental 
organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by 





Article 41 ECHR states that, 
 
‘[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the 
Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party 
concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, 
afford just satisfaction to the injured party.’ 
 
Individuals may thus apply for reparations before the European Court of Human 
Rights, a possibility in relation to which the Court is well known for having 
established extensive practice.  
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The possibility to transfer human rights concepts, as for instance established in 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, to ICC proceedings has been elaborated upon in 
Chapter One. It has been argued that based upon Article 21(1)(b) and (3) of the 
Rome Statute, the ICC is invited to interpret the Rome Statute and its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence in light of other international treaties. The Court may 
therefore not only rule upon child participation in light of the internationally 
recognised interpretation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child but also in 
light of other relevant human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The ICC is therefore advised to carefully assess those 
mechanisms, which are experienced in child participation.  
 
Trial Chamber I, indeed, seems to follow such an approach in the Lubanga case 
by explicitly stating that, 
 
‘given the substantial contribution by regional human rights bodies in furthering 
the right of individuals to an effective remedy and to reparations, the Chamber 
has taken into account the jurisprudence of the regional human rights courts and 
the national and international mechanisms and practices that have been 




Seeking guidance in the law and practice of the experienced institutions may, 
however, only be interesting for the ICC when these institutions have indeed been 
confronted with cases in which children claim reparations. 
 
One may or may not be surprised that only a small percentage of claims have been 
brought by children. As a preliminary note, it therefore seems that children have not 
invoked their right to reparation frequently. Furthermore, neither the procedural nor 
the substantive aspects of reparation claims submitted by minor claimants are 
explicitly addressed and regulated in great detail. 
 
The Council of Europe published data on cases before the European Court of 
Human Rights which deal(t) with child rights issues. The Council points out that at 
the ECtHR, 303 cases dealt with issues that were relevant to children between 1968 
and March 2014.
595
 Considering that at the end of 2011 more than 46,000 
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applications have been ruled upon by the ECtHR, the number of cases involving 
children constitutes a small percentage.
596
 Taking a closer look at these cases, it 
becomes clear that the majority dealt with the substantive protection of children 
under the ECHR, such as protection under Article 8 ECHR – the right to family 
life.
597
 Most of these cases have been lodged by parents who argued that their 
conventional right regarding separation from parents or the medical treatment of 
their children have been violated. Children themselves did not submit a complaint 
on their own behalf in the vast majority of the cases. This means that children were 
rather the object of the dispute before the ECtHR instead of taking a more active 
role as a claimant.  
 
The American alternative at regional level is manifested in the American 
Convention on Human Rights.
598
 As before the Human Rights Committee and the 
ECtHR, child victims are not excluded from submitting a complaint to the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights.
599
 Complaints may be submitted for a 
violation of their rights committed by Member States of the Organization of 
American States.
600
 Thus far, child victims themselves did not submit a complaint. 
The Inter-American Court was confronted with cases which were submitted as 
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It is interesting to also briefly look at the UN human rights mechanism in order to 
see whether complaints have been submitted by children. To date, just one 
complaint has been submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee by a 16-year-old 
boy, while other complaints relevant to children were, as in the case of the ECtHR, 
submitted by parents or close family members of the child in their own right.
602
  
The new Protocol under the Convention on the Rights of the Child is likely to be 
the first complaint mechanism which is specifically designed to provide access to 
an international complaint procedure for the child. The recently adopted complaint 
procedure (December 2011) is likely to be the only human rights mechanism which 
will receive more complaints submitted by minors than adults. Moreover, in 
contrast to the other human rights treaties, this mechanism (once entered into force) 
is the only mechanism, which is mandated to address human rights violations and 
selected violations of international humanitarian law.
603
 It thereby constitutes the 
only existing human rights mechanism which will be mandated to rule upon the 
recruitment of child soldiers. It is important to note that decisions of the Committee 
on claims submitted by children are legally not binding for the State concerned. 
 
It can be concluded that the child is a beneficiary of the right to reparation. It has 
also been established that the law and practice of experienced institutions, such as 
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the European Court of Human Rights, can indeed be referred to as yardstick in the 
context of ICC proceedings. It is, however, also shown that children have not 
frequently applied for reparations in their own right before the aforementioned 
human rights institutions. 
 
5.3 RULES AND PRACTICE GOVERNING REPARATION PROCEEDINGS 
 
The few rules and early practice governing reparation proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court serve as the point of departure for an analysis of the 
legal status of the child claimant. In turn, the legal framework of child claimant 
participation is addressed in light of both the general rules applying to reparation 
proceedings and specific aspects which arise for the child claimant. This approach 
is chosen in order to examine whether and to what extent the ICC is already or 
should be encouraged to adopt a child sensitive approach which is to be 
distinguished from the approach to be taken when adult victims participate. 
 
The analysis is in particular based on the first case and judgment of Trial Chamber I 
in the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. It is noted that procedural details 
of reparation proceedings, such as the application of eligibility criteria, are left 
unregulated.
604
 Neither do the travaux preparatoires serve as a guiding yardstick in 
relation to the procedural details of reparation proceedings. Instead, the Court itself 





It is due to the major lack of procedural regulation that this chapter immediately 
includes the first practice of the Court in relation to reparation proceedings in order 
to provide an overview of the ICC’s reparation scheme. The procedural 
implications of the existing regulation in light of the addressed practice are 
therefore, in contrast to the approach of the previous chapters, a major part of the 
current section. 
 
General aspects of reparation proceedings 
 
Pursuant to Regulation 86 of the Regulations of the Court, applications for 
participation in reparation proceedings have to be submitted to the Registrar. A joint 
application form for criminal and reparation proceedings has been made available 
on the website of the Court.
 606
 The existence of the joint form alludes that the 
technical matters as regards the information and documents which are to be 
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provided are very similar, if not even the same, as the procedure to be followed 




With regard to the additional common administrative aspects of the application 
procedure, further information can be found in Chapter Three (sections 3.4-3.5). 
The administrative similarity does not imply that participation in the reparation 
proceedings is dependent on participation in the criminal proceedings. Instead, the 
Rome Statute and the respective rules do not require that participation in the 
reparation proceedings necessitates previous participation in the criminal 
proceedings. Neither is the submission of reparation claims dependent on the 
conclusion of the criminal proceedings or the commencement of reparation 
proceedings. Accordingly, victim participation in the criminal and reparation 
proceedings are in principle two distinctive possibilities of victim participation 
before the ICC.  
 
Irrespective of the general independence of reparation proceedings, in one aspect, 
the successful claiming of reparations is definitely interrelated with criminal 
proceedings. As will be established in greater detail below, individual reparation 
awards ordered against the accused can only be implemented after a successful 
conviction of the perpetrator.
608
 This, once more, does not imply that victims have 
to participate in criminal proceedings, but means that criminal proceedings have 
successfully been concluded before reparation awards can be implemented against a 
convicted person. 
 
In substantive terms, article 75 of the Rome Statute constitutes the heart of the 
reparation scheme of the ICC. It states that, 
 
‘[t]he Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its 
decision the Court may, either upon request or on its own motion in exceptional 
circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or 
in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it is acting.’ 
 
This provision clearly leaves the Court with a wide discretion as regards reparation 
procedures and, in particular, the form and implementation of reparation awards. 
Limited guidance can be found in this provision in relation to the forms of 
reparations which are addressed in more detail below (5.4.1). 
 
Particular attention is to be paid to the practical handling of requests for reparations. 
Remarkably, the Trust Fund for Victims, and not the judicial institution of an ICC 
Chamber, has been mandated by Trial Chamber I to decide upon access or denial of 
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 An approach which can be criticised for introducing a 
procedure which is no longer under judicial scrutiny – while the establishment of 
the ICC was particularly welcomed for providing victims of international crime 
with a judicial remedy. Such practice implies that the right to claim reparations 
right loses its judicial dimension and thereby renders, in fact, the codification of 
Article 75 of the Rome Statute – to claim remedies - meaningless as regards the 
right to claim remedies before a judicial institution. As the right to a remedy 
encompasses the right to access justice, the availability to judicial reparation 




Trial Chamber I’s decision in the Lubanga case to delegate the substantive 
processing of reparation claims mainly to the TFV constitutes a development which 
therefore gives rise to concern. The Chamber itself pointed out that, 
 
‘[it] agrees with the observation of Pre-Trial Chamber I when it stated: The 
reparation scheme provided for in the Statute is not only one of the Statute’s unique 
features. It is also a key feature. In the Chamber’s opinion, the success of the Court 




The delegation to a non-judicial institution, such as the TFV, which is not an organ 
of the Court, entails the risk that the success or failure of the reparation proceedings 
is largely decided outside the ICC.
612
 Such a development cannot be said to mirror 
and accomplish the groundbreaking step that the International Criminal Court is the 
first permanent international criminal court which does not only aim to combat 
impunity but also to provide victims of international crimes with an opportunity to 
claim judicial remedies for the harm suffered. As the judicial remedies before the 
ICC for victims of international crimes, to date, constitute the only international 
avenue which might enable victims to enforce their legal right to a remedy, the 
transferal of this task to a non-judicial institution, not bound by the rule of law, is to 
be questioned. 
 
Delegation of the task to decide upon the substantive details of reparations to a non-
judicial institution means in particular that victims’, including children’s, legal right 
to reparation is assessed by an institution, which is not experienced and equipped to 
address the legal components of the right to a remedy. It may thus be questioned 
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what the added value of the newly introduced reparation procedure before the 
International Criminal Court is, if in the end, it is not the Court who decides upon 
reparation claims. One may even argue that, while the Rome Statute creates the 
impression that victims, including children, may legally claim reparations, the 
transfer to the Trust Fund for Victims constitutes a delegation of a judicial task 
which has not been intended by the drafters of the Rome Statute and thus 
constitutes a delegation which is not in accordance with the overall idea and 
objective of victim participation in the proceedings before the ICC. Even if the 
author of this thesis is of the view that the determination of the legal components of 
the right to claim reparations should be dealt with within the ICC, it does not take 
away that one may validly question whether a chamber composed of dominantly 
criminal law judges is sufficiently experienced in deciding upon on applications of 
a rather civil law nature. The Court might therefore re-think whether a specialised 
chamber should be vested with this specific task. 
 
The conclusion that the Court’s delegation of a judicial task and mandate as regards 
reparation claims to the Trust Fund for Victims is criticised in particular in light of 
the practice of Trial Chamber I. According to Trial Chamber I, the task of the Court 
is mainly minimised to ‘monitoring and oversight functions’, instead of pursuing its 




The importance of a procedurally regulated assessment has also been pointed out by 
the Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflicts Committee of the International Law 
Association. In 2012, the Committee concluded in its final report to the Sofia 
Conference that,  
 
‘[a] substantive right to reparation includes a procedural right to access to an 
effective mechanism to which victims may submit their claims.’  
 
As the current procedural rules of the Trust Fund for Victims do not provide for 
such procedure for claimants, including child claimants, it may indeed be 
questioned whether this delegation constitutes a referral to an effective mechanism. 
 
A step further in the course of reparation proceedings relates to the actual award of 
reparations. As regards the award of reparations, the Trust Fund for Victims has an 
important role. Rule 98 of the RPE states that, 
 
‘[t]he Court may order that an award for reparations against a convicted person be 
deposited with the Trust Fund where at the time of making the order it is impossible 
or impracticable to make individual awards directly to each victims.’ 
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According to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Trust Fund for Victims may 
thus be approached and involved upon a Court order when, for instance, the 
indigence of the convicted person or the large number of claimants prevent an 
effective award of reparations. 
 
Furthermore, as conflict situations might make it impossible for a child to access 
the ICC due to ongoing fighting, for instance, children themselves might not at all 
be in the position to access the Court in order to claim reparations. There is, 
however, an opportunity that even without submitting a reparation claim, children 
may nevertheless become beneficiaries of reparation awards. This is because the 
International Criminal Court may also award reparations on its own motion 
(proprio motu).
614
 The OPCV indicated in this regard that Trial Chamber I should 
indeed make use of this statutory possibility in the reparation proceedings in the 
Lubanga case.
615
 This empowerment of the Court could constitute another 
opportunity for children be beneficiaries of reparation awards. Particular 
importance may be underlined in relation to child claimants as this possibility may 
indeed enable children in a more child-sensitive manner to successfully benefit 
from reparations without having to comply with all the technical and practical 
difficulties of the application procedure. It still needs to be seen, however, whether 
at all and to what extent if at all the ICC will make use of this possibility in relation 
to children. While TRC practice in relation to the forms of reparations will show 
that children have been singled out as regards the particular forms of reparations, it 
may be said that a reparation award made by the ICC on the basis of the proprio 
motu power only towards child victims is less likely to ever be taken as the exercise 
of this competence as such can be expected to occur not frequently. If ever being 
relied upon by the ICC, it is then rather unlikely that the Court will give an 
reparation award which is limited to one specific group of victims. As far as the 
Lubanga case is concerned (the only case which have reached the reparation stage 
at the time of writing), such approach is not yet feasible.  
 
Child-specific aspects of reparation proceedings 
 
The information which the child is required to submit (irrespective of applying for 
reparation during trial proceedings or afterwards), amongst others, relates to the 
child’s identity and must contain a rather detailed description and proof of the 
alleged crime and harm suffered. Similar to when applying for participation in 
criminal proceedings, a child can be expected to encounter difficulties in providing 
the administrative and crime-related evidence (Chapter Three). Decisive for filling 
out the application form are, for instance, not only the capacities of the individual 
child and the available support of adults when filling out the form, but also the 
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existence of birth registration administration. After all, when conflict situations 
separate a child from his/her family and identification documents are not at the 
disposal of the child, the official registration of a child can be crucial for 
successfully proving identity. It is therefore that Trial Chamber I ruled that, 
 
‘[i]n the reparations proceedings, victims may use official or unofficial identification 
documents, or any other means of demonstrating their identities that are recognised 
by the Chamber. In the absence of acceptable documentation, the Court may accept a 
statement signed by two credible witnesses establishing the identity of the applicant 





It is to be remembered that if, irrespective of the subsequent need that the eligibility 
criteria, form and implementation of reparations need to be child-sensitive, the 
reparation proceedings themselves, in particular access requirements, do not 
sufficiently take into account the constraints a child might be confronted with, the 
aforementioned right of the child to an effective remedy may become 
meaningless.
617
 In this regard, UNICEF research underlines that in order to ensure 
that children in fact receive repairing benefits, it needs to be taken into account that, 
 
‘[a]ccess may be impeded by a lack of information, information provided in an 
inappropriate format or a lack of necessary documents, or by fear of reprisal, stigma 
and violence. For example, children are even more likely than adults to be illiterate 
and to lack financial resources that might be necessary (such as for travel, 
photocopying of documents, etc.) to be aware of, find out about or realize their rights. 
Additional challenges are that children often are not perceived as independent actors 
entitled to seek or receive reparations in their own right. […] Addressing such 
challenges requires meaningful participation by children and their communities and 




Similarly, the United Nations Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child 
Victims and Witnesses of Crime suggest that,  
 
‘35. Child victims should, wherever possible, receive reparation in order to achieve 
full redress, reintegration and recovery. Procedures for obtaining and enforcing 
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Without going into the details of the application procedure itself, Trial Child I 
explicitly pointed out that a number of requirements which were also requested 
when applying for participation in the criminal proceedings, are still to be provided 
for. As for children applying for participation in criminal proceedings, Trial 
Chamber I stipulated that, 
 
‘[p]ursuant to Rule 85 of the Rules, reparations may be granted to direct and indirect 
victims, including the family members of direct victims […]. In order to determine 
whether a suggested “indirect victim” is to be included in the reparations scheme, the 
Court should determine whether there was a close personal relationship between the 
indirect and direct victim, for instance as exists between a child soldier and his or her 
parents. It is to be recognised that the concept of “family” may have many cultural 
variations, and the Court ought to have regard to the applicable social and familial 
structures. In this context, the Court should take into account the widely accepted 




While the general distinction between direct and indirect victims was also applied 
in the course of criminal proceedings, the explicit application of a broad concept of 
a family and the recognition that children might also qualify as victims through 
succession constitutes a new development which (thus far) has not been applied in 
the course of criminal proceedings. Such an interpretation may allow for a wider 
circle of child claimants to come into consideration for reparations. 
 
Another note needs to be made in relation to the violations for which child victims 
may seek access to the ICC. As has been elaborated throughout the book, the 
commission of international crimes leads to high numbers of child victims. Those 
crimes are, however, not the only violations which occur during conflict situations. 
Many other violations of the fundamental rights of the child occur simultaneously, 
such as violations of the right to education and to the enjoyment of the highest 
standard of health.
621
 The International Center for Transitional Justice underlined 
in this regard that, 
 
‘[i]n many cases, the conflict or rights violations disrupt a child’s education and 
destroy her or his family support structure, thus creating a situation where children 
as young as eight years are left to care and provide for their younger siblings. Adults 
may already have benefited from education and job training before the conflict and 
may be in a better position to find a sustainable livelihood. In contrast, in many cases 
children have nothing to go back to; thus one of the serious consequences of massive 




Beneficiaries of ICC reparation awards are, however, only those children who have 
suffered harm as a result of a crime within the criminal jurisdiction of the Court. 
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The judicial mandate of the Court, as in the course of the criminal proceedings, 
covers war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
623
 Accordingly, a child 
who is the victim of any other violation is not entitled to access the Court in order to 
request reparations from a convicted perpetrator or to come into consideration for 
collective reparations.
624
 A child can therefore not claim reparations before the ICC, 
for instance, when it was unable to attend school or suffered from insufficient 
health care due to conflict situations – rights, which have been provided for under 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This limitation could be considered to 
lead to an arbitrary situation. This is because child victims of international crimes 
might, for instance, be eligible for reparations in forms of educational training while 
children who were not able to attend school as a result of the conflict situation are 
not eligible for these forms within a ICC context. It is noted that this limitation 
could be said to find its justification in the determination of the jurisdiction of the 
ICC, the focus of the Court on individual criminal responsibility and the need to 
guarantee a fair trial for the accused. Reparation claims from victims of violations 
beyond the ICC Statute could thereby constitute a threat to the fairness of the 
proceedings and in particular lack a legal basis under the Rome Statute. 
With regard to the potential limitation of beneficiaries to victims of the charged 
crimes in a particular case, in the same decision Trial Chamber I briefly referred to 
qualification criteria by limiting the group of potentially entitled beneficiaries to 
those victims who have suffered harm as a ‘result from the crimes of enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in 
the hostilities.’
625
 It can be deluded from this practice that, as anticipated above, 
victims of other child rights violations which have not been charged, are indeed not 
entitled to claim reparations in the respective case. 
 
It is also noteworthy, that Trial Chamber I in the decision establishing the principles 
and procedures to be applied to reparations, elaborated upon the standard of proof 
claimants have to comply with when accessing the ICC. The Chamber explicitly 
held that, 
 
 ‘[a]t trial, the prosecution must establish the relevant facts to the criminal standard, 
namely beyond reasonable doubt. Given the fundamentally different nature of these 
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reparations proceedings, a less exacting standard should apply. Several factors are of 
significance in determining the appropriate standard of proof at this stage, including 
the difficulty victims may face in obtaining evidence in support of their claim due to 
the destruction or unavailability of evidence. This particular problem has been 
recognised by a number of sources, including Rule 94(1) of the Rules, which 
provides that victims’ requests for reparations shall contain, to the extent possible, 
any relevant supporting documentation, including names and addresses of witnesses. 
Given the Article 74 stage of the trial has concluded, the standard of “a balance of 
probabilities” is sufficient and proportionate to establish the facts that are relevant to 
an order for reparations when it is directed against the convicted person. When 
reparations are awarded from the resources of the Trust Fund for Victims or any 
other source, a wholly flexible approach to determining factual matters is appropriate, 





Trial Chamber I introduced as a principle rule in the reparation proceedings in the 
Lubanga case not only a lower evidentiary threshold compared to the standard 
applied in the course of criminal proceedings, but it also distinguished between 
reparations awarded directly from the accused and an even lower standard when 
reparations are awarded through the Trust Fund or another source. Considering the 
surrounding circumstances, victims of international crimes in general, but also child 
victims in particular, finding themselves in such a lower standard clearly constitutes 
a welcome attitude by Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case – even if this is not 
specifically addressed at child claimants.  
 At the same time, it seems that it might also encourage victims to apply for 
participation in the reparation proceedings instead of aiming to participate in the 
criminal proceedings. As a result of the more lenient evidentiary threshold in the 
reparation proceedings, it seems that the Court thereby indirectly tries to limit 
interest and the actual number of victim participants in the criminal process.  
 
5.4 CHILDREN CLAIMING REPARATIONS BEFORE THE ICC: CURRENT AND 
FUTURE CHALLENGES  
 
It will be established in turn that children indeed claim reparations in the 
proceedings before the ICC for having suffered as a result of international crimes. 
The ICC is an institution which (in contrast to human rights institutions) is 
specifically mandated to adjudicate claims which are based on the commission on 
international crimes.
627
 Prior to the establishment of the ICC, victims of the most 
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serious crimes under international law were unable to claim reparations before an 
international criminal court or tribunal with the exception of the Statutes of the ad 
hoc tribunals. These allow for the restitution of property.
628
 Reparation proceedings 
before the ICC therefore constitute – next to the possibility to apply for 




 In the case of Cambodia, individuals can also claim reparations before the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Due to the primary 
reliance of the ECCC on national law and the very limited practical relevance of 
these Chambers’ practice in relation to children, the possibility to claim reparations 




 Despite the lack of extensive practice with regard to children claiming 
reparations before the ICC, the permissible practice of various Chambers regarding 
children’s participation in criminal proceedings (Chapter Three) provides some 
insight into a likely reparation approach of the Court.
631
 Furthermore, first 
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conclusions can be drawn from the practice of Trial Chamber I as regards reparation 
claims submitted by children against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. In this case, the 
Registry informed Trial Chamber I that of the 85 applications which have been 
submitted in total, 77 applications for participation in reparation proceedings have 
been submitted by victims or on behalf of victims who argue they were below the 
age of 15 years at the time of their recruitment as a child soldier.
632
 On 28 March 
2012, the Registry of the ICC reported to Trial Chamber I that, 
 
‘[o]f the 85 applications, 53 have been introduced by women and 32 by men; 77 
applications have been submitted by or on behalf of persons claiming to be under the 





It is noteworthy in this regard that Trial Chamber I, in the decision of 7 August 
2012, underlined the importance of ensuring the accessibility of the proceedings by 
not only providing proper information, but also by taking into account the views of 
the child. The Chamber pointed out that,  
 
 ‘[t]he victims of the crimes, together with their families and communities should be 
able to participate throughout the reparations process and they should receive 
adequate support in order to make their participation substantive and effective. […]. 
The Court shall provide information to child victims, their parents, guardians and 
legal representatives about the procedures and programmes that are to be applied to 
reparations, in a form that is comprehensible for the victims and those acting on their 
behalf. The views of the child are to be considered when decisions are made about 
individual or collective reparations that concern them, bearing in mind their 




Child victims thus indeed managed to file their applications. The large majority of 
victims that filed applications for reparations concerns the direct victims of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, namely child victims who were recruited when below the 
age of fifteen years.  
 
Noteworthy in this regard is that Trial Chamber I unmistakably pointed out that not 
only those victims who had already participated in the criminal proceedings against 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo or who had applied for reparations through the application 
form could participate. Instead, the Chamber held that, 
 
‘[a]ll victims are to be treated fairly and equally as regards reparations, irrespective of 
whether they participated in the trial proceedings. Notwithstanding the submissions of 
the defence and the legal representatives of victims, it would be inappropriate to limit 
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reparations to the relatively small group of victims that participated in the trial and those 




It seems that the Court encourages far more victims to participate in the reparation 
process than limiting the participation to the small group who already successfully 
applied. It is laudable that the Chamber did not limit the potential group of 
beneficiaries of reparations in the Lubanga case to those victims who were 
participating in the proceedings at the time of the decision but invites all victims 
qualifying as direct and indirect victims of the charged crimes.
636
 As a result of this 
positive attitude of the Chamber as regards those victims who have not already 
participated in the course of the criminal proceedings, the potential group of 
beneficiaries of reparations is clearly not limited to those victims who participated 
in the course of the criminal proceedings. 
 
The child claimant can expect to be confronted with similar, if not the same, 
constraints as in criminal proceedings (Chapter Three) when seeking access to 
reparation proceedings. This assumption can be made since in principle the child 
has to communicate his/her request for reparations to the Court through the earlier 




The Chamber pointed out in the same decision that, 
 
‘[t]he victims of the crimes, together with their families and communities should be able 
to participate throughout the reparations process and they should receive adequate 




Such a victim-centred approach seems to minimise the potential advantage of 
having already participated during the criminal proceedings. This also means that 
the added value of child participation in the course of the criminal proceedings. may 
be questioned even more, since, as was established in Chapter Three, participation 
in the criminal proceedings cannot be considered to be generally in the best interests 
of the child. 
 
On the other hand, the potential advantage of prior participation may, amongst 
others, be seen in the fact that in cases which do not lead to a conviction of the 
alleged perpetrator, further participation and thus hearing of victim’s voices is 
impossible. Waiting until the commencement of reparation proceedings to convince 
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the Court of victim’s alleged suffering entails therefore the risk of never being 
heard by the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, participation during the 
criminal proceedings might, which has, however, not yet been proven, pave the way 
for a stronger position in the course of reparation proceedings. After all, as a result 
of their successful prior participation, victim’s allegations and claims have already 
been raised and thereby drew the Court’s attention to their individual harm suffered. 
 
Moreover, considering that Trial Chamber I ruled that it is not at all examining 
those requests for reparations which have been submitted to the Registry prior to 
this decision, it seems that waiting for the public debate which is held at local level 
constitutes an opportunity for victims to claim remedies which is a lot easier than 
applying for reparations prior to the local activities (section 5.4.3 
Implementation).
639
 As the localities should be those which have been mentioned 
by Trial Chamber I in the judgment and where the crimes for which Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo has been convicted were committed, the ICC and the potential 
benefit of reparation are brought close to the victims.
640
 In particular for children, 
the closeness might constitute an opportunity to submit reparation claims which is 
far more realistic than trying to apply for reparation proceedings via the formalistic 
avenue and far away in The Hague. 
 
The aforementioned decision of Trial Chamber I dated 7 August 2012 on the 
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, as will be shown throughout 
this chapter, does, in addition to the major silence of the procedural regulation as 
regards reparations and in particular child specific aspects, not provide for extensive 
insight into child-specific challenges the child is and can be expected to be 
confronted with. Those issues, which might arise with regard to the child in the 
course of reparation proceedings, have therefore (thus far) not been mirrored 
extensively in the practice of the relevant Chambers. The analysis of the ICC’s 
reparation scheme (to a large extent) can, as a consequence of the aforementioned 
gaps in law and in practice, only attempt to anticipate on the current and future 




The following sections examine under which conditions, whether and in which 
form child victims may claim child-specific reparations before the ICC and to what 
extent a modified approach is required for children in contrast to adults. The section 
concludes with an examination of the issues concerning the implementation of 
reparation awards.  
 
Aspects addressed include the child-specific forms of reparations (5.4.1), the 
eligibility to these (5.4.2) and difficulties in relation to the implementation of 
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reparation awards (5.4.3). The following sections therefore examine whether the 
ICC, first of all, is the ICC advised to provide different forms of reparations to 
children compared to other categories of victims? Secondly, should the ICC 
introduce eligibility criteria for child claimants in order to benefit from child-
specific reparations. Finally, is it also necessary to adjust the procedures regulating 
the implementation of reparation when children are the beneficiaries? This analysis 
thereby aims to provide insights into the underlying question whether at all or to 
what extent child participation in reparation proceedings before the ICC is in the 
best interests of the child or perhaps dispensable for providing child victims with an 
international remedy? 
 
5.4.1 Forms of reparations 
 
As the Rome Statute and the related procedural rules do not provide for extensive 
guidance on the forms of reparations - especially not in relation to the child 
claimant – selected legal documents, the practice of various TRCs and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights is referred to as a yardstick for an evaluation of 
the ICC reparation scheme as far as the child claimant is concerned.  While limited 
guidance is provided in the final report of the Liberian TRC, the final report of the 
Sierra Leonean TRC constitutes, up till now, the only TRC report which addresses 




Reparations share the same purposes for both adult and child victims of 
international crimes, such as undoing injustice, the restoration of justice and 
annihilating the consequences of the wrongful act(s). It will be established in turn 
that in addition to the commonly shared objectives, reparations awarded to children 
are to be made in a child-sensitive form in order to constitute an effective remedy 
for children from a substantive perspective.
643
 This means that while the award of 
reparations shares a common objective for adult and child victims, the nature of 
reparations to be provided, as will be seen, differs between adult and child victims. 
General aspects concerning the forms of reparations 
 
The central provision concerning reparations, which is applicable to all claimants, 
can be found in the Rome Statute. Article 75 of the Rome Statute states that, 
 
‘[t]he Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.’ 
                                                 
642
  Children also seem to participate in the statements sessions of the Kenyan Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, http://www.tjrckenya.org/. For general information on the 
establishment, mandate and criticism of the Kenyan TRC see, Reliefweb Kenya; Amnesty 
International Kenya 2008.  
643
  Ferstman, Goetz & Stephens 2009, at 24-25. See for example Principles 14-15 of the 2005 UN 
Basic Principles. For a more detailed overview of the purposes of reparations, see Dwertmann 









The wording of Article 75 Rome Statute stipulates that the forms of reparations are 
not limited to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, which have primarily 




 As regards a definition of these forms of reparation, the 2005 UN Basic 
Principles are useful to refer to. The Basic Principles define restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction as follows:  
 
 ‘19. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original 
situation before the gross violations of international human rights law or serious 
violations of international humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as 
appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life 
and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and 
return of property. 
20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as 
appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of 
each case, resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and 
serious violations of international humanitarian law […]. 
21. Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care as well as legal 
and social services.’ 
 
Article 75(2) prescribes furthermore that a conviction constitutes the necessary pre-
condition for a reparation award. Accordingly, after the conviction of an alleged 
perpetrator, the Court may order individual awards directly against the convicted 
person or deposit a(n) (individual or) collective award with the Trust Fund which 
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 Considering that most of the alleged perpetrators in the pending criminal 
proceedings before the ICC have provisionally been found wholly indigent, with the 
exception of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, reparations in the form of compensation - 
if restitution is at all possible (which is rather unlikely bearing in mind the 
underlying crimes) - is in the majority of cases not feasible.
646
 Neither is it 
conceivable that those persons are able to provide for rehabilitation – a form of 
reparations which is more suitable in cases of State Responsibility, which is a type 
of responsibility not at issue in ICC proceedings which is limited to the prosecution 
of individuals.
647
 Individual awards for reparations which are made directly against 
a future convicted person are, therefore, most likely to be ordered in other forms of 
reparations such as satisfaction.
648
  
 Bearing the forgoing in mind, it is understandable why Trial Chamber I came to 
the conclusion that collective reparations, which are to be provided through the 
Trust Fund for Victims, are to be preferred in the Lubanga case. The Chamber ruled 
that, 
 
‘[g]iven the uncertainty as to the number of victims of the crimes in this case – save 
that a considerable number of people were affected – and the limited number of 
individuals who have applied for reparations, the Court should ensure there is a 
collective approach that ensures reparations reach those victims who are currently 
unidentified. […] The convicted person has been declared indigent and not assets or 
property have been identified that can be used for the purposes of reparations. The 
Chamber is, therefore, of the view that Mr Lubanga is only able to contribute to non-
monetary reparations. Any participation on his part in symbolic reparations, such as 




The Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) may indeed be more suitable and capable of 
providing for collective awards and the other forms of reparation when, for instance, 
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the number of victims render individual awards inappropriate.
650
 Noteworthy in this 
regard is that in cases where the ICC orders that a reparation award against a 
convicted person is to be deposited with the Trust Fund, the Board of Directors may 
decide to complement its ‘resources collected through awards for reparations with 
“other resources of the Trust Fund.”’
651
 At the beginning of 2011, the total sum of 
those ‘other resources’ which are comprised of voluntary contributions from 
governments, international organisations or individuals, amounted to € 5.8 million. 
A further increase of voluntary contributions has been pointed out in the Draft 
Strategic Plan of the Trust Fund in 2013.
652
 The largest amount of these resources 
(€ 4.45 million) has been allocated to activities in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Northern Uganda and the Central African Republic and may be spent within 
the ambit of the second mandate of the Trust Fund.  
 Regulation 50 of the Regulations of the Trust Fund state that the Trust Fund is 
also mandated to provide  
 
‘physical or psychological rehabilitation or material support for the benefit of 




In contrast to the Trust Fund’s mandate in relation to reparation orders of the Court, 
this mandate may be implemented irrespective of a prior conviction and reparation 
award.
654
 In addition to the abovementioned amount of resources allocated to 
particular situations pending before the ICC, currently € 1.5 million has specifically 
been allocated for the award of future reparations – an increase compared to 2010 
where the resources for reparations amounted to € 750.000.
655
 It needs to be 
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  For an overview of the Trust Fund’s assistance to children and youth, see The Trust Fund for 
Victims, Assistance to children and youth, 
 http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/projects#Assistance%20to%20children%20and%20youth. As 
stated in the Fall 2010 Programme Progress Report of the Trust Fund for Victims, ‘[t]he dual 
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voluntary contributions. While this support is distinct from awards for reparations, in that it is not 
linked to a conviction, it is key in helping repair the harm that victims have suffered […]. [T]he 
TFV can provide assistance to victims in a more timely manner than may be allowed by the 
judicial process. Secondly, assistance is targeted to victims of the broader situations before the 
ICC, regardless of whether the harm they suffered stems from particular crimes charged by the 
Prosecutor in a specific case.’ Trust Fund for Victims, Programme Progress Report, Learning from 
the TFV’s second mandate: From implementing rehabilitation assistance to reparations (2010), 
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/, at 47. For a more recent overview of the activities of the 
Trust Fund, see Trust Fund for Victims, Programme Progress Report Summer 2012. 
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underlined that this amount constitutes the available Trust Fund resources for 
reparation awards at a specific moment for all cases before the ICC – while an exact 
number of all potential cases before the ICC cannot be given in advance. Bearing in 
mind the indigence of most alleged perpetrators, this limited amount is unlikely to 
be sufficient to finance the entirety of potential (individual or collective) reparation 
claims of large numbers of claimants if, in particular, compensation is requested. As 
a result, the need to complement the reparation allocated resources with ‘other 
resources’ of the Trust Fund for Victims does not only seem to be expectable, but 




Child specific aspects concerning the forms of reparations 
 
With regard to the forms of reparations which could be considered to be adequate 
for child victims of international crimes, it is noted at the outset that due to 
children’s steady psychological and physical developmental status (as reflected in 
the principle of the evolving capacities), reparations for children should take 
sufficiently into account the particular needs of children as reflected in the 
 
‘interdependence of children’s political, civil, economic and social rights […] and 




The Key Principles for Children and Transitional Justice request in 
particular that, 
 
‘[r]eparations programmes should be based on a careful assessment of the harms 
suffered by girls and boys during armed conflict and political violence to determine 
their individual and collective needs. […] In determining reparations for children, 
due account should be taken of the relevant provisions and principles of the CRC, 
such as the right to health care and education and the rights of children with 




The Registry of the ICC pointed out in the Second Report on Reparations in the 
Lubanga case that, 
‘[f]or children who lose their childhoods through conscription, and the opportunities 
and possibilities it affords, loss of social, education and familial opportunities are a 
key form of harm inflicted through conscription. Such forms of harm have been 




Accordingly, wiping out the consequences of the wrongful act(s), for instance, 
requests that reparations awarded to children are to be targeted in the sense that 
their particular needs are accommodated. It thereby needs to be taken into account 
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that full reparation of the harm suffered by the child during armed conflict cannot 
easily be imagined; moreover it may not even be possible.
660
 Repairing the loss of 
family members, irrecoverable bodily harm and foremost the loss of a person’s 
(entire) childhood are in itself not eligible for recovery.
661
 
 The International Center for Transitional Justice held in this regard in a 2011 
report that, 
 
‘[t]he right to reparations extends to all victims of gross human rights violations, 
including children. Few reparations programs have explicitly recognized children as 
beneficiaries, however, and others have struggled with effectively designing and 
administering child-sensitive reparations. Child-specific reparations are crucial 
because they reaffirm the rights of children in face of past violations, attempts to 




It is therefore argued in this research that the distinguishing factors between adult 
and child specific forms of reparations concern in particular the following three 
aspects, namely, access to and provision of child specific health care, education and 
family live/shelter. While all victims of international crimes might be in need of 
health care, access to health care is to be provided in a manner which also enables 
children to benefit from health care measures. This is because a large group of 
children, depending on the individual evolving capacities, is likely to be dependent 
on adults when seeking access to health care. In other words, in situations in which 
support persons are not at hand, a particular group of child victims of international 
crimes might face difficulties in accessing health care measures. Furthermore, not 
being in the position to benefit from health care measures which also aim to provide 
assistance as regards the harm which requests an immediate response exposes 
children to the risk to suffer even further from neglect as one of the potential 
consequences of situations in which international crimes are committed.
663
  
 The second aspect which calls for child specific forms of reparations relates to 
children’s need to benefit from educational training. While education is usually 
delayed if not even provided at all during and as a result of conflict situations, 
children who are for these reasons prevented from participating in educational 
programs are particularly disadvantaged. This is, for instance, because sufficient 
educational training is, inter alia, crucial for enabling the child to build up a stable 
future in particular in economic terms.
664
 Considering the before mentioned, the 
more important it is that children are entitled to receive forms of reparations which 
aim to fill the gaps of educational training in order to enable the child to build up a 
stable future on the basis of those skills which are taught during educational 
trainings. In contrast to children, adults (generally speaking though) face not the 
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difficulty of having missed educational training when having reached adulthood 
prior to the commencement of the conflict situation. As a result, they are in 
principle capable to rebuild their economic existence based on the educational and 
vocational training they have benefitted from when peace is re-established. Child 
specific forms of reparations should therefore include educational training which 
addresses the individual needs of the victims, taking in particular into account the 
particular educational phase the child claimant has not been able to benefit from as 
a result of having suffered from international crimes. This also means, that young 
adults who have been victims of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC and who 
have been prevented from participating in educational programs during childhood 
as a consequence of the conflict situation should also be able to come into 
consideration for educational programs being award despite having reached 
majority in the meanwhile. 
 The third distinguishing core factor relates to children’s need to be provided 
with sufficient shelter as a measure which could be provided for by reparation 
awards. While family live cannot per definition be expected to be re-established 
after the course of conflict situations, providing children with shelter in terms of a 
safe environment constitutes the core condition in addition to essential health care 
measures. Without a safe environment, the healthy development of the child in 
accordance with their evolving capacities is not easy to be ensured if not even 
impossible.  
 The aforementioned pillars of forms of reparations to children complements the 
approach developed by the inter-American Court, the so called ‘damage to a life 
plan’ concept, which also calls for a holistic view as regards the forms of 




Turning next to the characteristics of ICC reparation proceedings, when considering 
potential forms of reparations, huge numbers of victims, including child victims, are 
to be expected to claim reparations before the ICC. Reparations in the form of 
compensation, in particular individual cash payments, are less likely to be awarded 
to (individual) children. While the example of Germany shows that a large number 
of victims as such does not prevent cash payments to be awarded, as illustrated by 
the reparation agreement which was concluded between Israel and the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1952 but also the 772 million Euros which Germany 
agreed in 2013 to award to Holocaust survivors, such approach, at least to date, 
seems less likely in the context of ICC proceedings.
666
 This is because the currently 
amount of financial resources which are at the disposal for victims in the course of 
ICC proceedings, make it simply not likely that individual cash payments constitute 
a realistic form of reparation to be awarded.
667
 In addition, considering the 
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importance of health care, education and shelter as forms of reparation for children, 
it may generally be questioned whether cash payments are adequate for young 
claimants. 
 Considering furthermore the indigence of the majority of the (alleged) 
perpetrators currently facing judicial proceedings before the ICC, it is neither likely 
that the ICC will award reparations in the form of restitution and rehabilitation if 
not being deposited from the Trust Fund for Victims.  
 Alternatively, reparations in the form of satisfaction and/or guarantees of non-
repetition could constitute forms of reparations directly ordered against the 
convicted person since these forms of reparations can be offered independently of 
the financial constraints of the convicted person. The Registry of the ICC suggested 
in its Second Report on Reparations that collective awards could even be provided 
to a group of victims “as a Whole”. It underlined that, 
 
 ‘[i]n the context of the Lubanga case specifically, collective award to a group of 
victims as a whole would for instance be appropriate in a situation where a large 
number of children had been abducted for purposes of child conscription from a 





Legal research and international practice on how a child’s needs could be reflected 
in child-specific forms of reparations is, to date, available to a very limited extent. 
The thus far available guidance on child-specific forms of reparations is addressed 
in turn. Particular attention has been granted to child beneficiaries within a few 
international documents. More extensive guidance can be found in the final report 
of the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
669
 The form of 
reparation awards to child claimants therefore confronts the ICC with the difficulty 
that major guidance, in particular within the context of judicial proceedings, is non-
existent. This omission, however, constitutes at the same time a challenge for the 
ICC to promote that children, for the first time in international criminal justice, will 
benefit from child-specific and therefore child-sensitive reparation awards.  
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Little guidance as to the forms of reparations can be found, for instance, in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child points out that, 
 
‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and 
psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of 
neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and 
reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect 
and dignity of the child.’ 
 
Article 6(3) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the involvement of children in armed conflict reflects a similar request that 
children are in need of targeted reparations by requesting States Parties to 
 
‘take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or 
used in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol are demobilized or otherwise 
released from service. States Parties shall, when necessary, accord to such persons 





Similarly, the United Nations Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child 
Victims and Witnesses of Crime suggest that,  
 
‘reparation may include restitution from the offender ordered in the criminal court, 
aid from victim compensation programmes administered by the State and damages 
ordered to be paid in civil proceedings. Where possible, costs of social and 





These international documents establish that reparations to children ought to be 
ordered in the form of rehabilitation measures if restitution or financial 
compensation is not conceivable. The Registry of the ICC, however, critically 
pointed out that it is to be taken into account that, 
 
‘[i]n the specific context of the Lubanga case a number of factors are significant as 
regards the practicability or feasibility of individual or social rehabilitation as a form 
of reparation. The first is cost. While the provision of medical rehabilitee, including 
measures such as prosthetic treatment, undoubtedly has the potential to substantially 
alleviate the harm suffered by child soldiers, some of whom have been grievously 
injured in the course of hostilities, it is also a resource intensive form of reparation. 
For instance, the establishment and operation of some form of medical service 
capable of providing various forms of assistance to an appropriate category of 
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victims would require trained and skilled professional staff, certain forms of 
specialized equipment might also be necessary depending on the help the 
programme was established to provide and such a programme could also be expected 
to attract significant operational costs. Moreover, the greater the number of victims 
such a programme sought to assist the greater these costs could be expected to be. 
Given the resource intensive nature of rehabilitation programmes, it should therefore 
be born in mind that the establishment of such a programme may have implications 
for the other forms of reparation that it would be possible to award and, more 




Clearly, the Registry underlines the financial limitations which have implications 
for the forms of reparations to be awarded. Compared to the reparation which 
Germany agreed upon to award from 2014 onwards to Holocaust survivors, which, 
i.a., explicitly covers the medical treatment of the victims, the provision of medical 
treatment in the case of former child soldiers confronts the ICC with serious 
difficulties.
673
 A failure to provide adequate medical treatment, in particular the 
treatment of those child victims who are in need of prosthetic treatment might, if 
not being provided, lead to meaningless reparation from a child perspective. This 
may be assumed, because it is a fact that the physical recovery constitutes the 
condition sine qua non for benefitting from any other form of reparation. Deciding 
upon the forms of reparation to be awarded in light of the most immediate needs of 
child victims therefore seems to be a necessity if reparation are to be effective from 
the victim’s perspective. In other words, educational training as a form of reparation, 
despite being of crucial importance for child victims, can be expected to not be of 
use for the beneficiaries if physical constraints which are the result of the 
victimisation hinder the victim to access the training. 
 
Rehabilitation, as was explained before, is furthermore not realistically a form of 
reparation which convicted perpetrators are frequently able to provide. 
Notwithstanding the lack of guidance of these documents in terms of reparations 
ordered directly against a convicted person, they nevertheless underline the 
importance of rehabilitation and reintegration measures for child victims, which has, 




In addition to the international legal documents that explicitly refer to the child in 
terms of reparation, the final report of the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission provides for further guidance by recommending particular forms of 
reparations to child claimants.
675
 While selective forms of reparations which have 
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been recommended by the TRC to the Government of Sierra Leone could also be 
directly ordered against convicted persons in the context of ICC reparation 
proceedings, the majority of reparations recommended by the Sierra Leone TRC are, 
due to the collective character and financial complexity, more suitable to be 
deposited with the Trust Fund for Victims if similarly applied within ICC reparation 
proceedings.  
 
Depositing reparation orders with the Trust Fund constitutes an option, which 
would enable the Court to address the needs of large groups of victims, including 
particular measures for children. It is to be noted, that the mandate of the Trust 
Fund in this particular context constitutes a welcome possibility in order to provide 
targeted reparations to the victims. This position is to be distinguished from the 
earlier made general criticism (section 5.3) as regards the approach of Trial 
Chamber I taken in the Lubanga case by transferring the decision on reparation 
awards as such to the TFV. While the Trial Chamber’s approach taken is criticised 
for transferring judicial responsibilities to a non-judicial organ, the decision on the 
actual forms of reparation is seen as a task which requests especially insights into 
the substantive needs of the victims and not the question whether the victim fulfils 
the legal requirements for coming at all into consideration for reparation. A decision 
by the TFV on the forms of reparation which reflect most adequately the needs of 
the victim therefore constitutes a decision which the TFV could be equipped and 
mandated to take. 
 An appropriate form of reparation awards ordered directly against a convicted 
person could, for instance, be of symbolic nature. The TRC of Sierra Leone 
suggested that individuals could be ordered by the ICC to acknowledge their 
crime(s) committed against children and publicly apologise.
676
 The value of such 
apology is, however, prior to such an order to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
This is because a forced apology, which does not reflect that the perpetrator means 
to honestly apologise is of any value to the victims. 
 
The majority of recommendations made by the Sierra Leonean Commission relate 
to health or education benefits and are therefore suitable to provide the ICC with 
guidance if reparation orders are deposited with the Trust Fund for Victims.
677
 The 
Sierra Leonean TRC recommended measures such as: 
 
o assistance to children branded with scars 
o health care for amputees or other war-wounded children 
o health care for child victims of sexual violence 
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o free counselling and psychological support 
o free education at a basic level for all children 
o free education until senior secondary school level for particular groups of 





By recommending specific reparations for children, the Commission recognised 
that children constitute a particular group of beneficiaries which are in ‘dire need of 
urgent care […] and specific measures of reparations’.
679
 The Sierra Leonean TRC 
concluded that it is also necessary to distinguish among children themselves and 
called for specific forms of reparations for particular groups of children. The final 
report points out in this regard that, 
 
‘[w]hereas many of the recommendations of the Commission refer to all the children 
in Sierra Leone, the Commission is nevertheless convinced that some specific 
reparations measures need to be taken in respect of those categories of children who 
suffered during the war or that still suffer from the consequences of the war such as 
abducted children, forcibly conscripted children and orphans. The Commission 




Likewise the final report of the Liberian TRC recommended particular forms of 
reparations to be awarded to specific groups of children. The Commission pointed 
out that, 
 
‘[w]hile reparations generally should avoid targeting specific categories of children, 
certain groups of victims might need special attention. In particular, reparations 
should include specific provisions for those victims who have been falling through 
the cracks of specific post-conflict programs targeted at children, notably former 
CAFF [children associated with the fighting forces] who have not gone through the 
DDRR process, girls who have been victims of sexual violence, rape, and sexual 
slavery, children separated from their parents and family members, children with 





In line with the above, the Sierra Leonean and Liberian TRCs, in contrast to other 
TRCs, also recommended particular reparations for child victims of sexual and 
gender-based violence, such as reparations which provide treatment to the harm 
suffered as a result of maltreatment of the reproductive system of girls and young 
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women, including HIV-testing as victims of gender-based violence are more likely 




The ICC could be particularly inspired by the final report of the Sierra Leonean 
TRC when ordering future reparation awards for a variety of reasons: Firstly, the 
ICC is likely to be confronted with similarly large numbers of claimants - reparation 
orders beyond the form of satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition when ordered 
directly against the convicted persons are therefore not likely to constitute suitable 
forms of reparations. 
 Secondly, the focus of the Sierra Leonean TRC could encourage the ICC to 
deposit reparation awards with the Trust Fund in order to encourage a collective 
approach towards children by, for instance, ordering measures relating to the 
particular health and educational needs of child claimants. Such a need has not only 
been explicitly referred to the Registry of the ICC, but also by the OPCV which 
represents child claimants in the proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.
683
 
Thirdly, as in the case of the Sierra Leonean TRC, the ICC might also be advised to 
distinguish between the needs of particular groups of children. In other words, the 
ICC is likely to be confronted not only with child claimants who have perpetrated 
themselves international crimes as former child soldiers – being thus perpetrator 
and victim at the same time - but also child victims or (victim) witnesses of other 
crimes within the jurisdiction. Forms of reparations will therefore need to reflect the 
differences which flow from the various procedural capacities. While there might 
be a large number of child victims who are in need of medical treatment – 
irrespective of their procedural capacity – former child soldiers might be in need to 
benefit in particular from demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration measures. 
They are thus not only likely to be in need of health and educational measures. This 
particular group of child victims may therefore be said to be in need of a broader 
variety of reparations compared to child victims of other international crimes. 
Children who are victims of other international crimes, such as sexual violence 
might be in need of particular psychological treatment instead. Consequently, the 
particular form of reparation for child victims is to be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis and should in particular focus on the immediate needs of the victim in order 
enable the victim to benefit from the awarded reparation. 
 
The importance of child-specific measures and the effectiveness of addressing 
children’s needs on a collective basis is also reflected in the current projects of the 
Trust Fund for Victims. These focus not only on counselling, vocational training 
and the reintegration of former child soldiers and/or abductees, but also on the 
measures to be taken for children orphaned by war, in particular the counselling and 
material support for family members who care for children who lost their parents 
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 The Fall 2010 Programme Progress Report of the Trust Fund 
underlines that ensuring that large numbers of children benefit from the Trust 
Fund’s projects does not entail that targeted, thus child-specific, measures cannot be 
provided at the same time. The Trust Fund describes its approach, namely ‘targeting 
both specific categories and specific needs’ using an example from one of its 
projects in Ituri, Eastern Congo: 
 
‘Many of these children were abducted into fighting forces, but others were made 
vulnerable by war in other ways: some lost their parents, some lost their entire 
families. In designing the project so that all of these children impacted by conflict 
are supported together, former child combatants can avoid the label of “child-
soldier”. This is especially important as one of the primary goals of reintegration 





With regard to the reintegration of former child combatants and abducted children, 
the TFV implemented particular projects which 
 
‘utilize a combination of individual and collective approaches whereby each youth is 
(1) provided with a kit containing most of the supplies needed for his or her 
livelihood rehabilitation activity of choice (such as a sewing machine for tailoring or 





The Trust Fund decided to implement projects for child soldiers and/or abductees 
by combining individual approaches and programmes offered to communities after 
doing a survey among this particular group of victims.
687
 In Northern Uganda, on 
the other hand, the same group of victims indicated a preference for individual 
benefits.
688
 Thus, depending on the perception of former child soldiers in the 
specific post-conflict community - which is often determined by the role of family, 
communities and cultural aspects of a particular society - children benefited from 
individualised reparation projects. If considered more suitable, a combination with 
community projects were also implemented by the Trust Fund.
689
  
 This practice underlines, that generalised forms of child-specific reparations do 
not necessarily reflect the needs of children belonging to a particular post-conflict 
society. ICC awarded reparations targeting the needs of child claimants are 
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therefore also to be ordered in light of the specific needs of child claimants within 
particular conflict societies. 
 
Taking a closer look at the decision of Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case on the 
principles and procedure to be applied to reparations, it can be concluded that as a 
first step, the Chamber’s approach is promising. Though only very briefly, the 
Chamber did explicitly state that the age of a child victim constitutes a crucial 
factor when deciding upon forms of reparations. The Chamber held that, 
 
‘[p]ursuant to Article 68(1) of the Statute, one of the relevant factors – which is of high 
importance in the present case – is the age of the victims. Pursuant to Rule 86 of the Rules, the 
Court shall take account of the age-related harm experienced by, along with the needs of, the 
victims of the present crimes. Furthermore, any differential impact of these crimes on boys and 
girls is to be taken into account. In reparations decisions concerning children, the Court should 
be guided, inter alia, by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the fundamental 




Unfortunately, the Chamber did not elaborate in detail to what extent the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the principle of the best interests of the 
child are to be taken into account. Furthermore, the Chamber did not only underline 
the importance of reparations which adequately accommodate the suffering of 
victims of sexual and gender-based violence, but also called for a ‘specialist, 
integrated and multidisciplinary approach.’
691
 Also a case-by-case approach has 
been indicated as being appropriate – without elaborating, however, on potential 
difficulties in achieving such an approach.
692
 Forms, such as rehabilitation and 
reintegration programmes for former child soldiers, medical services and assistance 
with housing and education have – as was the case in the mechanisms addressed 







As a preliminary note it is to be pointed out that the decision of Trial Chamber I of 
7 August 2012 establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to 
reparations in the Lubanga case did not address any aspect relating to eligibility.
694
 
One may therefore wonder whether eligibility is indeed to be expected to be an 
issue when child claimants participate in reparation proceedings. It is established in 
turn that this is indeed the case.  
 The silence of Trial Chamber I as regards eligibility criteria in this specific 
decision might be explained by the fact that parties and participants themselves did 
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not raise issues relating to the eligibility to child-specific forms of reparations. It 
might also be simply unconsciously that the Chamber did not rule on this aspect. 
 
Based on the experience of the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which is addressed in more detail in the previous section dealing with 
the forms of reparations, it can be argued that the eligibility for child specific-
reparations constitutes an issue which also might arise in future ICC reparation 
proceedings. Considering in particular the large number of potential child claimants, 
the ICC might simply be compelled to introduce eligibility criteria in order to be 
able to adequately divide the available but limited sources among child claimants. 
Considering furthermore, that child claimants will usually, with the exception of the 
Lubanga case, will not constitute the only group of victims which is potentially 
entitled to receive reparations the Court can be said to be in even greater need to 
introduce eligibility criteria. This is because the simultaneous prosecution of other 
crimes besides the recruitment crime automatically widens the categories of 
potential claimants beyond the group of child claimants. In other words, in order to 
ensure that those child claimants who are in greatest need of child-specific 
reparation measures as a consequence of the harm suffered from an international 
crime will indeed receive such reparations, might deem it indispensable to introduce 
eligibility criteria.  
 At the same time, the application of eligibility criteria will most likely limit the 
group of potential beneficiaries. Such limitation will then also confront the Court 
with the difficulty to decide upon the question who can be considered to be in 
greatest need to benefit from child-specific forms of reparation. In line with the 
aforementioned, the Court can also be expected to be confronted with the question 
of whether child-targeted reparations are limited to the group of claimants below 
the age of eighteen or whether young adults might also be potential beneficiaries of 
child-targeted reparations. These questions, irrespective of the fact that it is not of a 
legal nature, unavoidably requests the ICC again, to look at a holistic approach 
when dealing with children in the course of the proceedings in order to implement a 
child-sensitive approach as regards the child claimant. As it has been established 
throughout this research, such child-sensitive approach is indispensable in order to 
adequately accommodate the child in the proceedings – be it as participant in the 
criminal proceedings or as claimant in reparation proceedings. 
 
In contrast to the previous lack of child-specific regulation, selected TRC practice 
offers some reference on eligibility criteria. In addition to the limited guidance 
provided in the final report of the Liberian TRC, the final report of the Sierra 
Leonean TRC constitutes, up till now, the only TRC report which addresses in more 
detail children as beneficiaries of specific forms of reparations and provides 
guidance on the application of eligibility criteria.
695
 Truth and Reconciliation 
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Commissions, such as the TRC for South Africa, Peru or Timor-Leste mention 




 The Sierra Leonean TRC limited the group of child beneficiaries to particular 
groups of child victims, such as war-wounded victims, victims of sexual violence, 
children who were orphaned as a consequence of any abuse or violation within the 
TRC’s mandate. In addition, the TRC set an eligibility condition as regards the age 
of child claimants. The Sierra Leonean TRC ruled that, firstly, the crime causing 
harm to the child victim should have occurred between 23 March 1991 (beginning 
of the conflict) and 1 March 2002 (lifting of state of emergency); secondly, only 
those children who were eighteen years of age or younger on 1 March 2002 were 
eligible for reparations for children.
 697
 As a consequence, young adults who 
suffered from violations during their childhood but reached majority before 1 
March 2002, were not considered to be eligible for those reparations which were 
particularly designed to address the needs of children. 
 The final report of the Liberian TRC, on the other hand, established that children 
and young adults should be eligible for child-specific forms of reparations. It stated 
that, 
 
‘[r]eparations should aim at repairing the consequences of violations borne by 
children during the Liberian conflict. There should be symbolic and material 




Having reached majority, therefore, in view of the Liberian TRC, should not 
prevent young adults from being eligible to receive reparations which aim to repair 
the consequences of the wrongful acts committed against young adults during 
childhood. The TRC recommended in particular that lost educational opportunities 
should in particular be covered by reparations by providing additional schooling for 
those in need. The final report indeed underlines that such measures provided to 
young adults indeed bear positive consequences for the victims.
699
 Bearing in mind 
that young adults might still have child-specific needs and should therefore also be 
eligible for child-specific forms of reparations therefore requests that eligibility 
criteria do not prevent this particular group of victims from benefitting from child-
specific forms of reparations.  
 
The ICC might also be confronted with the need, in order to ensure the 
practicability of the reparation proceedings, to introduce eligibility criteria for 
                                                                                                                       
establishment, mandate and criticism of the Kenyan TRC see, Reliefweb Kenya; Amnesty 
International Kenya 2008.  
696
  UNICEF 2010a, at 88. 
697
  TRC Sierra Leone Vol. 2, Chapter 4, Reparations, at 248, 250. For an overview of the conflict, see 
TRC Sierra Leone Vol. 1, Chapter 1, Mandate, at 21-46. 
698
  TRC Liberia, Vol. 3: Appendix, at 107. 
699









specifying the group of victims, including children, who are entitled to specific 
forms of reparations. A requirement which is based on a temporal element could be 
helpful in this regard. The period which has been determined to constitute the time 
frame in which the prosecutor investigated the charged crimes, as contained in the 
confirmation of charges decision, could for this purpose be referred to as the time 
slot. Eligibility for child-specific forms of reparations could thus be said to require 
that claimants have been a child at the moment of crime commission, which 
simultaneously falls within the period of the confirmation of charges decision. This 
solution would lead to the result that victims, despite having reached majority in the 
course of the proceedings, might nevertheless be entitled to request child specific 
forms of reparation. While Rule 85 RPE does not explicitly provide for such 
limitation, it could be argued that this limitation is within the object and purpose of 
this provision and victim participation as such, as it still enables all potential direct 
and indirect victims to claim reparations. Claiming reparations as such is thus not 
limited, only the entitlement to a particular form of reparations, namely those who 
are child-specific, is made dependent on this temporal requirement. That the overall 
group of victims is automatically limited by specific period stated in the 
confirmation of charges decision is a practical consequence which exists regardless 
of the nature of the proceedings (criminal or reparation proceedings). This is 
because participation in a specific case requires as such that victims comply with 
the temporal element as stated in the confirmation of charges decision as they 
would otherwise not qualify as victims of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC 
which is charged against an (alleged) perpetrator. 
 
An upper age limit as introduced by the Sierra Leonean TRC with regard to 
claimants eligibility to request child-specific reparations, on the other hand, bears 
far-reaching consequences for children who have reached majority in the meantime 
but are nevertheless in need of reparations which target the particular needs 
attacked during childhood, and should therefore be avoided by the ICC. This is 
because, as has been elaborated in the previous section, victims, who have reached 
majority in the meanwhile might nevertheless be in need of child specific forms of 
reparations, such as educational training or particular medical treatment. Being 
limited to forms of reparation which do not address the particular needs of child 
claimants (independent of the fact that they might have reached majority in the 
meanwhile), and especially lost opportunities due to their suffering during 
childhood, entails the risk to not adequately enable these victims to effectively 
benefit from reparation awards. Such reparation awards would then not mirror a 
child-sensitive approach of the ICC. 
 
In the reparation proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the competent 
Chamber should therefore hold that entitlement to child-specific forms of 
reparations is dependent on the specific age of a claimant at the moment of crime 
commission (which is also included in the confirmation of charges decision). 








reparations who have reached majority during the time frame charged or within the 
course of the proceedings.  
 
In conclusion, based on the practice of more experienced mechanisms it is argued 
that child claimants may in the future indeed be expected to be confronted with 
child-specific eligibility criteria in order to come into consideration for forms of 
reparations which address the particular needs of this group of victims. Examining 
carefully the practice of experienced mechanisms might therefore provide useful 





General aspects of implementation 
 
Concerning the previously examined aspects, the statutory provisions of the 
International Criminal Court largely remain silent on the implementation of 
reparation orders. If reparation orders are made against a convicted person or 
deposited with the Trust Fund for Victims, limited guidance on the modalities for 
the disbursement of reparations awards can be found in the Rome Statute or the 
Regulations for the Trust Fund For Victims.
700
 In addition, Trial Chamber I’s 
decision of 7 August 2012 in the Lubanga case does set out a five-step 
implementation plan. According to this plan, the TFV, in conjunction with the 
Registry, the OPCV and appointed experts, determine which localities are to be 
addressed in the reparation process. Second, these actors consult with the localities 
selected. Third, the appointed experts determine the harm suffered within the 
localities. Subsequently, the principles and procedures of reparation proceedings are 
to be publicly explained in the localities. During the public debates, victims are 
invited to express their expectations. Finally, proposals for collective reparations 
are collected in order to forward them for approval to a competent Chamber of the 
ICC.
701
 Accordingly, the Chamber mainly delegates the substantive parts of the 
reparation proceedings to the Trust Fund for Victims. The Chamber explicitly held 
that, 
 
‘[it] is satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case, the identification of the 
victims and beneficiaries (Regulations 60 to 65 of the Regulations of the TFV) 
should be carried out by the TFV. […] The Chamber accordingly: […] [r]emains 
seized of the reparations proceedings, in order to exercise any necessary monitoring 
and oversight functions in accordance with Article 64(2) and (3)(a) of the Statute 
(including considering the proposals for collective reparations that are to be 
                                                 
700
  Regulation 66-68 of the 2005 Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims. 
701














Despite the attempt of Trial Chamber I to provide more clarity as regards reparation 
proceedings by setting out the reparation proceedings in a five-step implementation 
plan, numerous questions remain unanswered. As a consequence, the reparation 
proceedings in the Lubanga case, but equally the implementation of other 




Child-specific aspects of implementation 
 
Bearing in mind the procedural particularities which arose thus far in criminal 
proceedings, the following two questions, among others, are likely to occur in 
reparation proceedings in relation to the child claimant: Firstly, how should the 
Court determine what is considered to be in the best interests of the child? Will the 
individual child (need to) have a say? Secondly, bearing in mind the urgency of 
children’s needs, are child claimants’ reparation requests to be treated with priority 
compared to adult or other claimants’ reparation claims? In turn, guidance on these 
two questions is sought in the remaining provisions, the practice of the ICC within 
the criminal proceedings and, again, the involvement of children in the Sierra 
Leonean TRC. 
 
5.4.3.1 Best Interests 
 
The assessment of the best interest of the child has been examined within the ambit 
of Chapter One. Similar, if not even greater relevance of the principle of the best 
interests compared to the previous chapters exists when reparation awards are to be 
implemented. Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has 
been recognised by various Chambers as applicable law in the pending criminal 
proceedings before the Court states that, 
 
‘[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 




Considering that various Chambers recognised the applicability of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, in particular Article 3, the extent to which the 
determination of the best interests of the child could play a role in reparation 
proceedings, in particular whether children themselves have a say in what is in their 
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best interests when expressing their preference for particular forms of reparations 
needs to be examined.
705
 
 Chapter One underlined that an assessment of the best interests of the child is to 
be made in light of the evolving capacities of the individual child. Such 
consideration should further take into account that a universal standard for the best 
interests of the child does not exist.
706
 The earlier mentioned Guidelines of the 
Council of Europe are restated as a yardstick for an assessment of the best interests 
of the child as regards the implementation of reparation awards. The Guidelines 
request that, 
 
‘their views and opinions shall be given due weight; all other rights of the child, such 
as the right to dignity, liberty and equal treatment shall be respected at all times; a 
comprehensive approach shall be adopted by all relevant authorities so as to take due 
account of all interests at stake, including psychological and physical well-being and 




Accordingly, as pointed out in Chapter One, the best interests of the child can be 
assessed through a three-fold test which goes beyond a purely legal assessment: 
Firstly, the child needs to express his or her views which are to be taken into 
account; secondly, the best interests of the child in a particular situation need to be 
examined in light of the other rights of the child. Thirdly an interdisciplinary 
approach is to be applied in order to scrutinise the non-legal fields of interests, such 
as the psycho-social constitution of the individual child. As underlined by the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the ICC is encouraged to consider that, 
 





Also within the context of reparation proceedings, the Court is advised to enable 
children to progressively exercise their right to reparation and allow their individual 
participation, by, for instance, inviting them to express their personal views and 
concerns on the forms of reparations.  
 
Despite the major lack of procedural rules regulating the implementation of 
reparation awards, Article 75(3) Rome Statute, indeed, enables the Court to ‘invite 
[…] representations from or on behalf of […] victims’ which the Court shall take 
into account before making a reparation order. This provision, therefore, empowers 
the Court to also invite child claimants and/or their legal representatives to bring 
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their views and concerns to the attention of the Court before reparation awards are 
made.  
 It is noteworthy to repeat in this regard that two former child soldiers (child 
participants) were invited by Trial Chamber I to give evidence in the courtroom in 
the criminal proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Chapter Three). During 
their testimony, both young adults also expressed their wish to receive educational 
training as a form of reparation to be awarded by the Court.
709
 Their testimony 
therefore provided the Court with valuable insights into the personal views and 
expectations of the young adults. After the conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Trial Chamber I invited legal representatives and the Office of Public Council for 





In addition, the Court can also assess the personal views and expectations of child 
claimants by studying their respective application forms. Question 34 of the 
standard form invites claimants to describe what they expect to receive. On the 
other side, as the use of the application form is not compulsory for child claimants, 
one may generally question whether the form will be used to a great extent in the 
future. If this will not be the case, the Court will be in need to receive information 
as regards the preferred forms of reparation from other sources, such as the earlier 
addressed meetings at community level. Next to the potential usefulness of the 
application form for the Court, it may also be noted at this point that, bearing in 
mind the limited forms of reparations the Court will be able to order directly against 
a convicted person, the explanatory note, which states that victims can also expect 
reparations in the form of compensation or restitution, might be confusing for child 
claimants (but also adult claimants). It might in particular create wrong expectations 
concerning what kind of reparations can be expected from the Court.
711
  
 The relevance of the possibility for children to express their personal 
expectations through the one or the other means depends, however, on the 
promotion of this option in a child sensitive manner. Particularly important in this 
regard is the earlier addressed right of the child to be adequately informed (Chapter 
One). Children are accordingly in specific need of being properly informed and 
supported in order to formulate their expectations within the possible forms of 
reparations which could be awarded by the ICC. Since the number of claimants is 
likely to be of such size that individual hearings are less feasible, the written 
statement in any case invites claimants, including children, to formulate their 
personal needs, expectations and preferences. The extent to which the ICC and in 
particular the Trust Fund for Victims will take the child-specific wishes into 
account remains to be seen. 
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In line with the foregoing, the practice of various TRCs also underlines that victims, 
including children, have personally been invited for statement sessions.
712
 In 
addition to the possibility for children to express their individual views on 
reparation in person, the Sierra Leonean TRC cooperated with the Children’s 
Forum Network. The Commission stated in its final report that, 
 
‘[t]he children of Sierra Leone have not had a meaningful role and voice in the social, 
political and economic life of Sierra Leone despite the fact that they were compelled 
to adopt adult roles during the conflict. The establishment of the Children’s Forum 
Network (CFN), an advocacy group run by children, enabled the Commission to 
hear and listen to the voices of Sierra Leone’s children telling about their 




Increasing the role of child rights NGOs in the context of ICC reparation 
proceedings could therefore constitute another option in order to fully assess the 
best interests of the child in respect of reparations to be received. Bearing in mind 
that many potential child claimants have been permanently or are temporarily 
separated from their parents due to international crimes, strengthening the position 
of the child claimant by relying on the support of child rights NGOs potentially 
constitutes a meaningful tool to enable the Court to fully understand the broad 
variety of children’s needs and wishes. Such need has been pointed out by the 
Registry. It held that, 
 
‘[t]he information in the possession of these groups [NGOs such as UNCIEF but 
also local child rights organisations] may be of great assistance to the Court in 




UNICEF submitted in March 2012 a request to participate in the reparation 
proceedings in the Lubanga case in order to assist the Court on matters in relation to 
child victims.
715
 In April 2012, Trial Chamber I, indeed granted leave to UNICEF 






Another aspect which relates to the implementation of reparations concerns the 
question of the potential priority of claims submitted by child claimants. The ICC 
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Statute, again, does not provide guidance on the issue. Regulation 65 of the Trust 
Fund, on the other hand, establishes that 
 
‘[t]aking into account the urgent situation of the beneficiaries, the Board of Directors 
may decide to institute phased or priority verification and disbursement procedures. 
In such cases, the Board of Directors may prioritize a certain sub-group of victims 




Accordingly, if the Trust Fund may generally decide to prioritise between certain 
sub-groups of victims, the prioritisation of the implementation of child claimants’ 
reparations is not excluded at the outset.  
 Previous practice with regard to the priority of children’s reparations was, again, 
established by the Sierra Leonean TRC. By recommending specific reparations for 
children, the TRC of Sierra Leone recognised that children constitute a particular 
group of beneficiaries which is in ‘dire need of urgent care.’
718
 Despite the fact that 
the conflict in Sierra Leone resulted in a large amount of victims, the Commission 
saw a need to give priority to the needs of children. The Commission concluded 
that reparations to children should be  
 
‘prioritised as victims in need of particular care and assistance given the enduring 




A prioritised implementation of reparation requests of child claimants therefore 
does not lack precedence and could also be adopted by the ICC. Furthermore, the 
prioritisation of reparation awards was also suggested to Trial Chamber I in the 
Lubanga case. The Registry pointed out in its Second Report on Reparation in this 
case that, 
 
‘the Chamber may consider something […], by which resources for redress are 
prioritized in favour of some victims but not others on the basis of equitable criteria 
in those many cases where the resources at its disposal for redress are insufficient to 
provide meaningful redress to all victims potentially eligible. In these circumstances 
it may make more sense to prioritize resources so that certain groups of victims, such 
as those most in need or those most seriously affected by the crime in question, can 




It is therefore a welcome step, that Trial Chamber I ruled that children may indeed 
benefit from prioritised treatment. The Chamber held that, 
 
‘[it] recognises that priority may need to be given to certain victims who are in 
particularly vulnerable situations or who require urgent assistance. These may 
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include, inter alia, the victims of sexual or gender-based violence, individuals who 
require immediate medical care (especially when plastic surgery or treatment for 
HIV is necessary), as well as severely traumatized children, for instance following 




Does this mean that a child’s claim is generally to be prioritised compared to claims 
from adult victims? One may indeed assume that, bearing in mind the psychological 
and physical developmental progression of the child that claims which request 
medical treatment are to be prioritised – a position which also appears to be adopted 
before the Sierra Leonean TRC and by Trial Chamber I of the ICC. This may be 
explained by the fact that (further) delay in medical treatment might cause more 
disproportionate negative implications for the child compared to adult victims. One 
may even argue that also victims who have reached majority in the meanwhile are 
entitled to such prioritised treatment when having suffered harm as a result of an 
international crime during childhood. Whether a priority of claims beyond a 
medical necessity, such as claims requesting educational training, will be 
introduced remains to be seen. In any case, it needs to be remembered that since 
other Chambers have not yet ruled on reparations, it remains to be seen whether a 
prioritised treatment for children will generally be provided for. 
5.5 CONCLUSION  
 
It has become clear, that, without having yet been extensively confronted with 
specific questions concerning the forms, eligibility and implementation of 
reparation awards in relation to the child claimant in the young practice of the Court, 
the ICC can be expected to be confronted with these aspects in the future. Each of 
these issues requires that child-sensitive awareness is present in order to ensure that 
children and young adults can benefit from reparation awards which adequately 
address the particular needs that are inherent to childhood. It has also been pointed 
out that these needs are not limited to immediate reparation measures which aim to 
support the child victim in terms of medical recovery. Instead, a holistic view is to 
be applied when considering not only who is eligible for child-specific reparations, 
but also when determining the precise forms of reparations and a potential 
prioritisation of claims submitted by child victims when implementing reparation 
awards.  
 The material scale of an effective remedy requires that reparations to children 
and young adults reflect their particular needs in order to constitute meaningful 
reparations. The fact that the procedural framework of reparation proceedings 
before the ICC is not provided for in the statutory rules, constitutes a complicating 
factor in this regard. 
 As regards the decision of Trial Chamber I to not examine individual 
applications but to forward all to the TFV raises the particular questions of what the 
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added value of early reparation requests is, and whether individual requests for 
reparations being transmitted to the Court prior to the commencement of reparations 
proceedings is at all in the best interests of the child – bearing in mind the 
possibility of joining the proceedings at a later stage by participating in the public 
debates at local level.  
 In any case, as long as the Rome Statute and the respective procedural rules 
create the impression that reparations are awarded by the judicial institution of the 
ICC, a delegation to the Trust Fund cannot be applauded. Instead, the Court should 
himself fulfil this task, be it with, for example the establishment of specific 
reparation chambers, including chambers whose members are experts in child rights 
issues. 
 
As was pointed out previously, the examination of the evolving capacities of the 
child requires a complex assessment (Chapter One). The lack of an explicit analysis 
of the evolving capacities of child participants in the Lubanga case might be caused 
by the fact that the criminal proceedings simply prevent the ICC from a detailed 
inquiry. The conclusion of these proceedings may therefore invite but also enable 
the Court to change perspective. From being a fair trial watchdog, the Court may 
now also (without losing sight of the fact that the convicted person also has the right 
to a fair trial in reparation proceedings) act as a protector of the various facets of the 
best interests of the child. Furthermore, the judges could pay particular attention to 
the need that a child is invited to participate in accordance with his or her evolving 
capacities. In addition to the responsibility of judges to take the child-specific 
particularities into account, explicit awareness of the other actors involved, in 
particular the Registry, the Trust Fund and the legal representatives has been 
established as being indispensable for child-sensitive participation in reparation 
proceedings before the ICC.  
 
In conclusion, if the ICC aims to ensure that children and young adults can remedy 
the harm suffered during childhood as a result of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court, the Court is encouraged to bear in mind that not only the procedure itself 
needs to be child-sensitive but also the material component of the proceedings 
relating to the forms of reparations. In addition, child-sensitivity should not be 
limited to those who are minors when claiming reparations. Instead, an adequate 
response in the law of procedure and practice is necessary in order to also enable 
young adults who have suffered from violations of rights during childhood to 
remedy these violation(s) and be in particular eligible for child-specific forms of 
reparations. Such a response could provide an effective remedy for child victims 
(being children and young adults in the course of reparation proceedings) in 


























Each of the foregoing chapters draws conclusions as to the child-specific 
particularities before the ICC pursuing two research aims:  
 
o to analyse whether and to what extent the proceedings are child 
sensitive; 
o to establish whether additional child-specific regulation and awareness 
is necessary in order to accommodate the particular needs of the child. 
 
It has been established, where necessary, whether additional child-specific 
regulation and awareness is necessary in order to adequately accommodate the 
particular needs of the child.
722
 The research thereby also assessed whether it is 
possible at all that ICC proceedings are sufficiently child sensitive. If not, it might 
be necessary to reconsider the possibility that children participate. Summarising the 
foregoing, the concrete objective this research focused on has been formulated as 
follows: 
 
The research aims to provide informed insights into whether participation in 
ICC proceedings is in the best interests of the child. 
 
When addressing these aims, it has been kept in mind that, even if victims, 
including children, participate in the proceedings before the Court and claim 
reparations, I agree with the perspective that the ICC has as its primary objective to 
ensure a fair trial for alleged perpetrators. Accordingly, throughout the entire 
research, the punitive nature has been of foremost importance when balancing the 
best interests of the child against the core objective of international criminal justice. 
Bearing in mind the objective of the ICC, the fight against impunity, an individual 
examination of a child (and in particular the individual child’s best interests) could 
be considered to be beyond the capacities of a criminal court whose core task is to 
safeguard that alleged perpetrators receive a fair trial. One may therefore as such 
still question the principal relevance of child participation in ICC proceedings. 
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The various chapters point out that child participation in ICC proceedings (but also 
other international criminal and reparation proceedings), indeed, requires a child-
specific response in law and in practice. This response aims to ensure that 
children’s involvement in various capacities can be considered to be in their best 
interests and in accordance with their evolving capacities. 
 
The current chapter aims to develop a concluding comparison of only a few 
procedural aspects: namely those which are (or are likely to be) commonly shared 
among the various procedural capacities of the child.  
 
The following evaluation therefore focuses on an assessment of the ICC’s position 
towards the same procedural particularities within different procedural capacities of 
the child. It will address three questions, namely, whether, and if so, to what extent 
and why did the various Chambers of the Court approach the same particularity 
differently? This comparative approach at the end of this research aims to add 
another perspective on child participation in ICC proceedings – a perspective which 
constitutes an additional incentive for the evaluation of the legal aspects of child 
participation. Subsequently, based on the examined regulation and practice in this 
research, the chapter draws final conclusions as regards the principal relevance of 
child participation in international judicial proceedings. Finally, alongside ten final 
recommendations, this chapter calls for further research in light of the procedural 
dimension of child participation in the criminal and reparation proceedings before 




The numerous procedural particularities which arose in the ICC’s practice in 
relation to the child witness, victim and claimant point out that these three 
procedural capacities can be considered to play a dominant role in the existing 
practice of the ICC. Selected peculiarities are commonly shared. The individual 
criminal responsibility of a child perpetrator or being the child of a(n) (alleged) 
perpetrator have either been excluded from the jurisdictional mandate of the ICC or 
played (thus far) a minor role. Accordingly, particular attention is awarded to a 
comparative evaluation of the commonly shared particularities relating to the child 
witness, victim and claimant. 
 
6.2.1 Legal capacity of the child  
 
The legal capacity of the child constitutes a procedural particularity which arose 









– a particularity which is likely to also arise in future reparation proceedings 
(Chapter Five).  
 The legal capacity is the requirement which is to be examined prior to children’s 
participation in ICC proceedings. This is because, in principle, only those children 
who possess legal capacity are eligible for participation. The minor age of the child 
has, however, been found to be a potential constraint to children’s participation as 
minors are frequently seen as lacking full legal capacity. 
 
Various Chambers established that a child victim is, in principle, not recognised as 
being legally competent to submit an application for participation on his/her own 
behalf. Thus, while adult applicants are only requested to comply with the four 
requirements of Rule 85 RPE when accessing the ICC, children have to comply 
with two additional requirements that are not called for in the statutory rules. These 
requirements relate to the legal (in)competence of the child to file an application 
and the related condition that another person should act on behalf of the child. Both 
aspects have been introduced by various Chambers of the ICC and have also been 
included in the amended application form. This implies that these Chambers held 
that only next-of-kin or the legal guardian of the child victim are seen as competent 
third persons who may submit an application for participation on behalf of the child 
(Chapter Three). The exclusion has been based on the fact that the respective 
victims were minors. 
 
The minor age of the child has also been a procedural particularity which received 
specific attention when children were invited to testify in the witness capacity. The 
limited legal capacity of children has been reflected in the need to be provided with 
the consent of another person when a minor is called into the witness stand. The 
adult consent was deemed indispensable as the child was not deemed to be able to 
provide informed consent to testify. 
 
In contrast to the approach of the Chambers as regards the child victim, the limited 
legal capacity of the child witness has been dealt with differently. The competent 
Chambers ruled in this regard that the appearance of the child witness is not 
conditional on the consent of the next-of-kin or legal guardian. At first hand, it is 
surprising (bearing in mind the potential risk of re-traumatisation during testimony) 
that the procedural rules on the questioning of children are broader by establishing 
that other adults who are relevant (thus not being limited to kinship or legal 
guardianship as is the case for child victim participants) may also provide the 
necessary consent to call a child as a witness (Chapter Two). 
 Despite a further explanation of what is to be understood under relevant adult, 
this addition bears particular consequences for the Prosecution. It enables the 
Prosecution, regardless of the fact that a potential child witness may not be in 
contact with his/her parents or legal guardian, to question children, because of being 
allowed to obtain consent from a wider range of persons. This opportunity is of 








refugee children who stay in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration or 
refugee camps. These children may not yet have re-established contacts with their 
families due to the consequences of their recruitment and flight. The re-unification 
may be further complicated by a possibly still ongoing armed conflict such as the 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
 
While both, child victims and witnesses are not automatically recognised as always 
having full legal capacity before the ICC, the possibility of relying on a relevant 
adult in relation to child witnesses raises the question why the Court, thus far, 
followed a stricter approach with regard to child applications for participation in 
criminal proceedings despite the fact that this group of children faces the same 
practical constraints as child witnesses. In light of the lack of explanation for the 
stricter approach, it seems that the Court, depending on the competent Chamber, 
thereby aims to indirectly limit the number of participating child victims. 
 
Bearing in mind the examined difficulties for child victims of international crimes 
to access the ICC (Chapter Three), enabling child victims or claimants to also rely 
on relevant adults (not fulfilling the kinship or legal guardian requirement) when 
submitting the joint application form, would allow children to access more easily 
the criminal and/or reparation proceedings of the International Criminal Court. This 
is particularly the case when conflicting interests between the child and his or her 
parents, but also the separation from and the loss of parents and the non-existence 
of a system of legal guardianship are at issue.  
 
The addressed practice of various Chambers, however, introduced the condition that 
if neither parent(s) nor the legal guardian submit an application on the child’s behalf, 
child victims have to provide the consent of next-of-kin or a legal guardian that 
someone else submits an application on behalf of the child. Such a requirement has, 
however, far-reaching consequences since it restricts the child in accessing the 
criminal and/or reparation proceedings before the ICC. UNICEF clarified in this 
regard that, 
 
‘[a] common constraint on the child’s right to express views and concerns is the 
requirement that his or her parent give prior authorization. Such a constraint is not 





Accordingly, the Court should depart from the strict requirement that the child’s 
limited legal capacity can only be bypassed with the consent of next-of-kin or a 
legal guardian. Instead, the Court should assess whether another person’s consent is 
to be requested and if so, under which conditions child rights NGOs or other care-
takers, for instance, could be considered as being suitable to provide such consent. 
                                                 
723









Furthermore, a case-by-case assessment should be relied upon when deciding on 
whether a child’s request for participation should be accompanied at all with the 
consent of another (relevant) person. Such a decision should, however, not be made 
in light of the age of the child, but be based on an assessment of the capability of 
the individual child to communicate and express his or her views, in other words the 
decision should be taken in light of the evolving capacities of the individual child 
(Chapter One). A competence of the judges to examine the capability of a 
individual child to communicate and express his or her views cannot automatically 
be assumed as such decision requests expertise beyond the law. Instead, transparent 
proof of expertise and, if necessary, the support of qualified and trained experts 
when taking this decision is suggested in this context. 
 
What is clear from this practice in relation to the legal status of the child witness, 
victim and claimant is that there is a strong need for transparency in the Court’s 
practice. Questions of a possible limitation of the child’s legal capacity are of such 
an essential nature as they are decisive for the legal status of the child participant 
that they should be answered in line with (as long as there is no procedural 
regulation) a publicly available Court strategy and coherent Court practice in order 
to enable children, their care takers and legal representatives to anticipate on their 
legal (potential) legal status before the International Criminal Court. 
 
6.2.2 Informed consent of the child 
 
Closely related to the legal capacity of the child is his/her ability to provide 
informed consent - an issue which also arose in the criminal proceedings with 
regard to the child witness and victim. The doctrine of informed consent generally 
plays an important role in three situations: when a child is called to the witness 
stand, when the Court intends to use confidential medical information concerning 
the child during the trial or when a child participant or claimant is represented by a 
legal representative. Five components have been held to be the elements of 
informed consent: information, competency, understanding, voluntariness and 
decision.
724
 The second element, the competency of the child to provide informed 
consent, has received particular attention in the ICC’s practice. 
 
While it is argued in this research that age itself should not be a factor which 
determines the legal capacity of a child, it has been relied upon in practice in 
particular when assessing whether a child is able to provide informed consent. 
Though the ICC does not draw a sharp distinction based on age when assessing the 
vulnerability of a witness and his/her need for specific protection (see below), the 
international standard of eighteen (Article 1 CRC), by contrast, is strictly applied in 
so far as the consent of an adult is requested before calling a child to the witness 
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 Thus, while in terms of protection it is not decisive whether the young 
witness is older or younger than eighteen years of age, requesting the consent of a 
third person before calling a child to the witness stand establishes that in this regard, 
child witnesses are strictly seen as children below the age of eighteen and unable to 
provide an informed consent on whether testifying in the witness stand.  
 
Whereas the need to recognise that the child himself or herself is capable of 
providing informed consent in relation to acting as a witness may be questioned, 
child victims and claimants, on the other side, should generally be seen as being 
competent to provide such consent.  
 The request to recognise child participants and claimants competency to provide 
informed consent becomes particularly clear when assessing the possibility to be 
represented by a legal representative. Chapter Three established that being 
represented by a legal representative in the proceedings before the Court, requires 
that an informed decision is made. If the child, however, is seen as not being 
competent to provide informed consent, he/she cannot come into consideration for 
such representation without the support of others. Participation without a legal 
representative, as underlined in Chapter Three, reduces the modalities of 
participation. This is because participation through a legal representative entails 
more extensive participation options. Accordingly, child victims and claimants 
should in principle be recognised as being legally competent to formulate an 
informed decision on their legal representation in ICC proceedings. 
 
The same assumption can, however, not generally be made with regard to child 
witnesses’ ability to provide informed consent. This is particularly the case when a 
child cannot be expected to be able to oversee the possible negative implications of 
witnessing – such as re-traumatisation and the risk of self-incrimination (Chapter 
Two). Not presuming generally that the child can give an informed consent with 
regard to testimony, does not take away the possibility that individual children are 
capable of doing so. Thus, while the child should be presumed to be capable of 
providing an informed consent in relation to participation in the criminal and/or 
reparation proceedings, this capability should be carefully examined before calling 
a child to the witness stand. This examination should not be limited to the 
competent judges prior to actually calling a child into the witness stand. Instead, a 
preliminary examination should also be undertaken by those actors who intend to 
call child witnesses, namely, the prosecution and defence teams. This preliminary 
examination aims to, firstly, ensure that children’s involvement with the ICC is 
critically assessed from the outset and, secondly, to ensure that children’s best 
interests are constantly respected and examined by all actors involved. Such 
preliminary assessment could be achieved by introducing the respective provisions 
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in the relevant code of conducts, but more effectively by a regulation under the 
Rome Statute.  
 
As far as the reparation proceedings in the Lubanga case are concerned, Trial 
Chamber I seems to be of the view that children are indeed seen as being legally 





6.2.3 Age of the child  
 
The determination of the age of the child has crystallised to become a central issue 
for the child witness, victim and most likely also for the child claimant. The 
determination of the age of a child witness or participant is particularly relevant 
when they are called to testify on their recruitment as a child soldier (victim witness, 
Chapter Two) or when filing an application for participation as an alleged victim of 
this crime (Chapter Three). Obviously, only those witnesses who were below the 
age of fifteen years at the time of recruitment are able to provide evidence on the 
alleged crime as a direct victim. Equally, only those child victims who were 
recruited when they were below the age of fifteen years are eligible for the victim 
status of the recruitment crime. 
 
Chapter Three established that various Chambers of the International Criminal 
Court adopted a pragmatic approach with regard to the age determination of a child 
victim by applying a prima facie standard at pre-trial and trial stage, 
notwithstanding the fact that inconsistencies existed with regard to the date of birth 
of some applicants.
727
 A range of documents but also the statement of two witnesses, 
were accepted as establishing the identity and age of the applicant.
728
 Efforts by the 
Defence counsel of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who argued that the exact age of 
participants at the time of crime commission had not been established, were mainly 
only successful when the participant failed to submit any identification document 
which could establish his or her age.
729
 The majority of child victims seeking access 
succeeded, despite the doubts raised by the Defence, in sufficiently establishing, 
prima facie, their age.
730
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 While this prima facie standard approach could be said to contravene the earlier 
statement that the ICC indirectly aims to limit child participation by restricting 
children’s legal capacity to apply for participation on their own behalf and not 
automatically recognising children’s capacity to provide informed consent, one 
needs to be aware of the exact moment when the decision on the child’s capability 
is taken and when age is to be proven. The former decision is taken prior to an 
actual examination of the application for participation. Children are thus potentially 
excluded already before the merits of their application (including an assessment of 
proof of age) have been touched upon. It is therefore argued, that the approach 
taken by the Court, thus far, in relation to the child’s capability constitutes an 
constraint which constitutes a general entrance hurdle to child participation in ICC 
proceedings. The less restrictive approach of a prima facie standard, which is 
adopted at a later stage, can therefore not be said to mirror a generally child 
oriented attitude of the Court.  
 
Bearing the aforementioned in mind, I therefore still critically view the fact that, as 
Chapter Five established, an even more lenient approach was adopted by Trial 
Chamber I in the reparation proceedings against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo before the 
Court with regard to the child claimant.  
 
In contrast to the lenient approach in relation to child victim participation in the 
criminal and reparation proceedings, remarkably higher efforts were taken in order 
to prove the age of a child witness who is called to the witness stand to testify on 
his/her recruitment as child soldier.  
 The Prosecution invited two expert witnesses on age determination in order to 
establish the age of the child witness called in the case against Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo. The Prosecution thereby aimed to achieve that Trial Chamber I was 
convinced beyond reasonable doubt about the allegation that the accused 
committed the war crime of enlistment and recruitment of children below the age of 
fifteen years (Chapter Two).
  
 The higher evidentiary threshold of proving beyond reasonable doubt mirrors 
that, depending on the procedural capacity of the child in combination with the 
crimes charged, the Court will apply different standards of proof. From an 
institutional perspective, such an approach mirrors that criminal proceedings 
request a higher burden of proof in order to safeguard that alleged perpetrators 
receive a fair trial. 
 From a child rights perspective, this is a logical and welcoming approach which 
does not render child participation unfeasible for reasons of age determination since 
(thus far) the higher threshold is applied in relation to child witnesses and not 
victims and claimants. This positive conclusion does, however, not diminish the 
earlier raised criticism that the Court (on a general basis) indirectly seems to restrict 
child participation. The welcoming approach in relation to age determination of 
child victims is therefore only a partial success from a child rights perspective as 









6.2.4 Protection of the child 
 
Another aspect which arises in relation to the child witness, victim and claimant 
concerns the child’s need to specific protection. The need to provide child witnesses 
and victims with sufficient protection has been recognised. With regard to child 
victims’ need to receive protective measures in order to prevent re-traumatisation, 
Trial Chamber I ruled, for instance, that,  
 
‘protective and special measures for victims are often the legal means by which the 
Court can secure the participation of victims in the proceedings, because they are a 
necessary step I order to safeguard their safety, physical and psychological well-




The legal representatives of the participating victims in the Lubanga case 
underlined that many victims are children coming from the ethnic group of the 
accused.
732
 The application of protective measures may therefore be an 




 In line with the argumentation of the legal representatives, Trial Chamber I also 
recognised the particular vulnerability and need of specific procedural protection of 
child witnesses.
734
 In addition, various Chambers of the International Criminal 
Court developed a child-focussed practice in order to prevent that children’s 
participation in the one or the other procedural capacity does not contravene the 
best interests of the child. The appearance of the first child witness in the Lubanga 
case, at the same time, illustrates that the Court still needs to further develop the 
protection of the child and in particular apply a case-by-case assessment on whether 
sufficient measures have been adopted. An assessment of the concrete needs should 
include an examination of the psychological needs of the child by experts, such as 
psychologists. Furthermore, a case-by-case assessment should also address the 
child’s need for support and advise concerning the legal aspects and (potential) 
legal implications – an assessment which is not necessarily limited to the competent 
judges, but may also involve prosecution and defence teams as well as legal 
representatives.  
 
6.2.5 Credibility of the child 
 
The question whether a child is a credible statement provider has been raised in 
particular in relation to the child witness and child victim.  
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 Child witness testimony is accompanied by a number of factors which could be 
assumed to be decisive for the child’s credibility to provide truthful testimony in 
international criminal proceedings. The immaturity of the young witness and the 
likelihood that the child has been traumatised in the course of the conflict are 
important in this regard. Chapter Two established in more detail that a child- 
sensitive approach is necessary in order to ensure that a child is able to provide 
truthful testimony. 
 
Questions concerning children’s trustworthiness were, however, also raised in 
relation to the child victim in the Court’s practice. As far as the credibility of the 
child as statement provider is concerned, it needs to be pointed out that the 
trustworthiness of the two former child soldiers, who were called by Trial Chamber 
I to testify in the victim capacity, was indeed challenged by the Defence (Chapter 
Two and Three). Uncertainty as to their truthfulness was not only raised during their 
testimony, but in particular in the aftermath when the Defence of Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo (successfully) argued that the two witnesses lied about their identity.
735
  
 Trial Chamber I seems to adopt a strict approach since it ordered the disclosure 
of confidential identifying information within the application form in order to 
enable the Defence to clarify whether the doubts raised were justified and to 




 Doubts were furthermore raised by the Defence in relation to the credibility of 
child victims due to contractions within their application form for participation.
737
 
Contrastingly, the same Chamber, but also Pre-Trial Chamber I, did not deem it 
necessary to examine the credibility of child victim participants at the respective 
stages of the proceedings as far as children have ‘only’ submitted an application for 
participation and did not participate in another procedural capacity before the ICC. 
Pre-trial Chamber I held that, 
 
‘[co]nsidering further that the applicants are only required to demonstrate that the 
four requirements established by rule 85 of the Rules are met prima facie and that 
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therefore the Single Judge’s analysis of the Applications “will not consist in 
assessing the credibility of the [applicants’] statement[s] or engaging in a process of 
corroboration strictu sensu”, but will assess the applicants’ statements first and 
foremost on the merits of their intrinsic coherence, as well as on the basis of the 




Likewise, Trial Chamber I underlined that the credibility of the statement is 
assumed as long as the provided documents do not indicate another conclusion, 
despite the fact that inconsistencies existed with regard to some applicants’ birth 




The Chamber thereby established that it distinguishes between child witnesses and 
child victims in its assessment of credibility. While the latter is assumed on a prima 
facie basis, challenges of the Defence have been successful in examining child 
witnesses credibility in more detail. As a result of such careful assessment, all 
former child soldiers who were called by the Prosecution to give testimony in the 
Lubanga case have been dismissed by Trial Chamber I (Chapter Two). In addition 
to these child witnesses, the Defence also succeeded in convincing that those child 
victims who gave testimony before Trial Chamber I in person had to be declared as 
being unreliable due to serious contradictions in their testimony.  
 Such practice indicates that the Chamber thereby introduces a balanced 
approach (bearing in mind the above mentioned critical remarks) between on the 
one side, the right of the accused to a fair trial, which requires a detailed assessment 
of the child’s statement and, on the other side, the possibility for child victims to 
participate. 
 
6.3 PRINCIPAL RELEVANCE OF CHILD PARTICIPATION 
 
It is pointed out throughout the entire research that, to date, the International 
Criminal Court constitutes the only international avenue to justice which enables 
victims of international crimes, including children, to be involved to such a 
remarkable degree. Victim participation before the Cambodia and Lebanon 
tribunals, on the other side, is provided for, but to a lesser degree.  
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 A child can participate by not only being called to the witness stand as part of a 
prosecutorial or defence strategy, but also by submitting an application for 
participation in criminal and/or reparation proceedings. This specific possibility, for 
the first time in the history of international criminal law, enables children to directly 
enforce violations of their rights to the extent they have been criminalised under the 
Rome Statute. The recognition of the child as a procedural actor with procedural 
rights and the need for procedurally regulated protection constitutes a tremendous 
and welcome step in international (criminal) law. It contributes to the humanisation 
of international law.  
 
It nevertheless needs to be taken into account that the ICC, in its early practice, has 
been confronted with a serious omission in procedural regulation and struggled in 
various instances when children were involved. It furthermore needs to be borne in 
mind that the Court is likely to be confronted with similar but also other procedural 
particularities in the future when children participate. A particular filed of attention 
could, for instance, be the regulation of family visits – an aspect which thus far has 
not received much attention as the Court struggled with numerous other issues 
relating more directly to the course of the criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the 
concretisation of reparation orders can also be expected to confront the ICC with 
child-specific questions which have, to date, not been (comprehensively) addressed. 
 
The analysis establishes that the participation of the child in the proceedings before 
the ICC is not a straightforward exercise. Instead, the major lack of procedural 
child-specific regulation, but also fair trial constraints, prevent the Court from being 
obliged to comprehensively take into account the particular needs of the child 
which often request a case-by-case assessment.  
 
Despite the forgoing doubts as regards child participation in ICC proceedings, it 
needs to be underlined that certain forms of child participation are not likely to 
disappear from ICC practice. Ensuring, for instance, the well-being of child 
witnesses was a recurring issue which requested all actors involved to adapt the 
procedures and behaviour to the particular needs of young human beings in order to, 
for instance, prevent re-traumatisation. Considering the importance of children who 
can provide insider information, especially with regard to the recruitment crime, it 
is unfeasible that this procedural capacity will disappear in the future. Similarly, the 
consequences which children of (alleged) perpetrators are facing and the legal 
issues which arise due to the involvement of their parents in ICC proceedings, such 
as family visits and allowances are neither likely to disappear from the list of the 
challenges facing the ICC.  
 
With regard to these aspects, the ICC is therefore called upon to not only develop 
guidelines and include procedural rules, but in particular to streamline its practice in 









decision-taking. This is not only important from a child rights perspective, but 
equally relevant from a defence point of view.  
 
6.4 FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ON 
CHILD PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AND REPARATION 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
The introductory chapter underlined that the present research aims to determine 
child specific procedural particularities as reflected in the laws and practice of 
international criminal and reparation proceedings with a particular focus on the ICC. 
Accordingly, the research is not intended to provide an exhaustive analysis of the 
child-specific procedural issues, but only seeks to provide a major step and 
incentive for a comprehensively researched legal status of the child when 
participating in the proceedings before the International Criminal Court. The need 
for further research is supported by numerous arguments. These are addressed in the 
light of ten final recommendations which are based on the findings made in the 
various chapters of this research. The examination of the procedural particularities 
concerning the child establishes that the ICC and all actors involved should 
especially adhere to the following recommendations: 
 
1. A presumption of the child’s capability to participation should 
generally prevail. This presupposes respect for the evolving capacities 
which is indispensable in order to enable the individual child to 
participate to the greatest extent possible.
740
 
2. Critical monitoring is required in order to ensure that the child is 
recognised as a holder of independent rights.
741
 
3. ICC proceedings should be more accessible to those children who wish 
to participate in criminal and/or reparation proceedings.
742
 
4. The ICC should publish child participation statistics in order to 
promote transparency. In addition, the child-specific benefits/outcomes 
of participation should also be publicly pronounced.
743
 
5. Child participation in ICC proceedings should not be limited to 
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6. The legal status of the child should be recognised as not being a static 




7. The capacity of the individual child should be the triggering aspect for 
child participation and not age.
746
 
8. The ICC and actors involved shall seek guidance from the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child when interpreting the principles of the best 
interests and evolving capacities.
747
 




10. The limitation of access for children to the ICC cannot be justified on 





A presumption of the child’s capability to participation should generally prevail. 
This presupposes respect for the evolving capacities which is indispensable in order 
to enable the individual child to participate to the greatest extent possible. 
 
Recommendation 2 
Critical monitoring is required in order to ensure that the child is recognised as a 
holder of independent rights. 
 
In light of the first and second recommendation it is to be remembered that child 
participation before the ICC has only recently commenced. Future ICC proceedings 
can be expected to also involve children, in particular as long as there is no 
international judicial alternative for the child who wants to participate in criminal 
proceedings or claim reparations for harm suffered as a result of an international 
crime. In order to ensure that child participation does not contravene the best 
interests and evolving capacities of the child, a comprehensive assessment of 
procedural particularities, in particular potential risks but also benefits of child 
participation, are to be defined. This comprehensive overview aims to enable all 
persons involved, including the child, to assess the advantages and disadvantages 
prior to their participation. A presumption of the child’s capability to participate 
thereby aims to ensure that the child is not overlooked as a potential participant in 
international proceedings. Critical monitoring mechanisms should hereby carry the 
task of ensuring that the child is recognised as a holder of independent rights. 
Failure to do so should be spotted and made public. Research should therefore 
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examine whether, for instance, monitoring mechanisms are available under the 
existing institutions, such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child or whether 
there is a need to set up a distinct institution which may also operate independent 
from ICC proceedings and being mandated to monitor child participation also in 
other than the criminal and reparation proceedings before the International Criminal 
Court. 
 
Various chapters also underline that the participation of children can give rise to 
conflicts of interests between the child and his or her parent(s). While there might 
be instances in which a child indeed wishes and is entitled to participate, even 
without the consent or against the will of next-of-kin, research should analyse how 
and to what extent international proceedings need to take into account that the child, 
while recognised as having an independent legal status from adults, is (usually) also 
part of a family. Despite the fact that the legal status of the child is complex and 
challenging and inherent to this status are tensions between the rights of parents and 
children but also the rights of defenders, research should examine how these 
tensions and challenges, which are likely to remain, can be balanced without 
negatively affecting the interests of the parties involved.  
 
Recommendation 3 
ICC proceedings should be more accessible to those children who wish to 
participate in criminal and/or reparation proceedings. 
 
Recommendation 4 
The ICC should publish child participation statistics in order to promote 
transparency. In addition, the child-specific benefits/outcomes of participation 
should also be publicly pronounced. 
 
As regards the third recommendation, it is stated that accessibility for child 
participants presupposes inter alia that clarity exists as regards how the ICC 
proceedings are accessible. While selected documents, such as the UN Handbook 
for Professionals and Policymakers on Justice in matters involving child victims 
and witnesses of crime or the Council of Europe Guidelines on Justice in Matters 
involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime provide useful guidance in 
determining some of the procedural particularities, the overall use of these 
documents is limited due to their primary focus on domestic proceedings, and in 
particular judicial proceedings which are accessible during peacetime.  
 
The need therefore remains to establish a guiding document on child participation 
in international criminal/reparation proceedings which are held during or in the 
aftermath of an armed conflict or large-scale violence. This guiding document 
should in particular be accessible to all stakeholders and provide transparent 
guidance on child participation. These guidelines should specifically address the 








the ICC itself does not include a transparent child focus in its procedural regulations, 
such an international guiding document should be referred to as the minimum 
standard for child participation in order to promote and ensure transparency in 
decision making.  
 In relation to the fourth recommendation it is stated that, as long as the current 
machinery of child participation in ICC proceedings remains in the status quo, the 
ICC should publish child participation statistics in order to promote transparency to 
the greatest extent possible. Such statistics should not be limited to the actual 
amount of children who participate or whose applications for participation have 
been rejected. The statistics should also make information available on the practical 
difficulties children face when seeking access or participate. Furthermore, 
additional statistics which provide sufficient research material is needed on what 
children as beneficiaries of reparation awards expect to receive and what their 
specific needs are during or in the aftermath of conflict situations. While 
educational training, health care and shelter might be the most predominant needs 
of children, future research should establish more precisely and in particular context 
related which forms of reparations could adequately remedy the suffering of the 
child. Knowing the particular impacts of conflict situations, research should 
therefore establish how children as international legal actors can gain redress in a 
child-friendly manner. 
 
Based upon the statistics it can then be seen whether, in relation to which 
procedural aspects and to what extent a response in law and practice is necessary in 
order to accommodate child participation when children seek access and participate 
in the course of the proceedings. In addition, the child-specific benefits/outcomes of 
participation should also be publicly pronounced. Such practice could, at least to a 
certain extent, bring clarity into the thus far rather unpredictable flow and 
implications of child participation. 
 
Recommendation 5 
Child participation in ICC proceedings should not be limited to consultation of the 
child but include active participation of the child participant. 
 
The fifth recommendation aims to stimulate research which provides further 
justification for an active participation of the child. This active participation may 
take place in different forms, taking the individual developmental status of the child 
into account. Furthermore, the implications of different cultural backgrounds might 
also be an important factor when establishing the adequate modalities for active 
participation. Future research should therefore, amongst other things, also address 
the implications of different cultural backgrounds of the child on his/her needs, but 
also the child’s capabilities when involved in a procedural capacity. Different 
cultural backgrounds might, for instance, need to be taken into account when a 
particular hierarchical relationship exists between children and adults. After all, 









truthful testimony. Raising allegations against an adult and providing testimony on 
alleged crimes might, for instance, be particularly difficult for minor witnesses 
when their cultural background does not allow them to raise their voices against 
adults or make accusations against adults. In addition to the research focusing on 
the particular needs of children, it should also be examined to what extent the 
parties involved (such as judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers, legal representatives 
and psycho-social staff) could benefit from more child-tailored training in order to 
be properly prepared to address the child in a child-sensitive manner in the court 
room. 
 
The aim of active participation is, however, at the same time to be viewed critically. 
It is repeatedly pointed out throughout the research that the participation of the child 
might give rise to tension between child protection and the rights of defendants. 
Research should therefore also examine how to balance these two seemingly 
conflicting interests and propose procedural modalities on how to properly address 
the need of the child for protection, his/her limited autonomy, the right to 
participation and the evolving capacities of the child on the one side, and the right 
of the accused to receive a fair trial on the other side.  
 
Recommendation 6 
The legal status of the child should be recognised as not being a static concept, but 
constantly influenced by the evolving capacities of the individual child. 
 
Recommendation 7 
The capacity of the individual child should be the triggering aspect for child 
participation and not age. 
 
The sixth recommendation aims to remind all actors who engage with children in 
the course of the proceedings that the legal status of the child is inextricable linked 
with the evolving capacities of the child. The practice of the ICC, as mirrored in the 
first decisions before the ICC, established that the Court’s understanding of, in 
particular, the principles of the best interests and the evolving capacities of the child 
– the core principles relating to children’s participation – reflects a rather restrictive 
approach of the Court and limited recognition of the child as a legal subject with 
evolving legal autonomy. This practice thereby established that the Court, including 
the various organs next to the competent Chambers, needs guidance on how to 
involve children in a child-sensitive manner in order to fill the current omissions 
and lack of child-specific understanding. 
 
The practical difficulties of many children being supported by their parents or legal 
guardians in the proceedings before the International Criminal Court gave rise to 
the question whether others should be recognised as being competent to act on 
behalf of the child. Research is therefore needed to examine inter alia under which 








including non-governmental organisations, such as Save the Children or War Child, 
should be recognised as being appropriate and legally competent to act on behalf of 
a child.  
 
As regards the seventh recommendation, it is underlined once more that age itself 
should not be decisive for including or excluding children from participation in ICC 
proceedings. Research is therefore needed which focusses in detail on the overall 
criteria which should be applied when deciding upon the capability of the child to 
participate in international criminal and/or reparation proceedings. While guidance 
on these aspects could have been expected to be available under the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications 
Procedure, one will rather be disappointed. Even if Article 2 of the Optional 
Protocol explicitly refers to the best interests, age and maturity of the child, it is not 
further explained how these factors are taken into account in order to ensure that 
child participation is in accordance with the evolving capacities of the individual 
child. Aside from the focus of this research, it is noted that the effectiveness of a 
complaint procedure under the CRC is expected to be limited due to the lack of a 
sufficiently child-focused Optional Protocol. Such criticism is based on the fact that 
the provisions are rather generally formulated and constitute mainly copies of the 
provisions of the existing UN complaint mechanisms – mechanisms which have, to 
date, mostly been relied upon by adult complainants and not children. 
 Moreover, even if coming into force, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
will – like the Committees under the other UN Human Rights Treaty mechanisms – 
be limited in addressing and if necessary criticising the legal status of the child 
under national law. If however, national proceedings fail to recognise children’s 
legal status and the accompanying procedural rights and need for protection – a 
scenario which is not unlikely in particular in conflict regions – the Committee will 
be limited to assess the respective shortcomings but cannot provide children with an 
international avenue to justice where their rights could be enforced. Against this 
background it is the more important that not age itself but the capacity of the 
individual child constitutes the triggering aspect for child participation.  
 
Recommendation 8 
The ICC and actors involved shall seek guidance from the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child when interpreting the principles of the best interests and evolving 
capacities. 
 
The entire research has stipulated that the assessment of the individual child’s best 
interests and evolving capacities should be decisive in enabling or preventing the 
child from participating in ICC proceedings. This implies per definition that the 
participation of the child may, indeed, be limited. What, however, is to be 
understood under the child’s capacity to be capable of participating has not yet been 
fully researched. Transparent reasoning on whether or not allowing the child to 









takers to argue whether and in particular why a child is capable or incapable of 
participating. 
 
Accordingly, as long as a more transparent understanding and assessment of the 
best interests and evolving capacities principles is not available, the eight 
recommendation aims to encourage the ICC and actors involved to seek guidance 
from the Committee on the Rights of the Child when interpreting the principles of 
the best interests and evolving capacities. Bearing in mind the lack of a clearly 
established standard of interpretation concerning these two core principles of child 
participation, further research is not only indispensable in order to promote the 
development of child-sensitive ICC proceedings, but also to strengthen children 
being universally recognised as not being human beings of the future but as human 
beings entitled to immediately benefit from their child- specific rights and 




A legal aid scheme needs to be developed providing for pro bono legal aid for 
minors.  
 
The request of the ninth recommendation finds it justification in the fact that a child, 
being usually financially dependent on adults, may simply be prevented from 
relying on the right to a remedy when pro bono legal aid is not available. As the 
right to a remedy constitutes a human right, and since human rights are inclusive of 
all human beings, children should be viewed as having unlimited legal capacity 
with regard to the enforcement of this right in the case of rights violations during 
conflict situations without being prevented from relying on this right due to 
financial shortcomings. Accordingly, international law should promote equal justice 
with regard to the recognition of the legal status and legal capacity of all human 
beings with the additional ingredient of pro bono legal aid for minor participants. 
Research should therefore analyse how, for instance, funding mechanisms could be 
introduced in order to ensure a sufficiently equipped financial budget to represent 
children on a pro bono basis. 
 
Recommendation 10 
The limitation of access for children to the ICC cannot be justified on the basis of 
judicial economy if not equally applied towards adults. 
 
The status quo of the international legal status of the child – as far as children’s 
substantive protection is concerned – can be characterised as a decently established 
legal status with a broad range of legal protection provided for under international 
law. The status quo of the international procedural legal status of the child, on the 
other side, remains at an early stage which requests further research and more 








 When further developing the procedural legal status of the child, it is 
indispensable to underpin that childhood should be seen as an independent legal 
status – instead of a phase which prepares children for adulthood. The latter 
perspective prevents focusing on the procedural rights of children during childhood. 
Accordingly, future research should ensure that children should not be seen as mini 
adults but as independent legal subjects of law. In light of the foregoing, the tenth 
recommendation aims to underline that grounds for exclusion of child participation, 
such as judicial economy, do not constitute a valid justification if not being equally 
applied to adults. Instead, such a rigid exclusion of only children discriminates 












A child who has been victimised during an armed conflict or large-scale violence 
does not only face the challenge to heal from the immediate suffering caused to his 
or her physical or psychological well-being. Instead, the child also has to cope with 
the often traumatising experiences of conflict situations in the long term. Separation 
from family or even the loss of family members are just two instances which are 
likely to have consequences that a child will be confronted with during and in the 
aftermath of the armed conflict or large-scale violence. 
 
International law, in particular the protection of children during and in the aftermath 
of armed conflict, is reflected in numerous child-specific international legal 
documents. In addition to children’s substantive protection, the status of children 
seems to have gained another component: the child as procedural player. This is 
because children have increasingly participated not only in criminal proceedings 
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, but also in proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court. Whether the child is also in need of particular 
procedural protection as a result of being a child, has not yet been comprehensively 
addressed under international law and is therefore the subject of this research. 
 
Taking into account the serious lack of international regulation concerning the 
procedural status of the child in international criminal proceedings, the research aim 
is twofold: Firstly, it analyses whether and to what extent the proceedings are 
sufficiently child-sensitive. Secondly, a lack of child sensitivity might lead to child 
participation which cannot be considered to be in the best interests of the child. 
Consequently, where necessary, this research aims to establish whether additional 
child-specific regulation and awareness is necessary in order to adequately 
accommodate the particular needs of the child. It thereby also aims to assess 
whether it is at all possible that ICC proceedings are sufficiently child-sensitive. If 
not, it might be necessary to reconsider the possibility that children participate. To 
summarise the above, the concrete objective of this research reads as follows: 
 
The research aims to provide informed insights into whether and to what 












In light of this research aim, the problem statement reads as follows: 
 
To what extent is the ICC procedural framework child-sensitive taking 
account of the evolving capacities of the child? 
 
With a view to shedding light on this problem statement, some concrete research 
questions have been formulated that guide the evaluation of the different capacities 
in which children participate. In sum, this research addresses child participation in 
the following five procedural capacities: the child witness, the child participant, the 
child perpetrator, the child of an (alleged) perpetrator and the child claimant. 
 
While Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines children as 
human beings below the age of eighteen years, this research is not led by an explicit 
age limitation of young adults as the author is of the view that a case-by-case 
analysis is necessary in order to determine whether a participant can be considered a 
child participant. Based on the above, the term child participant is neither 
understood to be limited to infants and young children, nor does the current 
understanding of the term exclude young persons above the age of eighteen years 
who are in their early twenties but who suffered harm as a child. Both adolescents 
in their teenager years and young persons who have reached majority at the time of 
their involvement in ICC proceedings, might indeed qualify as child participants 
within the ambit of this research.  
 
Also important to note, is that the assessment of the best interests of the child is not 
limited to a legal assessment and should generally be made on a case-by-case basis. 
This research, however, does not aim to provide a definite answer to the 
overreaching question of whether child participation in the proceedings is in the 
best interests of the child. It is limited to providing an assessment as far as the legal 
aspects are concerned concerning all actors involved, in particular the judges, when 
deciding on whether or not children should participate. The limitation to an 
examination of the child sensitivity from a legal perspective also explains why this 
research does not try to give a final and definite conclusion on whether child 
participation should generally be encouraged or not. 
 
The substantive part of the book is divided into three parts. Pursuant to the primary 
aim of this research (the examination of the child-specific procedural particularities 
and the child-sensitivity of the ICC procedure), Part I (criminal proceedings) and 
Part II (reparation proceedings) address the procedural particularities of the child 
participant. Both parts focus on the question of whether and to what extent ICC 
proceedings are child-sensitive. The analysis of the law and practice focusses in 
particular on the question: to what extent procedural insensitivities exist when 
children access and are involved in ICC proceedings. Pursuant to the second 
research aim (to determine whether there is a need for child-specific regulation), the 









provide not only an overview of the procedural rights and protection of the child, 
but also to scrutinise those fields in which additional procedural regulation, child-
focused awareness and practice is needed. As the procedural particularities might 
vary depending on the specific procedural capacity in which children are involved, 
each capacity is addressed in a separate chapter.  
 
Chapter Two analyses the law and practice with regard to the child witness. 
Particular attention is paid to the law and practice of the SCSL and the ICC. The 
child, as bystander, victim, or even perpetrator of international crimes, may qualify 
as an important witness in international criminal proceedings. Due to the usually 
huge numbers of witnesses of international crimes, the child is more likely to be 
called to the witness stand only when crimes were committed directly towards 
him/her. Two issues which received particular attention at the ICC concern the 
difficulties associated with age determination of children when called in particular 
as victim witness of the war crime of recruiting children below the age of fifteen 
years, and the impact of trauma on the credibility of the child witness. Another 
aspect which is addressed in relation to the child witness concerns the ability of the 
child to provide informed consent for his or her participation as a witness in 
criminal proceedings. It is shown that, compared to the following procedural 
capacities of the child, the child witness capacity constitutes the only one which has 
also played a role in other international criminal proceedings, namely those before 
the ICTY and the SCSL. Consequently, in contrast to the remaining analysis, only 
the research on the child witness capacity could rely on more extensive previous 
international court practice. Remarkably, while the other capacities clearly restrict 
the qualification of the child to the age of the individual child, this is not the case 
with regard to the child witness. This capacity rather includes all young people who 
were witness to international crimes. As a consequence, the procedural protection 
granted is neither limited to those below the age of eighteen, nor to children above a 
certain minimum age. Instead, protection is also applied to witnesses above the 
internationally recognised standard of eighteen years of age as codified in article 1 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child – thus, protection is not dependent on 
the child status.  
 
Chapter Three focuses on the child as victim participant. For the first time in the 
history of international criminal law, victims, including children, are allowed to 
participate in criminal proceedings at the International Criminal Court. Children can 
thereby pursue their personal interests, independent of a prosecutorial or defence 
strategy. The chapter examines child-specific procedural particularities which are 
above all the result of the child’s limited legal capacity. Questions are pursued 
relating to the ability to file an application on his/her own behalf or the possibility 
of being represented by a legal representative in the course of the proceedings. 
 This chapter presents the procedural requirements the child has to comply with 
in order to be recognised as a victim participant in criminal proceedings. Court 








applicants - a distinction which is not provided for in the Rome Statute or its Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. Alongside this distinction, various Chambers 
introduced that child applicants have to comply with requirements in addition to the 
ones provided for in Rule 85 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence in 
order to be considered for the status of victim participant. Furthermore, in contrast 
to the procedural capacity of the child witness, the age of the child applicant has 
repeatedly been relied upon by various Chambers (with no mention in the Rome 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) when deciding upon the legal 
capacity of the child to file an application for participation on his or her own behalf. 
A coherent established practice in relation to the legal capacity of the child to file an 
application for participation is, however, still absent. Subsequently, attention is paid 
to the practical difficulties faced by the child applicant which arise when filing an 
application for participation, such as proof of identity and kinship or legal 
guardianship. 
 Once acknowledged as victim participants in proceedings, the participation of 
children can take place in various forms. The analysis therefore also discusses the 
possibility that a child appears in person before the Court.  
 Another aspect analysed in light of the practice of the ICC concerning child 
participants is gender. The practice of various Chambers alludes that whether a 
child is a boy or a girl can give rise to procedural implications based on gender. 
After all, not recognising that girls who have been recruited solely for the purpose 
of sexual violence can qualify as child soldiers within the sense of the recruitment 
crime entails the risk of impunity as regards the crimes perpetrated against these 
victims. This is because these crimes are likely to fall outside the scope of the war 
crime of sexual violence as codified in the Rome Statute. 
 Two additional interrelated aspects are the representation of the child and the 
provision of legal aid. While the Court seems to prefer the common legal 
representation of children, such a generalised approach cannot be found in relation 
to the provision of legal aid to children.  
 
Chapter Four looks at the possibility of the procedural capacity of the child 
perpetrator and the procedural capacity of the child of a(n) (alleged) perpetrator. It 
addresses the international practice in regard to these two capacities. The 
participation of child soldiers in hostilities is a well-known and continuing reality. 
Despite the existence of child perpetrators, their international prosecution has only 
been possible - though limited to those children aged between fifteen and eighteen 
years at the time of alleged crime commission - without ever having been initiated, 
before the SCSL. By excluding the jurisdiction on persons below the age of 
eighteen from the mandate of the ICC (Article 26 Rome Statute), the establishment 
of the International Criminal Court brought the discussion on whether prosecuting 
minors before the ICC to an end. 
 Chapter Four also highlights selected procedural particularities in relation to the 
implications for the child of a parent being prosecuted by the Court. In contrast to 









When a parent is involved as an alleged perpetrator or has been convicted by the 
ICC, the detention and imprisonment can give rise to not only financial and social 
implications for a child, but is also likely to bring up questions regarding the 
amount of and entitlement to family visits – aspects which have not been dealt with 
in the Rome Statute or its Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
 
Subsequently, Part II addresses the child in international reparatory justice 
mechanisms. Chapter Five discusses the law and practice of the ICC regarding the 
child claimant who is a victim of the crimes falling within the jurisdictional 
mandate of the ICC.  
 The first decisions of the Court in relation to the child participant already 
anticipate various procedural aspects in relation to the access of the child claimant. 
In addition, one can allude from the practice of the European Court of Human 
Rights, which is experienced in reparation claims, that the ICC is also likely to be 
confronted with the question of whether, and to what extent, statutory limitations 
should be applied when a child files a reparation request? Considering that 
reparations for gross human rights violations and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law were not provided for on a statutory basis prior to the 
establishment of the ICC, it is not surprising that the Court is also faced with the 
question of which forms of reparations are to be awarded to the child? Bearing in 
mind the huge numbers of potential child claimants (which have already confronted 
the Court in the Lubanga case with practical difficulties prior to awarding 
reparations), it is also feasible that the Court will need to establish eligibility criteria. 
 The last challenge addressed in this chapter - perhaps even the biggest challenge 
for the ICC - relates to the fact that the Court will need to develop an effective 
implementation mechanism in order to ensure that the child, in the end, benefits 
from reparation awards. 
 
Finally, Part III provides a concluding and comparative evaluation of the 
procedural capacities of the child in the proceedings before the ICC. Chapter Six 
connects and assesses the core conclusions reached within each chapter and offers 
some overreaching reflections on the position of the child as a procedural actor in 
the criminal and reparation proceedings before the International Criminal Court. 
The research concludes with a view to the future, and in particular calls for further 
research and procedural regulation of the procedural particularities in relation to 






PARTICIPATIE VAN KINDEREN IN DE PROCEDURE 
VOOR HET INTERNATIONAAL STRAFHOF 






Een kind dat slachtoffer is geworden ten tijde van een gewapende strijd of 
grootschalig geweld wordt niet alleen geconfronteerd met de uitdaging om van het 
directe psychologische en fysieke leed te helen. Tegelijkertijd dient het kind 
gedurende het hele leven te leren omgaan met de vaak traumatiserende ervaringen. 
Scheiding van de familie of het verlies van familieleden zijn slechts twee 
voorbeelden van mogelijk consequenties van een gewapende strijd of grootschalig 
geweld voor het kind. 
 
Het internationale recht, in het bijzonder de bescherming van kinderen ten tijde van 
of na afloop van een gewapende conflict omvat talrijke kind-specifieke regelingen. 
In aanvulling op de materieel rechtelijke bescherming van het kind schijnt de 
rechtsstatus van het kind een verdere component verkregen te hebben: het kind als 
procedurele deelnemer. De reden hiervoor is dat het kind steeds meer deelneemt in 
internationale juridische procedures. Niet alleen in de context van de internationaal 
strafrechtelijke procedure voor het Speciale Hof voor Sierra Leone, maar tevens in 
de procedures bij het Internationaal Strafhof. De vraag of het kind in aanvulling op 
zijn materieel rechtelijke bescherming tevens behoefte heeft aan een kind-specifieke 
procedurele bescherming omdat het een kind is, is tot heden niet omvattend 
beantwoord binnen het internationale recht. Deze vraag staat centraal in het 
voorliggend onderzoek. 
 
Rekening houdend met het feit dat er een ernstig gebrek is aan internationale 
regelgeving betreffende de procedurele status van het kind in een internationale 
strafprocedure, omvat dit onderzoek twee centrale doelstellingen: ten eerste wordt 
er geanalyseerd of en in welke omvang internationale strafprocedures voldoende 
kind-specifiek zijn. Ten tweede, een gebrek aan kind specificiteit kan leiden tot 
deelname van het kind, welke niet in het belang van het kind is. Dit onderzoek heeft 
tot doel vast te stellen of additionele kind-specifieke regelgeving en bewustzijn 
noodzakelijk is om de behoeften van het kind in de procedure adequaat te 
accommoderen. Hierbij beoordeelt het onderzoek tevens of het überhaupt mogelijk 
is dat de procedures bij het Internationaal Strafhof voldoende kind-specifiek kunnen 
zijn. Indien dit niet het geval is, is het wellicht noodzakelijk om de mogelijkheid 
kinderen deel te laten nemen te heroverwegen. Samenvattend kan de concrete 









Het onderzoek heeft tot doel een weloverwogen inzicht te geven ten aanzien 
van de vraag of en in welke omvang deelname aan de procedures bij het 
Internationaal Strafhof in het belang van het kind is. 
 
Indachtig deze doelstelling van het onderzoek, luidt de probleemstelling als volgt: 
 
In welke mate is het procedurele raamwerk van het Internationaal Strafhof 
voldoende kind-specifiek bij het in acht nemen van de zich ontwikkelende 
vermogens van het kind? 
 
Om nader toelichting te geven ten aanzien van deze probleemstelling werden 
concrete onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd, welke als richtlijn dienen voor een 
beoordeling van de verschillende capaciteiten waarin het kind participeert. 
Samenvattend kan worden vastgesteld, dat dit onderzoek de deelname van het kind 
in de volgende vijf procedurele capaciteiten analyseert: het kind als getuige, het 
kind als deelnemer, het kind als dader, het kind van een (vermeende) dader en het 
kind als eiser. 
 
Artikel 1 van het Kinderrechtenverdrag bepaalt dat ieder mens onder de achttien 
jaar een kind is. Dit onderzoek daarentegen, is niet gebaseerd op een dusdanig 
strikte leeftijdsbeperking. De auteur is van mening dat een case-by-base analyse 
noodzakelijk is om te bepalen of een procedurele deelnemer ook als kind deelnemer 
erkend mag worden. Uit het bovengenoemde volgt dat de term kind deelnemer 
binnen het kader van dit onderzoek zich niet beperkt tot kinderen onder de achttien 
jaar. De uitleg van de term in dit onderzoek sluit ook jonge volwassenen boven de 
achttien jaar, die schade hebben geleden tijdens hun jeugd, niet uit als kind 
deelnemer. Dit heeft tot gevolg dat zowel minderjarige pubers, maar ook jonge 
volwassenen die ten tijde van hun deelname aan de procedures bij het Internationaal 
Strafhof achttien jaar of ouder zijn zich kunnen kwalificeren als kind deelnemer 
binnen het kader van dit onderzoek. 
 
Tevens is het van belang te vermelden dat de beoordeling van het belang van het 
kind niet beperkt is tot een juridische analyse en op case-by-case basis dient 
uitgevoerd te worden. Dit onderzoek beoogt geen definitief antwoord op de vraag te 
formuleren of deelname van kinderen in de strafrechtelijke procedure bij het 
Internationaal Strafhof in het belang van het kind is. Het beperkt zich echter tot een 
analyse van de juridische aspecten welke van belang zijn voor alle betrokken 
partijen in de procedure, in het bijzonder rechters, die een beslissing dienen te 
nemen betreffende de vraag of kinderen wel of niet zouden moeten deelnemen. De 
beperking van onderzoek van de kind specificiteit vanuit een juridisch perspectief, 
verklaart in het bijzonder waarom het onderzoek niet tot doel heeft een definitief 
antwoord te geven ten aanzien van de vraag of participatie van kinderen in het 










Het boek is ingedeeld in drie delen. Overeenkomstig het primaire onderzoeksdoel 
(de analyse van de kind-specifieke procedurele bijzonderheden en de kind 
gevoeligheid van de procedure bij het Internationaal Strafhof), beschouwen Deel I 
(strafprocedure) en Deel II (schadevergoedingsprocedure) de procedurele 
bijzonderheden ten aanzien van de participatie van kinderen. Beide leggen de 
nadruk op de vraag of en in welke mate de procedures bij het Internationaal 
Strafhof kind-specifiek zijn. De analyse van de regelgeving en praktijk richt zich in 
het bijzonder op de volgende vraag: in welke mate bestaan er procedurele 
onachtzaamheden wanneer kinderen toegang tot het Hof zoeken of betrokken zijn 
bij een lopende procedure bij het Internationaal Strafhof. Op grond van de tweede 
onderzoeksdoelstelling (het bepalen of er een noodzaak is voor een kind-specifieke 
regelgeving), heeft de beschouwing van de procedurele status van het kind binnen 
iedere procesrechtelijke capaciteit, niet alleen tot doel een overzicht te bieden van 
de procedurele rechten en bescherming van het kind. Tevens wordt beoogt 
zorgvuldig te onderzoeken binnen welke gebieden aanvullende procedurele 
regelgeving, een kind georiënteerde bewustzijn en praktijk noodzakelijk is. 
Aangezien de procedurele bijzonderheden per specifieke procedurele capaciteit van 
elkaar kunnen afwijken, wordt ieder procesrechtelijke capaciteit in een 
afzonderlijke hoofdstuk nader onderzocht. 
 
Hoofdstuk Twee analyseert de regelgeving en praktijk ten aanzien van de kind 
getuige. In het bijzonder wordt aandacht besteed aan de regelgeving en praktijk van 
het Sierra Leone Tribunaal en het Internationaal Strafhof. Het kind als omstander, 
slachtoffer of zelfs dader van internationale misdrijven kan een belangrijke getuige 
zijn in internationale strafprocedures. Gezien de normaalgesproken grote aantallen 
van getuigen in internationale misdrijven, is men eerder geneigd het kind als 
getuige op te roepen indien het rechtstreeks slachtoffer is geworden van een 
internationaal misdrijf. Twee aspecten die binnen het Internationaal Strafhof 
bijzonder aandacht hebben ontvangen, hebben betrekking op het bepalen van de 
leeftijd van het kind in gevallen waar kinderen als getuigen werden opgeroepen 
(omdat zij tevens slachtoffer zijn van het oorlogsmisdrijf van het rekruteren van 
kinderen onder de vijftien jaar) en op de gevolgen van trauma op de 
geloofwaardigheid van de kind getuige. Een ander aspect van groot belang betreft 
het vermogen van het kind om een bewuste toestemming ten aanzien van zijn 
deelname als getuige in de strafprocedure te geven. Het is aangetoond dat 
vergeleken met andere procedurele capaciteiten van het kind, de capaciteit van de 
kind getuige de enige is welke tevens van belang was in andere internationale 
strafprocedures, namelijk de procedures bij het Joegoslavië Tribunaal en Sierra 
Leone Tribunaal. Derhalve, in tegenstelling tot bestaand onderzoek, kan slechts de 
analyse van het kind in de capaciteit van getuige rekenen op de praktijk van 
vroegere uitgebreide internationale straftribunalen. Het valt in deze samenhang op, 
dat de capaciteit van de kind getuige in tegenstelling tot de andere procedurele 
capaciteiten, niet is beperkt tot een bepaalde leeftijdsgrens. De procedurele 








internationaal misdrijf. Dit heeft tot gevolg dat de procedurele bescherming niet is 
beperkt tot getuigen onder de achttien jaar of boven een minimum leeftijd, op het 
moment van getuigenis. In tegendeel, procedurele bescherming werd ook getuigen 
geboden, die ouder dan achttien jaar (standaard van artikel 1 van het 
Kinderrechtenverdrag) waren op moment van getuigenis. Bescherming voor deze 
categorie van getuigen is derhalve niet afhankelijk van de kind status zoals 
genoemd in de zin van artikel 1 van het Kinderrechtenverdrag. 
 
In Hoofdstuk Drie staat het kind als participerend slachtoffer centraal. Voor de 
eerste keer in de geschiedenis van het internationaal strafrecht mogen slachtoffers, 
waaronder ook kinderen, deelnemen in de strafrechtelijke procedure bij het 
Internationaal Strafhof. Kinderen kunnen hierdoor hun eigen belangen nastreven, 
onafhankelijk van de strategie van de aanklager of verdediging. Het hoofdstuk 
onderzoekt de kind-specifieke procedurele bijzonderheden welke bovenal het 
gevolg zijn van de beperkte rechtsbekwaamheid van het kind. Centraal staan vragen 
ten aanzien van de bekwaamheid van het kind om zelfstandig een aanvraag tot 
participatie in te dienen en de mogelijkheid om tijdens de procedure 
vertegenwoordigd te worden door een advocaat. 
 Dit hoofdstuk legt de procedurele vereisten voor waaraan het kind dient te 
voldoen om erkend te worden als een participerend slachtoffer in de strafprocedure. 
Uit de praktijk van het Internationaal Strafhof blijkt dat het Hof onderscheid maakt 
tussen kinderen en andere aanvragers – een onderscheid dat niet is bepaald in het 
Statuut van Rome of in de procedure en bewijsregels van het Hof. Naast dit 
onderscheid hebben verschillende kamers van het hof extra vereisten waaraan 
kinderen dienen te voldoen ingevoerd, boven de reeds in Regel 85 van de procedure 
en bewijsregels van het Hof, om in aanmerking te komen voor de status van een 
participerend slachtoffer. Bovendien werd, in tegenstelling tot de procedurele 
capaciteit van de kind getuige, de leeftijd van de minderjarige aanvrager door 
verschillende kamers als reden genoemd om een beslissing te geven op de 
rechtsbekwaamheid van de minderjarige ten aanzien van zijn capaciteit om een 
aanvraag in te dienen in zijn eigen naam. Vermeld moet worden dat deze praktijk 
niet is voorgeschreven of geregeld door het Statuut van Rome en de procedure en 
bewijsregels van het Hof. Een coherente gevestigde praktijk ten aanzien van de 
rechtsbekwaamheid van het kind om zelfstandig een aanvraag tot participatie in te 
dienen, ontbreekt tot op heden. In aanvulling op de voorafgaande procedurele 
bijzonderheden onderzoekt dit hoofdstuk tevens de praktische problemen die zich 
voordoen wanneer het kind een aanvraag tot participatie wil indienen. Hieronder 
vallen bijvoorbeeld de noodzaak van het bewijzen van zijn identiteit en 
verwantschap, of wettelijke voogdijschap. 
 De participatie van kinderen kan plaatsvinden in verschillende vormen zodra het 
kind erkend wordt als deelnemend slachtoffer in de procedure bij het Internationaal 
Strafhof. Dit onderzoek behandelt derhalve ook de mogelijkheid dat het kind in 









 Een ander aspect dat nader onderzocht wordt indachtig de praktijk van het 
Internationaal Strafhof betreft het geslacht van het kind. Uit de praktijk van 
verschillende kamers blijk dat het geslacht van de minderjarige participant 
implicaties kan voortbrengen voor de procedure. Per slot van rekening, het niet 
erkennen van het feit dat ook meisjes, die uitsluitend werden gerekruteerd voor 
seksuele doeleinden of diensten, ook gekwalificeerd kunnen worden als 
kindsoldaten, binnen het kader van de misdaad van rekruteren, kan verregaande 
gevolgen hebben. Het gevaar van straffeloosheid van de dader is hier van bijzonder 
belang. Dit is omdat deze daad niet binnen de categorie van het oorlogsmisdrijf van 
seksuele geweld valt, zoals gecodificeerd in het Statuut van Rome. 
 
Twee andere onderling samenhangende aspecten die nader onderzocht worden zijn 
de vertegenwoordiging van het kind door een advocaat en het genieten van 
rechtsbijstand. Terwijl het Internationaal Strafhof een voorkeur schijnt te hebben 
voor de procedurele vertegenwoordiging van het kind door een advocaat, is een 
dergelijk algemene aanpak niet zichtbaar ten aanzien van het garanderen van 
rechtsbijstand voor de minderjarige. 
 
Hoofdstuk Vier beschouwt de mogelijkheid van de procedurele capaciteit van de 
kinddader en de procedurele capaciteit van het kind van een verdachte of dader. In 
het bijzonder gaat dit hoofdstuk in op de bestaande internationale praktijk van deze 
twee procedurele capaciteiten. De deelname van kindsoldaten in 
gevechtshandelingen is algemeen erkend en een dagelijkse realiteit. Ondanks het 
bestaan van kind daders, bestond de mogelijkheid tot een internationale 
strafrechtelijke vervolging uitsluitend bij het Sierra Leone Tribunaal. Alleen het 
Statuut van het Sierra Leone Tribunaal biedt de mogelijkheid minderjarigen, welke 
ten tijde van de vermeende daad tussen de vijftien en de achttien jaar waren, 
strafrechtelijk te vervolgen. In de praktijk van het Sierra Leone Tribunaal werd 
echter nooit gebruik gemaakt van deze procedurele mogelijkheid. In tegenstelling 
tot deze procedurele mogelijkheid sluit Artikel 26 van het Statuut van Rome de 
strafrechtelijke vervolging van minderjarigen bij het Internationaal Strafhof uit. De 
discussie of minderjarigen door dit Hof vervolgd zouden kunnen worden is hiermee 
tot een einde gebracht. 
 Het vierde hoofdstuk vestigt tevens de aandacht op de procedurele 
bijzonderheden ten aanzien van de gevolgen voor kinderen wier ouders 
strafrechtelijk vervolgd worden door het Internationaal Strafhof. In tegenstelling tot 
de voorgaande procedurele capaciteiten, is de leeftijd van het kind hier van minder 
groot belang. De vervolging van maar ook veroordeling en aansluitende 
gevangenisstraf voor een ouder kan zowel financiële als ook sociale gevolgen voor 
de minderjarige hebben. Tevens kunnen er vragen opkomen ten aanzien van het 
recht op en aantal van familiebezoeken. De regeling van familiebezoeken wordt 
echter niet behandeld binnen het Statuut van Rome of binnen de procedure en 









Aansluitend aan de voorafgaande analyse betracht het onderzoek de status van de 
minderjarige binnen schadevergoedingsprocedures van internationale aard. 
Hoofdstuk Vijf stelt de regelgeving en praktijk van het Internationaal Strafhof ten 
aanzien van de minderjarige eiser die slachtoffer is geworden van een misdrijf 
binnen de jurisdictie van het Hof, ter discussie. 
 Reeds de eerste beslissingen van het Hof met betrekking tot de minderjarige 
deelnemer anticiperen dat er een aantal procedurele aspecten in verband met de 
toegang tot het Hof bestaan voor de minderjarige die aanspraak wil maken op 
schadevergoeding. Men dient verder in gedachten te houden dat het niet eerder 
mogelijk was om als individu een schadevergoedingsklacht in te dienen indien 
schade werd geleden door internationale misdrijven. Derhalve zal het Internationaal 
Strafhof zich tevens moeten buigen over rechtsvragen ten aanzien van de vorm van 
schadevergoedingen en in het bijzonder de vraag of de minderjarige een bijzondere 
vorm van schadevergoeding behoeft. Bovendien is te verwachten dat gezien het 
groot aantal potentiële minderjarige eisers (het Hof heeft reeds kennis gemaakt met 
de praktische moeilijkheden voorafgaande het toekennen van schadevergoeding in 
de Lubanga zaak) ertoe zal leiden dat het Hof eisen zal introduceren om in 
aanmerking te komen voor kind-specifieke vormen van schadevergoeding. 
 De laatste uitdaging, wellicht de grootste voor het internationaal Strafhof, betreft 
het feit dat het Internationaal Strafhof een effectief implementatie mechanisme zou 
moeten ontwikkelen om te kunnen bewerkstelligen dat het kind op den duur 
daadwerkelijk profijt heeft van de toegekende schadevergoeding.  
 
Ten slotte omvat Deel III een concluderende en vergelijkende beoordeling van de 
procedurele capaciteiten van het kind binnen de procedures bij het Internationaal 
Strafhof. Hoofdstuk Zes verbindt en evalueert de belangrijkste conclusies van ieder 
hoofdstuk en biedt een overkoepelende reflectie op de rechtsstatus van de 
minderjarige als procedurele deelnemer in de straf- en schadevergoedingsprocedure 
bij het Internationaal Strafhof. Het onderzoek sluit af met een zicht op de toekomst 
en vraagt in het bijzonder om verder onderzoek en procedurele regelgeving van de 
procedurele bijzonderheden ten aanzien van participatie van minderjarigen in de 
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